Afghanistan Crisis : Current Developments

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy:?In Brief

Afghanistan emerged as a significant U.S. foreign policy concern in 2001, when the?United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military?campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored and?supported it. In the intervening 19 years, the United States has suffered over 22,000?military casualties (including around 2,400 fatalities) in Afghanistan and Congress has?appropriated approximately $144 billion for reconstruction and security forces there.In that time, an elected?Afghan government has replaced the Taliban; improvement in most measures of human development is limited;?toward activities Afghan government representatives were not participants in U.S.-Taliban talks, leading some observers to?conclude that the United States would prioritize a military withdrawal over securing a political settlement that?preserves some of the social, political, and humanitarian gains made since 2001. After months of delays, on?September 12, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives officially met in Doha, Qatar, to begin their?first direct peace negotiations toward activities such a settlement, a significant moment with potentially dramatic?implications for the course of the ongoing Afghan conflict. Talks between the two sides continue but have not?made substantial progress and remain complicated by a number of factors.

In light of the stalling of intra-Afghan talks, the United States appears to have intensified its efforts to broker an?intra-Afghan agreement. The United States reportedly produced a draft peace agreement to “jumpstart”?negotiations that includes a variety of options, including the establishment of an interim “transitional”?government, which Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has rejected. The culmination of these efforts was to be a?senior-level Afghan conference in Turkey planned for April 2021, but the Taliban refused to attend and continue?to reject participating in such a meeting. Observers speculate about what kind of political arrangement, if any,could satisfy both the elected Afghan government and the Taliban, who have not specified in detail their vision for?Afghanistan’s future beyond creating an “Islamic government.”

Afghan officials have sought to downplay the impact of the U.S. military withdrawal on their own forces’?capabilities, but some official U.S. assessments indicate that the withdrawal could lead to Taliban gains on the?battlefield. By many measures, the Taliban are in a stronger position now than at any point since 2001, controlling?as much as half of the country, though many once-public U.S. government metrics related to the conflict have?been classified or are no longer produced. Future changes in political arrangements and/or in the security?environment may in turn influence U.S. policymakers’ consideration of future levels and conditions of?development assistance. It is unclear to what extent, if at all, the prospect of continued U.S. assistance to?Afghanistan (which remains one of the world’s poorest countries) represents leverage over the Taliban.

Introduction

This report provides background information and analysis on U.S. policy in Afghanistan, with a?focus on the ongoing U.S. military withdrawal and its implications for a number of factors,?including:

? security dynamics and the ongoing conflict between the Afghan government and?the Taliban;?

? the social and political gains made in Afghanistan since 2001; and?

? intra-Afghan negotiations, which began in Doha, Qatar, in September 2020, but?appear to have since stalled.?

The report also provides information on questions about the future of U.S. development and?security aid to Afghanistan (which has totaled approximately $144 billion since 2001).

Background: U.S.-Taliban Agreement

After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral?agreement on February 29, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” guarantees: the withdrawal of?all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other?groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies.In the months after the agreement, several U.S. officials asserted that the Taliban were not?fulfilling their commitments under the accord, especially with regard to Al Qaeda (see text box?below). U.S. officials also described increased Taliban violence as “not consistent” with the?agreement. Although no provisions in the publicly available agreement address Taliban attacks?on U.S. or Afghan forces, the Taliban reportedly committed not to attack U.S. forces in non-public annexes accompanying the accord.Some lawmakers have raised questions about the?executive branch’s decision to classify these annexes.5In Section 1217 of the FY2021 National?Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-283), Congress directed the Administration to,?among other requirements, submit within 90 days after enactment and not less than every 120days thereafter, a report verifying that the Taliban is upholding its commitments under the?February 2020 accord.

U.S. Military Drawdown

The United States began withdrawing forces before the February 2020 agreement was reached?Dynamics Inany major changes to the two complementary U.S. missions in Afghanistan: counterterrorism and?training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces. However, some military officials implied at the?time that the reduced troop level ordered by President Trump might result in some adjustments to?U.S. operations and limits to U.S. capabilities. Many outside observers, including the?congressionally mandated Afghanistan Study Group, questioned the extent to which the United?States could perform both the training and counterterrorism missions at acceptable risk levels?with 2,500 forces.Afghan officials have sought to downplay the detrimental impact of the U.S. troop withdrawal?while emphasizing the need for continued U.S. financial assistance to Afghan forces. In a May?2021 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley said “bad?outcomes” are not “inevitable,” given?what he characterized as the strengths of?the Afghan government and military.Some other U.S. government assessments?are less positive: in its 2021 annual threat?assessment, the Office of the Director of?National Intelligence reported that “the?Afghan Government will struggle to hold?the Taliban at bay if the Coalition?withdraws support.”U.S. military?officials have said various options,?including remote training (which has?largely been in place since the onset of?the Covid-19 pandemic) or training?Afghan personnel in third countries, are?under consideration to continue?supporting Afghan forces.The?departure of U.S. contractors may also?pose short term threats to Afghan?capabilities, given Afghan forces’?reliance on contractor support for most?maintenance work. For example, in a?February 2021 report, the U.S. military?assessed that without DOD-funded?contractor support, no Afghan airframes?“can be sustained as combat effective for more than a few months.” U.S. military officials are?reportedly considering seeking authorization for airstrikes (likely launched from U.S. bases in the?Persian Gulf) against the Taliban in the event that Kabul or other major cities are at risk.Beyond the immediate effects on Afghan forces and their capabilities, a full U.S. military?withdrawal may have second- or third-order effects on the fragile Afghan state, especially when it?comes to local perceptions of U.S. intentions and of the impact of U.S. withdrawal on Afghan?forces. Some Afghans, recalling the complex, multi-sided civil war of the 1990s, have suggested?that their communities (and, often, their associated militias) may pursue more independent?courses of action if the Afghan government is unable to provide security in the context of the U.Swithdrawal.Some Afghan leaders have suggested that continued infighting among Afghan elites?may pose as much of a threat to the Afghan political system as the Taliban.Operations by the Taliban, whose strength has been estimated at 60,000 full-time fighters, against?Afghan government forces continue, including numerous attacks nationwide after the U.S.?withdrawal began on May 1. A major offensive by the Taliban in May 2021 prompted the United?States to launch airstrikes in support of Afghan government forces in southern Afghanistan’s?Helmand Province. The group controls or contexts more territory in 2021 than at any point since?2001 by many measures.

The United Nations mission in Afghanistan reported that while the number of civilian casualties?in 2020 fell below 10,000 for the first time since 2013, violence against civilians increased in the?months following the start of intra-Afghan negotiations in September 2020. Targeted attacks?have risen in recent months. The Taliban denied involvement in the January 2021 assassination of?female Supreme Court judges in Kabul and other attacks, but the United States and other?countries released a joint statement on January 31, 2021, charging that “the Taliban bears?responsibility for the majority of this targeted violence.”The Taliban also denied responsibility?for a May 8, 2021, attack targeting schoolgirls in a Kabul neighborhood populated mostly by?Hazaras (an ethnoreligious Shia minority); the attack killed more than and wounded nearly?That attack was not claimed by the regional Islamic State affiliate, though that group has?often targeted Afghan Hazaras.The Afghan government has prioritized a permanent ceasefire, which the Taliban have rejected,?though they have in recent years conducted three limited truces during religious holidays?(including in mid-May 2021). Many observers doubt the Taliban would agree to abandon?violence, arguably their main source of leverage, before an intra-Afghan political settlement,?Though targeted reductions in violence could pave the way for a more comprehensive ceasefire.

Intra-Afghan Talks and Efforts to Achieve a?Settlement

Intra-Afghan talks aimed at reaching a comprehensive peace settlement began in Doha, Qatar, In September 2020, representing a major step toward resolving the conflict. The two sides have met?sporadically in recent months, but appear to remain far apart on the two key issues that appear to?be central to talks—reducing violence and determining the future structure and orientation of the?Afghan state.The U.S.-Taliban agreement committed the Taliban to entering talks with the Afghan government?by March, but negotiations remained unscheduled for months amid complications including gridlock in Kabul due to the disputed September 2019 presidential election, delays to a prisoner?exchange between Taliban and the Afghan government, and ongoing violence. Afghan President?Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani’s electoral opponent and former partner in a unity?government, agreed in May 2020 to end their political impasse and appoint Abdullah as chairman?of the newly-created High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR) to oversee talks with the?Taliban.The prisoner exchange was completed in early September 2020, removing the main?obstacle to intra-Afghan talks, which began in Doha that month. The two sides have met?intermittently in recent months, with some describing the talks as stalled.Some doubt the Taliban’s trustworthiness and express concern that, in the absence of U.S.?military pressure, the group will have little incentive to comply with the terms of any agreementreached with Kabul.Some Afghan officials reportedly suspect the taliban of trying to “run out?the clock on the withdrawal of American troops,” remaining in negotiations long enough to?secure a full U.S. withdrawal, after which they will capitalize on their advantage on the battlefield?to seize control of the country by force. Still, at least some Afghans reportedly support “peace at?any cost” given the decades of conflict through which the country has suffered.

Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors

Regional dynamics, and the involvement of outside powers, directly affect the conflict in?Afghanistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan,?which has played an active, and by many accounts negative, role in Afghan affairs for decades.?Pakistan’s security services maintain ties to Afghan insurgent groups, most notably the Haqqani?Network.Afghan leaders, along with U.S. military commanders, have attributed much of the?insurgency’s power and longevity either directly or indirectly to Pakistani support.The Trump?Administration sought Islamabad’s assistance in U.S. talks with the Taliban after 2018, and U.S.?assessments of Taliban’s role have generally been more positive since. For example, Khalilzad?thanked Pakistan for releasing Baradar from custody in October 2018 and for facilitating the?travel of Taliban figures to talks in Doha, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin “expressed?gratitude” to his Pakistani counterpart in March 2021 for Pakistan’s “continued support for the?Afghan peace process.”Pakistani leaders assert, however, that their country will not host U.S.?bases after the military withdrawal from Afghanistan.Despite official Pakistani leadership’s statements to the contrary, Islamabad may view a weak and?destabilized Afghanistan as preferable to a strong, unified Afghan state (particularly one led by an?ethnic Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul; Pakistan has a large and restive Pashtun?minority). Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of over onemillion Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over?their shared 1,600-mile border.Pakistan’s security establishment, fearful of strategic?encirclement by India, apparently continues to view the Afghan Taliban as a relatively friendly?and reliably anti-India element in Afghanistan. India’s diplomatic and commercial presence in?Afghanistan—and U.S. rhetorical support for it—exacerbates Pakistani fears of encirclement.?India has been the largest regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction, but New Delhi has not?shown an inclination to pursue a deeper defense relationship with Kabul and, according to one?June 2021 media report, has “opened channels of communication” with Taliban leaders.Afghanistan maintains mostly cordial ties with its other neighbors, notably the post-Soviet states?of Central Asia, whose role in Afghanistan has been relatively limited but could increase.In the?past two years, multiple U.S. commanders have warned of increased levels of support for the Taliban from Russia and Iran, both of which have cited the Islamic State affiliate presence in?Afghanistan to justify their activities. Both were reported in 2020 to have been more directly?involved, including possibly supporting Taliban attacks against U.S. forces.Both nations were?opposed to the Taliban government of the late 1990s, but reportedly see the Taliban as a useful?point of leverage vis-à-vis the United States. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority?for China in the context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally.