Action Plan Frontex
FRONTEX – ACTION PLAN
The erosion of the European Commission’s authority necessitates a robust Frontex action plan to restore effective governance and border management. Here are key points to consider:
8. The principle of proportionality, enshrined in Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union, mandates that any action taken by EU institutions must be suitable, necessary, and not excessively burdensome relative to the objective pursued. As the guardian of the treaties, the European Commission ensures that member states comply with EU law, including the proportionality principle.
In the context of temporary border controls, the proportionality principle requires that such measures are justified by a genuine need, such as a significant threat to public policy or internal security, and that they are limited in duration and scope to what is strictly necessary. Given the vast number of annual border crossings into the EU (approximately 500 million) compared to the relatively smaller number of illegal migrants, the Commission must assess whether prolonged or extensive border controls are proportionate to the actual threat posed
If the Commission finds that a member state’s border controls are disproportionate, it can initiate infringement proceedings before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The conditions for such proceedings include demonstrating that the member state’s actions exceed what is necessary to achieve the intended objective and that they violate EU lawBy addressing these points, the Frontex action plan will not only reinforce the EU’s border security but also restore the European Commission’s authority and governance over migration and border management.
Infringement proceedings are a key mechanism through which the European Commission ensures that EU law is uniformly applied across all member states. Here’s a brief overview of the process:
This process ensures that member states adhere to their obligations under EU law, maintaining the integrity and uniformity of the legal framework across the Union.
What about the collective memory of teh Europeans ?
Accrding to Patrick manning , the field of demography provides the basic tools for analyzing the data on birth, death, and migration to give a fuller picture of changes in human population. The basic patterns of human migration have doubtless changed somewhat over the years, but the underlying logic of human migration is remarkably consistent. The early days of human history brought two big changes in migratory patterns that have been with us ever since. In very early human migrations, the principal movements were to territories ecologically similar to the grasslands and waterways of eastern Africa. It is appropriate to affirm a more general appreciation of human technological and social innovation over a somewhat longer era: the Glacial Maximum and the Holocene combined to bring the era of production. Within just over the past millennium, four migration patterns developed further importance: pastoral, maritime, forced migration, and urbanization. The emergence of capitalism became evident wherever commerce was intensive. The needs of the EU business matters, but they are not as pronounced as in the US, a migrant society, where 13% of the migrats are from Latin America, rapidly growing since the end of the Cold war thirty years ago. Then ther eis the alrege migratory push in history
Here are the key findings from the articles on collective unconscious and the memory of large migrations into Europe:
These summaries provide a glimpse into how collective memory and identity are shaped by historical events and cultural artifacts, particularly in the context of large migrations into Europe.
We are no longer in the age of migrations. There are no ovwerwhelming pressures on Europe's borders. There is a lack of understanding how to integrate the EIBM-system into the Asylum and migration Pact, partial implementation of the teh shcegen acquis due to eurocrats pusillimous permissive attirude t populist member states politicians, a real and imagined threat to teh borders, and insuffient communication by the EU Commmission. The Eu will develop demographic needs fo import of foreigners into the labour market of the member states.
?So, there should be a multi-layered approach by the Eu Commission, encompassing an action plan on frontex and deliberations on when and how to haul the member states in front of the ECJ.
I propose taking the following perspective on my findings for the use and consideration of policy-makers:
First, Frontex should adopt a Border Management dress code and uniform for Frontex and member state frontier police officers and a uniform EU-wide rank structure, insignia, and epaulet. This should always be the case when ECBG is deployed. Training and stimulating a common culture should be extended beyond the Border Guards’ corpses. Thus, the Frontex Partnership Academies network should be strengthened by a core curriculum encompassing CT, riot control, combat training, EU and International law, and policework - and a compulsory 6-8 weeks Frontex boot camp and training sessions at Frontex bases in different geographical settings across types of the border in the interest of the formation of all-round frontier police officers throughout the EIBM-system having experience with the other disciplines and the challenges in the various areas of Europe’s borders, and who sleep, work and eat together. Frontex should strengthen its HR unit with due diligence reporting and integrate performance criteria and learning from Frontex partners into the EIBM system and educational activities[1]. In addition, there should be accessible online courses for the cadres of the EIBM system, emphasizing the transmissive, transformational, and transactional aspects of the theory and practice of good educational practice at the organizational level[2]. Border Police Officers wishing to make a career as a leader should be subjected to rigorous training in a Frontex Leadership Academy offered for free. This would relate to CEPOL and instructors educated in Strategic Border management under existing programs and involve the theory and practice of European Integrated Border Management. Frontex should not only be a vehicle for the internationalization of integrated border management but foster a European approach characterized by a multicultural identity, a sense of purpose, and a shared culture. However, the masks can often become too large in a network-centric society. Thus, the Frontex Liaison Officers Network’s remit should be fully exploited to ensure a proactive outreach. For instance, the FLON could address real and imagined threats to border security in both broader and operational terms without them developing into commissars in the interest of managerial control. The point is that the member states should be able to rely on Frontex will be there for them when the member states’ BM-organizations’ feel stretched or in need of operational succor.
Second, Frontex could propose a harmonized, standardized approach to defining member states’ border sectors and their minimum equipment. For example, naval and Land Border bases should be established as the need arises, their minimum equipment and level of personnel should be decided on, and their location should be published on Frontex’s home page. The Frontex Border Guards Corpse should be present at all these bases and commandeer the EU-MS joined frontier and coast guards. Outreach to the Frontex bases’ local community should be streamlined into guidelines on Frontex bases. This is essential to the psychological aspect of the EU’s presence at the external borders, a key feature of border management for diplomatic partnership and protecting a more advanced society against threats[3]. A sound material base and adequate security are essential for an evolving civilization like Europe. This implies conserving force and using military power indirectly as the instrument of political warfare, i.e., by working on the perceptions of others of The European Union’s strength rather than using that strength. Thus, Frontex should make judicious use of force against low-intensity threats and have a robust presence at the border. That is to say, the organizational advantages of Frontex falling under the remit of DG HOME are modified by the need to consider the strategic aspects of the EU’s external border management and EIBM’s integration into the overall diplomatic strategy. This should provide the conditions for lifting Netherlands and Austria’s reservations concerning Romania[4] and Bulgaria’s entry into the Schengen area’s visa-free travel zone[5].
Third, Frontex could move forward with establishing the total capacity of the EU Border Guard’s Corpse to 2024-25 and change the distribution of personnel between Frontex Statutory Staff and MS seconded border guards on a 75%-25%-basis. Furthermore, I propose to increase the size of the Frontex Border and Coast Guard by an additional 5,000 Frontex Statutory staff in the middle term – 2030.
Fourth, DG HOME should propose amendments to annex I- V of the Border Guards Corpse regulation by 2024. This would include the purchase of more surveillance and attack drones, patrol boats and bright buoys, etc. This could be undertaken following a thorough discussion in Enfopol to understand better the intelligence service’s chiefs’ view on the suitable course of action on EIBM. In addition, rules of engagement on using attack drones should be deliberated with the European Parliament’s Frontex scrutiny working group.
Fifth, DG Home still needs to address the question of the formation of a Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU), given that one of its objectives listed in the EIBM communication is counter-terrorism. This reflects on the EU Commission’s Counter-Terrorism Agenda, adopted in 2020.[6] The terrorism threat is one of the reasons the Member States cite as a cause for the manning at the border when notifying DG Home about the maintenance of national controls. But, again, DG Home needs to act more forcefully. I propose to remedy the matter and follow in the footsteps of the Australian Border Police. In Europe, a Frontex CTU could be present not only in selected airports but also at the land and sea border and in critical areas of deployment where Frontex is active or at Member States’ request or per recommendation by a member of the Frontex Liason Officer Network.
Sixth, I propose that the evaluation mechanism and vulnerability assessment under the Schengen mechanism are activated, and respect for the authority of the Frontex Liaison Officers’ competencies is to be observed by the member states so that a normalization of the Schengen playbook is put into effect in practice nonostante. In addition, consider giving publicity to the vulnerability and evaluation mechanism results. Finally, I recommend bringing the remaining four to five recalcitrant states who resist compliance with the Schengen-acquis to ECJ.
Seventh, the IT system replacing or integrating with Eurosur should not only be implemented, but Frontex should adopt a digital transformation strategy for the organization. DG Home does not cite the failure and delay in implementing the new IT system as an obstacle to moving forward but notes its introduction as a principle flowing from the objectives DG Home pursues. The new IT system could have a structural effect on the forms and content of cooperation.
Eigth, the relationship between the military mobility of EU soldiers and the EU’s external border management security is there and should be clearly articulated. Therefore, I propose that a representative of INTDIR get a seat on the Frontex Board of Directors. Consider also publishing a Frontex -study on establishing a situational awareness network, integrating sensor assets with satellites at EU-level with member state surveillance systems in the interest of economy of force.
Ninth, I propose that the Frontex Management Board adopts a collaborative crisis management concept[7], provided the integration of the new IT system has been completed based on evaluating the functioning of Eurosur amongst all actors involved in the EU’s integrated border management.
Tenth, I suggest publishing on Frontex.europa.eu an EU Capabilities Development Plan, which should stipulate the developmental potential of the EIBM system at EU and MS levels pending the completion of organizational adaptation and reduction of redundancies inside the EIBM system and the modalities to consider.
Eleventh, a policy and strategy for reducing the number of deaths in the Mediterranean are to be addressed by DG Home and Frontex as a matter of urgency. This could be done in terms of transactional performance indicators published in an annual report: reduction of deaths in geographical settings, number of returns effectuated, drop in the years spent in processing asylum applications in the Member states, reduction in the numbers of trafficked people, terror plots uncovered, reduction in illegal crossings etcetera. In addition, metrics concerning the time and costs of clearance of goods and persons could be developed from the World Customs Organisation standards on facilitation and customs procedures[8]. This could be combined with dialogue with stakeholders to test-proof the EIBM system’s administration and maintenance at the operational level. In addition, DG Home could provide incentives tied to aim fulfillment regarding specific budget allocations. At the same time, Frontex’s leadership could offer personnel rewards – bonuses, extra holidays, vocational training - to link up the EIBM strategy with Frontex’s performance to ensure good governance, rule-of-law, and human rights prevail at the EU’s external border. That is an effect chain.
Twelfth, the use of Trust Funds, where over €7 billion in public funding is being channeled to border management and migration management, according to EPC,[9] should be addressed by Commissioner Johansen. Undoubtedly, the European Commission can find a way to leverage this state-of-affairs, while increasing accountability, without loosening sight of the broader political objectives pertinent to advancing overall EU interests. Cigar boxes are an imperial practice, and the EU has no legal basis for funding member states’ border management equipment. This is reserved for candidate countries. The trust funds should come under the purview of the European Parliament. Or rather, the bribes to uphold already existing legal obligations by the Member States should come to a halt and be replaced by a strategic approach to migration of the Member States and externally by the formulation of an annual foreign economic statement by the European Commission with a project portfolio on the development of a competitive power of EU as a collective and the member states individually. Thus, a semblance of order could be restored to the pretty banged-up external frontier regime of The European Union.
Thirteenth, a policy review of EU policy and strategy towards Libya and Syria will be vigorously pursued. Ghadaffi used to keep the Jihadis down and the migrants out and was a stable regime. Libya has now regressed into civil war, a fragile truce, and gone back to tribalism in the absence of a renewal of a winning tribal coalition that has always undergirded governance in Libya. Militia and Islamists roam freely, sucking in and destabilizing the Sahel and causing harm to Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia’s sense of security and economy. EU’s contribution, partnership, and relationship with the Egyptian-Turkish effort, UN-led mediation, and the prodding of better coordination amongst the Maghribs on the management and impact of the destabilization of? Libya are to be reviewed and carefully calibrated by the European Union. The weakened authoritarian power structure is to be augmented and strengthened in terms of public administration reform, a new social contract, and reintegration of the plethora of militias, along with the ceasing of outside meddling, the building of civilized migration management, and practical and modern Libyan Border Management organization in terms of a strengthened and better funded EUBAM Libya[10]. There are spill-over effects into the Sahel from Libya, and the policies and funding of IBM programs within AU and ECOWAS are not working satisfactorily. In Syria, I propose establishing an EU-led contact group with all major contestants along the lines proposed by academics.[11] This could be coupled with a concrete target-oriented UN action plan for progress in reconstruction, reconciliation, and political reform[12] complemented by public administration program, back-rolled by KSA and inspired by the one needed in Iran, which Shams is desirous of taking the lead from[13]. Getting control of the Syrian territory is a priority of Assad. And so is addressing the plight of the internally displaced. In turn, the IBM project in Lebanon needs to be prolonged and receive better funding and more involvement by Frontex and member states toward institution-building, legislative reform, and policy development.[14] In addition, the various EUBAMs provide security to The European Union, promote European interests, and further its diplomatic objectives – not system export.
Fourteenth, the excessive and inhuman delay in member states’ asylum procedures will be raised as part of a broad-based, comprehensive, careful policy and legislative review at the EU and MS levels. For example, according to press reports, some asylum applicants fester in transition camps for 3-6 years and then move onto departure centers if they refuse to leave, where they stay for another 3-5 years. This is unacceptable and inhumane. DG Home should address the problem in a firm and supportive manner under the Migration and Asylum Pact[15].
Fifteenth, Frontex has published a study, “The Green Deal & The European Border and Coast Guard– A Research Study.”? A governance structure is being put in place to lead change. To follow up, I propose pilot projects are launched to ensure feedback and test commitment within time and budget to remain agile. The departure point for Frontex’s contribution could be purchasing EV vehicles, introducing hydrogen-driven drones, testing maritime e-fuels on Frontex Ships, and applying New Bauhaus principles in the new Frontex HQ.
Sixteenth, it is proposed that Frontex adopts a contemporary understanding of strategy development. The strategic departure point:? mission, vision, and values. The task is clear and sound, but the idea is somewhat fuzzy while discounts are mentioned. The Frontex Executive Director could publish a blog. Frontex could use story-telling, emphasizing how Frontex contributes to security at the border and the results of its work for people’s lives and the over 500 million lawfully crossing? EU borders. The revised version of Frontex’s technical and operational strategy for EIBM[16] must be proper[17] – not listing enabling legalities and technicalities. A proposal for establishing a FRONTEX HL IBM WG has been made. Consider the assignment of desk analyst operational intelligence officers responsible for geographical sectors across types of borderland, sea, harbor & air - to integrate data into the overall situational picture in the format of Europol or the Frontex Situation Centre through the establishment of intelligence units with responsibility for geographical areas. Assign Intelligence Agents who accompany BSGC when deployed and liaise with Frontex FSC. To move beyond the preliminary disarray in DG Home, consider adopting a Frontex (comprehensive) security concept proper with a duration dovetailing with the multi-annual policy cycle. At the same time, it seems opportune for the EIBM system to relate to and review the guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission External Cooperation, which is directed towards practitioners within the EIBM system rather than the EU delegations[18]. Thus, a Frontex-led task force could review and compare the functioning of the EIBM model, a work that might feed into the policy-making process on a Frontex security concept.
Seventeenth, I look forward to a study providing a comparative overview of the Member States Bor-der Management administrations and evaluating their IBM strategies published nonostante on DG Home’s webpage[19]. On Frontex’s webpage, a link could be inserted to the national members of the European Integrated Border Management system – the national partners-in-power. An authoritative commentary on the evolution of the Frontex regulations is relevant for educational and training purposes and helpful for researchers and the wider public. Such a book could be commissioned. Acknowledging this explorative study’s shortcomings, we would welcome a more systematic evaluation of public policy in the EIBM domain in conformity with OECD standards regarding relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability towards a complete integrated study of EIBM in the interest of better dialogue between academia and circles of policy-making.[20]
Eighteenth, I recommend a review of Frontex’s personnel salary and benefits package. The basic entry-level salary should be set at 3000€ paid out and tax-free. I also envisage polls and surveys conducted on the rank-and-file experiences and sentiments on salient issues throughout the EIBM system. This testing of the perceptions of users of the EIBM system could be extended into systematic surveys of the EU’s external partner’s assessment of the EIBM system as part of Frontex’s management of its relationships.
Nineteenth, Frontex could publish an annual report to reflect on the European Parliament’s desire for greater democratic accountability of Frontex, communicate the past year’s accomplishments, and reflect on the mission statement and how yearly goals were fulfilled. Frontex can draw on “Frontex in Brief” and the redundant Frontex annual activity report, which would be folded into the annual report. An annual report contains references to activities, but its purpose and social meaning change when oriented toward policy-makers. The Frontex Annual report could then add value to the yearly reports currently produced by some EUBAM and the Frontex Fundamental Rights office, refer to the achievements of the Frontex Consultative Forum on Human Rights, reflect and add value to the various strategic practices within the organizations, sum-up the results of the evaluation mechanisms of the Schengen acquis, address the activities and results of the FLON-Network. If a result contract is introduced, the assumptions of an accountable EIBM system would be embodied in a share of Frontex’s budget allocation against which the above-cited performance criteria of Frontex are to be judged. Frontex should therefore apply statistical evidence to that end in the annual report. The Frontex yearly report could be deliberated in the LIBE Committee, and Parliament’s views be submitted to the JHA Council of Ministers and DG Home. Interaction with Union citizens and stakeholder management is to be encouraged in the annual report.[21] The outreach on the annual report to the non-EU members of the Schengen-convention – Norway, Schweiz, Iceland, Liechtenstein - is to be determined by DG Home.
Twentieth next, there is the Strategic Risk Analysis report. Strategic risk analysis may be defined as “the process of identifying and managing the specific risks that affect an organization's ability to achieve key objectives. Strategic risks can harm or weaken the corporation's goals and objectives, potentially affecting shareholder value and the viability of the entire company”.[22] The science of Strategic Risk-Analysis is based on microeconomics and shareholder value, nourishing itself from the same waterhole as principal-agent analysis. This report is submitted to Parliament, the EU Commission, and the Council and feeds into the policy-making process. But which results and actions does this process yield? This is not being communicated. Scenarios make policy-makers think about long-term strategies that are not an extension of current plans through mega-trends, such as global developments, demographics and society, technology and science, and economic consequences. But is this what Frontex relates to when it conducts strategic risk analysis?
Twentieth-one Frontex’s communication on the agency’s role in international search and rescue is not comprehensive and somewhat odd, notably concerning the SAR convention[23]. It should dive into the literature[24] and clearly state how the European model relates to the SAR convention and how and why to move beyond it – not just how Frontex adds value to the coastal states of the European Union’s international obligations and who does what, when, and where under the EU Commission’s half-baked measures under the Action Plan on the Mediterranean[25]. In addition, it should engage with stakeholders who express concern about how the operating mode of Frontex may unintentionally contribute to deaths on the sea and communicate a plan to bring the numbers down. EU Regulation 656/2014 establishes rules on Search and Rescue operations and disembarkation and provides a common EU concept of a “place of safety,” which is protection-driven[26]. EU could move forward on SAR under the existing legislation in several ways. First, Frontex could support the Member States in fulfilling legal obligations under international law to assist any persons in distress at sea and to ensure their disembarkation in a place of safety. Second, Frontex could enhance coordination and cooperation among Member States and with third countries and international organizations, such as the IMO, IOM, and UNHCR, on search and rescue and related issues. Third, it provided financial, technical, and operational assistance to the Member States, especially those facing extreme migratory pressure through Frontex, EUAA, and other EU funds and instruments. Fourth, a common framework and mechanism for solidarity and responsibility-sharing among the Member States, based on voluntary relocation of asylum seekers or other forms of support following disembarkations from search and rescue events. It was fourth, addressing the root causes of irregular migration and preventing the loss of life at sea by promoting safe and legal pathways for migration and asylum, combating smuggling and trafficking networks, and enhancing cooperation with countries of origin and transit.[27] The latter is starting to be addressed under the 9 June 2023 Asylum Pact.
Twentieth-two concerns are being expressed about corruption in the EIBM system. Therefore, I recommend Frontex’s management get hold of Transparency International to review the needs for Institution-Building, Policies, and Legislation in anti-corruption throughout the EIBM system.
Twentieth-three, the EU Military Forum[28], an online magazine, is an example of how to provide a platform for discussion and exchange of ideas and perspectives. They inform and educate the readers about the role and activities within the policy domain. They contribute to fostering a common culture serving Europe’s interests. Such a magazine enhances the visibility and awareness of the defense dimension and contribution to the European Union’s security. And such a platform engages with partners inside and outside the EU on issues of mutual interest and concern in the policy domain. By that, EUMC has demonstrated the importance of public institutions’ digital literacy and the use of online communities. This broadens the appeal of policy matters, which may not need to be the exclusive property of a European elite. This also allows for creativity for positive reasons. Does Frontex receive the message?
Twentieth-four, the MEDIA program could fund a factual television program in the form of an observational documentary on the model of Border Security: Australia’s Front Line with the working title Limes – Borders of the European Union.
These measures could then be consolidated into an action plan. On this basis, I see no reason for treaty change. On the contrary, the treaty and regulations must be fully exploited to active, law-abiding, solution-oriented approaches. The transnational cleavage in the European Union is running like an under stream under the Schengen area and the entire EIBM construct, addressing or softening, which is a common interest[29].? Relationships and the cooption of German business interests are a condition for leadership but may need to be improved to make a difference on the ground. Determination and ambition are required. To lead change, strong leadership and sound management are necessary.
But, unfortunately, DG Home fails in leadership, needs clear strategy and communication, empathy, and effectiveness, and is creating a prolonged crisis not entirely of its own making but leading to multiannual rear-guard actions and perhaps even modification of the Schengen playbook. Money talks, leadership makes followers if adequately executed with good communication, coordination, and relationships, examination of organizational set-up and adequate policy processes, social interaction in furtherance of creativity, and forceful action in an interdependent and rapid-evolving political system and business environment. This is so true when one lacks the courage to face the present. It is time for Europe to come to its senses. From the contradictions between Freedom, Justice, and Security, unity may be derived, and what appears impossible can be turned into an opportunity.
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[1] Randall S. Schuler, Susan E. Jackson & Yadong Luo (2004).
[2] In transmissive education, knowledge is transmitted from teacher to student. In transactional education, it is recognized that the student has valuable experiences and learns best through experiences, inquiry, critical thinking, and interaction with other learners. Finally, in transformational education, the focus is on the student’s personal growth and development.
[3] Edward N. Luttwark The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. From the First Century a.d. to the Third, John Hopkins UP, 1979.
[4] “Full participation for Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia in the Schengen area”[online]https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/full-participation-bulgaria-romania-and-croatia-schengen-area-2022-11-17_en?ssp=1&darkschemeovr=0&setlang=da-DK&safesearch=moderate The EU Council Schengen Evaluation Working Group is today notably concerned about external border management and police cooperation. An EU Com fact-finding mission found lapses in areas of the use of biometrics, strengthening the cooperation with third countries, and ensuring adequate resources and training for border guards and police officers.
[5] The Fourth Schengen Forum 16 May 2023 discussed this topic as the EU Commission leveraged (1) delivering on the Entry-Exit System as a part of efforts to further strengthen the EU External Borders (2) Maximizing the use of SIS in order to make the return system more effective (3) Replacing long-lasting internal border controls with alternative police cooperation measures (4) Aligning visa policies of third-country partners with the one of the EU (5) Abolishing risky investor citizenship and residence schemes. “EU Commission urges Council to allow Romania & Bulgaria to fully Join Schengen in 2023”[online]https://www.schengenvisainfo.comnews/eu-commission-urges-the-council-to-allow-Romania-Bulgaria-to-fully-join-schengen-in-2023/
[7] Thomas Cole & Paul Verbinnen Collaborative Crisis Management: Prepare, Execute, Recover, Repeat, Chicago UP, 2022.
[8] Procedures and Facilitation [online]https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation.aspx
[9] Frederica Zardo, Sayed & Tsourdi (2023).
[10] Frederic Wehrey The Burnings Shores Inside the Battle for the New Libya, 2018.
[11] Christopher Phillips The Battle for Syria. International Rivalry in the Middle East, Yale, 2018.
[12] Itamar Rabinovich & Carmit Valensi Syrian Requiem. The Civil War and its Aftermath, Princeton, 2021.
[13] Christian Ilcus The Labyrinth of Ali, academia.edu
[14]Simone Tholens “Border Management in an era of state building lite′: security assistance and Lebanon’s hybrid sovereignty”, International Affairs, vol. 93(4), 2017[online]https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/50166/TholensLebanon_iix069.pdf?sequence=1
[15] See also Border Management, IOM, [online] https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd486/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-Thematic-Paper-Border-Management.pdf
[16] Technical and Operational Strategy for European Integrated Border Management[online]https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/IBM/EU_IBM_Brochure_EN.pdf
[17] See, for instance S?rensen & Carroll (2021).
[18] Guidelines for Integrated Management in European Commission External Cooperation, European Commission, 2010[online] https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/48280/file/Guidelines%2520for%2520Integrated%2520Border%2520Management%2520in%2520European%2520Commission%2520External%2520Cooperation%2520EN.pdf
[19] For a model, consult the commissioned report available at https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3e89d981-48fc-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
[20] Applying evaluation criteria thoughtfully. Understanding the six standards: Definitions, elements for analysis and challenges [online] https://www.oecd-library.org/sites/c249f611-en/index.html?itemld=/content/component/c249f911-en&ssp=1&darkschememeovr=0&setlang=da-DK&safesearch=moderate
[21] Freeman (1984) & Sadler (1993:54)
[22] Understanding Strategic Risk Analysis [online] https://www.onboardmeetings.com/blog/understanding-strategic-risk-assessment/
[23] How search and rescue work [online]https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/focus/how-search-and-rescue-works-83WoGT
[24] Button (2017)
[25] See also Migrants, Refugees, and Societies, World Development? Report, 2023[online]https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2023.
[27] This four-pronged action plan was developed by asking AI BING: “How could the EU add value in the area of international search and rescue ?”
[29]Hooghe & Marks (2018)
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