Afghanistan and Doha, Czechoslovakia and Munich
Alfredo Langa Herrero
Lecturer, researcher and consultant. Development, humanitarian action and conflict sensitivity. International PhD
On 30 September 1938, the so-called Munich Agreement was signed between Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, which was a de facto betrayal of the Czechoslovakia of the time. The treaty, which involved the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany, had French and British approval. Their top leaders, édouard Daladier and Arthur Neville Chamberlain, made a pact with the devil, then the National Socialist and Fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini, believing that this would put an end to the expansionist ambitions of both leaders and their hordes of fanatical followers, some of whom were professors and eminent intellectuals. As is well known, neither that pact nor subsequent ones could stop the greatest war tragedy of the 20th century.
I recall these events because in a way, and being cautious about territorial, contextual and historical differences, these agreements remind me of the Doha pact of 20 February 2020 between the US and the Taliban militia. The treaty called "Agreement to bring peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which is not recognised by the US as a state and known as the Taliban, and the US" has four main parts:
The agreement specifies that the first two parts pave the way for the third and fourth, and that the Taliban militia commits to abide by it in their territories until the inter-Afghan talks result in the formation of a government after the departure of foreign forces. In addition, the signatories undertake to release prisoners held by them (5,000 Taliban held by the Afghan government and 1,000 held by the Taliban).
In short, the Taliban pledged to enter into political life in Afghanistan by participating in peace negotiations with the US-recognised Afghan government and, in addition, guaranteed that they would not support or harbour groups or individuals who might threaten the US and its allies. In return, the latter undertook to leave the country within a transparent timetable. In this regard, the agreement specified that, by April 2021 at the latest, all US and allied military forces, as well as non-diplomatic personnel, private security contractors, trainers, consultants and other support personnel were to leave the country. In addition, a detailed timetable was set out by which such departure was to occur gradually, and within 135 days of the agreement, US troops were to be reduced to 8,600.
With regard to the peace talks and the exchange of prisoners, the Afghan government of former President Ghani signed a decree in August last year to release the first 1,000 Taliban militiamen, of the 5,000 planned, on the basis of their age, state of health and time served. The Taliban, on the other hand, attached conditions to the release of the prisoners in their possession and their spokesman, Suhail Shaheen, only referred to the release of the prisoners identified on their "list". On this point, both sides are doing their part, as the agreements do not specify the criteria for release.
According to the agreement, in June 2020 the US military forces were reduced to 8,600 and in November they were already less than 5,000. In January 2021, the Trump administration reduced US forces to 2,500, and in May, new President Joe Biden announced the unconditional withdrawal of all US forces. At this point, the Americans strictly adhered to the Doha agreement.
During that month, the Taliban launched an offensive that would increase their control over territory and border crossings, although this was in breach of the agreements regarding the Afghan peace process and inter-Afghan negotiations. Despite this, US and NATO forces continued with their troop evacuation plan.
The Taliban offensive continued throughout June, and by 9 July they controlled 90 of the country's 398 districts. By 29 July, the Taliban controlled 105 districts. By 6 August they had taken the country's first provincial capital, and by 13 August they held 132 districts and several towns. By 15 August, they controlled 345 districts and almost all of the territory except for the capital, which was taken on 16 August.
Needless to say, the Taliban have not complied with the third and fourth parts of the agreement, which committed them to a ceasefire and peace talks. By contrast, the US and its allies did comply with the second part of the agreement, which called on them to leave the country. So the militiamen waited quietly for the foreign armies to leave before reneging on the Doha agreement and taking over the country - something that does not seem improvised.
What seems unlikely now is that the Taliban will comply with the first part or condition of the Doha agreement, namely that "the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which is not recognised by the US as a state and known as the Taliban" will prevent armed or terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, from threatening the security of the US and its allies on Afghan soil. And the same goes for its willingness to send such groups a clear message not to try, to monitor their financing and recruitment activities, or to deny them visas or residence permits and to grant them asylum. Ultimately, everything depends on the goodwill of the Taliban and their commitment to abide by the signed agreements. Let us hope.
Going back to the Munich agreement of 1938, let us remember that only France and Britain kept their side of the bargain, at the expense of the Czechs, and that the Germans finally decided to invade Czechoslovakia a year later. Let us hope that this comparison between agreements is unfortunate and that the Taliban will honour their commitments, although history is sometimes stubborn.