THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS: THE WAY FOR REGIONAL PEACE

Introduction

On August 13, 2020, the United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates issued a joint of?cial announcement that Israel and the UAE would be embarking on a political process of full normalization of relations. A month later, on September 11, Bahrain joined the Emiratis by announcing its intention to normalize relations with Israel, also facilitated by the US. The timing of the Abraham Accords may have come as a total surprise to many; however, the formal announcements only serve to bring the incremental progress in bilateral relations between Israel and several Arab Gulf states since the turn of this century into plain view. Formalization of these prospective alliances makes complete sense as a “tacit security regime in light of shared and overlapping concern both regarding Iran and Islamic extremists and mounting uncertainties about future US strategy and engagement in the Middle East.

Rooted in the post-Oslo 1990s, the Israel–UAE relationship was one of mutual concealment until the current shift toward institutional recognition. This upgraded relationship, in addition to normalization with Bahrain and burgeoning ties with other Gulf states such as Oman and Saudi Arabia, can best be described as the product of quiet diplomacy that has been taking place “just below the surface” for some years now. Pragmatic contacts and businesslike dealings have been developing progressively and in a number of sometimes overlapping tracks: security/intelligence, economics/trade, and, more recently, a public channel that include.

interfaith dialogue facilitated by the UAE. However, there is reason to believe that had the Israeli government not proclaimed its intention in the preceding months to apply sovereignty in parts of the disputed West Bank territories with the backing of the Trump administration, this public normalization process might never have occurred, certainly not now or in the near future.

?Over the past two decades, Arab Gulf states have generally adhered to the terms of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), whereby any normalization of relations with Israel was made contingent upon an overall peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, which would culminate in the establishment of a Palestinian state. Nevertheless, in recent years, Israeli strategy has prioritized stronger relations with Arab countries over investing in what in any case remains a moribund peace process. The Palestinians, for their part, have fought to prevent any further détente between Israel and individual Gulf states in order to retain the promise of such normalization as a last, desperate bargaining chip against Israel.

The Emirati Calculus

The UAE’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), must believe that the price he will pay in the domestic sphere for opening his country to Israel is smaller than the anticipated gains. Although the wider public has yet to display any particular af?nity for Israel, recent public opinion surveys indicate that the Emirati street is concerned primarily with the threat posed by Iran, while the Palestinian issue is near the bottom of the agenda. Interestingly, the Saudi public holds similar sentiments. Moreover, the agreement is being portrayed by the UAE as a diplomatic victory aimed at helping the Palestinians, and as a reasonable price to be paid in return for thwarting Israel’s plans to apply sovereignty over territories in the West Bank. According to MBZ, normalizing relations with Israel not only preserves the relevance of the two-state solution but also contributes to stability in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, with regard to the regional sphere, opposition to the measure is being led by Iran and Turkey, who have positioned themselves as rivals of both Israel and the UAE.

More importantly, MBZ is con?dent that his calculated act will signi?cantly enhance the UAE’s relations with the United States, primarily in the realm of security, by providing President Donald J. Trump with a timely and much heralded foreign policy achievement. This may well explain the timing of MBZ’s US-brokered recognition of Israel.

?While the issue of Iran has only grown in importance for the UAE, doubts have mounted in recent years among Emirati leadership about the continuation of the US commitment to the federation’s security. It is now evident that as part of the agreement with Israel, quiet understandings were also reached between the US and the UAE, including various guarantees of advanced arms thus far denied to the Emiratis. For example, the UAE has continued to press Washington to supply it with sophisticated platforms, including the advanced F-35 ?ghter jet, even as the only current recipient in the region is Israel. Re?ecting the complexities of the trilateral August undertaking is the warranted concern that should this advanced warplane and other state-of-the-art weaponry be sold to the UAE, Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) might be seriously compromised. It would also accelerate the ongoing arms race in the region.

It is worth recalling that the “arms for peace” formula America is employing for the sake of Israel’s security is by no means unique or unprecedented. If anything, it is perhaps the standard approach. In an effort to facilitate and reinforce Israel’s peace agreements with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, the US substantially boosted military aid and sales to both Arab nations. Jordan, for example, received long- sought-after F-16 ?ghter jets. On the other hand, the UAE agreement marks the ?rst time an Israeli government is consenting to a major political undertaking without receiving any immediate military or ?nancial compensation from the US as a quid pro quo.

?The Bahraini Calculus

After the UAE, normalization with Bahrain was one of the next objectives for the US and Israel. Bahrain, a small, Shiite-majority country sandwiched between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, is important to Washington as it hosts the US Navy’s??Fifth Fleet, the headquarters of the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), and a support base for the US Central Command (CENTCOM). The country is closely aligned with the Saudis. In fact, it is likely that the Bahrainis only agreed to normalization once they had secured Riyadh’s approval.

?Like the UAE, Bahrain has had close, covert security ties with Israel. In recent years, Manama has displayed a softened stance toward Jerusalem, most notably by declaring an end to its boycott of Israel in 2005 (also because of US pressure). WikiLeaks documents reveal that Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa decreed that in of?cial discourse, Israel would no longer be called the “Zionist entity.”

?Bahrain reacted positively to the Israel–UAE agreement, becoming the ?rst Arab nation to signal support. However, Manama rejected the idea of advancing to normalization itself. At a meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Khalifa explained that his country sought to abide by the ideals of the API. Obviously the king had a change of heart, given the announcement the following month that his country would follow the UAE’s lead. It is likely that continued American pressure played a role in bringing the Bahrainis around on the matter.

?Among the Bahraini public, reaction to the deal has been mixed. The country’s primary opposition group, al Wefaq, opposes the deal, and there have been several protests against it. Additionally, Bahrain and Israel have agreed to a “joint communique on establishing peaceful and diplomatic relations,” markedly different than a full-?edged peace agreement like the one between Israel and the UAE. This suggests that the Bahrainis are advancing more cautiously due to domestic criticism.

?Gulf Insecurities as a Motivating Factor

A major factor leading to the Abraham Accords was its timing. First, the three-sided deals represent an expression of concern that former Vice President Joe Biden, if elected, might implement much stricter policies than the Trump administration regarding human rights and regional arms transfers; he might also take a softer approach on Iran. Second, over the past few years, concerns have also mounted across the Gulf regarding the continuation of America’s commitment to regional security, especially since both Trump and his predecessor, Barack Obama, sought to draw down the US military presence there. Third, the internal Palestinian split between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank is creating sharp differences in opinion and policy orientation among the Gulf countries. Although they all commit to the Palestinian cause on some level often manifested in signi?cant ?nancial aid rival interests drive their aid operations in different directions and result in varying degrees of largesse. Fourth, the Accords underscore the lengths to which some Arab states are willing to go to counter Tehran’s increased regional aggression and in?uence. Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, has gone so far as to say that Iran’s aggressive regional actions forced the Emiratis to consider a relationship with Israel “with fresh eyes.”

Other states are likely to continue to look for a political solution to the con?ict before following in the footsteps of the UAE and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia, for example, still backs the Palestinians’ positions on core issues, although it expects the leadership to demonstrate greater ?exibility at the negotiating table. At the same time, Kuwait, Qatar, and other Gulf states persist in vehemently objecting to any hint of unilateral Israeli annexation of territory in the West Bank, characterizing it as contrary to both the Palestinian cause and international law. Simi-larly, the foreign ministries in both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi continue to emphasize support for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, with east Jerusalem as its capital.

Potential Bene?ts

Looking ahead, the agreements between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain are likely to produce a warmer peace than Israel currently has with its two immediate neighbors, Egypt and Jordan. There are no territorial disputes between them, nor any grievances or accounts to be settled between their political elites or peoples. Another reason for optimism derives from ongoing, close security and political cooperation between the three states, sharing, as they do, similar strategic perspectives on the regional environment. All three countries are wary of the ambitions of Tehran and Ankara, which seek to employ regime destabilization as a means of expanding their respective in?uence deeper into countries across the Arab world. If pursued prudently and away from the limelight, these budding ties already rooted in pragmatism may become the warmest relationship between Israel and any Arab country. Similarly, they can serve as a precedent for other Arab countries whose interests in eventually achieving normalization have been piqued, judging from the surprisingly moderate reactions from the Arab and Muslim worlds. In fact, according to a recent report by the Israeli Intelligence Ministry, normalization agreements with Oman and Saudi Arabia could lead to very close ties, given the interest in economic and trade relations with Israel.18 Interestingly, the report mentioned Bahrain as a prime candidate as well.

?Indeed, following the announcement of the Israel–UAE agreement, positive feed- back was voiced in important Arab circles. It was welcomed with expressions of public as well as of?cial support in Bahrain, Egypt, and Oman. Other governments even revised their stances after initially criticizing the deal. For example, Moroccan Prime Minister Saad Eddine El Othmani walked back his initial remarks, explicitly clarifying that he had been speaking in a personal capacity. Some, however, may continue to hold out; Kuwait notably responded to news of the peace accord by unequivocally stating that it would be “the last to normalize relations” with Israel. Later on, Qatar adopted a similar stance, excluding the possibility of normalizing relations with Israel as long as the Palestinian issue remains unresolved.

?Potential Drawbacks

Although the agreements facilitated by the US are no doubt a net-positive for all parties involved, they are not without potential downsides. Most obvious is that they widen the cleavage between regional factions Qatar and Turkey with their Islamist orientation set against the conservative monarchies of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates. These deals place Israel squarely in the latter camp, which poses signi?cant risks to the country, including jeopardizing its economic relationship with Turkey as well as its reliance on Qatari facilitation to pacify Hamas in Gaza. Additionally, Bahrain and the UAE may feel emboldened to act more decisively in the region now that Israel is formally on their side. For example, the Emiratis recently deployed their air force to support Greece in the growing energy con?ict with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.

?Yet another potential pitfall is the fear that the shift in relations between Israel???and both Bahrain and the UAE is not likely to improve coordination in confronting the Iranian threat because both countries are already closely aligned with Israel on that issue. One could argue that some matters are best left tacit the 2020 agreement is liable to open the UAE and Bahrain to harsh reactions from the two ascendant regional powers, Iran and Turkey. Given Iran’s geo-graphical proximity, the danger is that now Tehran has both the anti-Israel motivation and the ability to retaliate against Bahrain and the UAE. In contrast, full diplomatic relations with Israel only bear the potential for expanded trade???and large-scale technological and scienti?c bene?ts, which in any event are still a long way off.

?The potential for conditions in the region to change quickly and in signi?cant ways presents another concern. An apprehension prominent among the Israeli security sector is that states in the region currently allied with Israel may change their postures. As Dr. Michael Koplow of the Israel Policy Forum notes, this has already been demonstrated by Iran and, more recently, by Turkey. Koplow also recalls the Israeli trepidation regarding its future relations with Egypt during the brief reign of Muslim Brotherhood-aligned President Mohamed Morsi after the Arab Spring.

?Saudi Arabia also presents concerns. Despite the desire of American and Israeli policymakers for an Israeli–Saudi peace, and their perception that present geopolitical conditions are ripe largely due to the Iranian issue such an achievement could be susceptible to blowback if regional conditions change. As the Saudis have continued to develop their nuclear program, their resistance to nuclear oversight or the ruling out of uranium enrichment is worrisome. Moreover, the Trump administration has secretly provided the kingdom with nuclear power technology and assistance. Who is to say that an Israeli–Saudi peace agreement would not only provide the Saudis with more American weaponry but also ensure the continued progress of their nuclear program? Policymakers must remember that past instances of American and Israeli acquiescence to the development of nuclear arms programs in Middle Eastern countries resulted in signi?cant negative consequences as history has demonstrated with Iran, whose nuclear program initially began under the Shah in the 1950s with American support. Despite Riyadh’s current alliance with the US (and covertly with Israel), a regime changes or other signi?cant regional development might upend this coalition.

The accord also provides the Emiratis (and perhaps, implicitly, the Saudis and other Gulf states) with leverage against Israel. We have already seen the Israeli concession of halting annexation in exchange for normalization. Jerusalem now must think twice before acting in ways that may be contrary the interests of Arab states. In all likelihood, Israel will be pressured to make further progress on the Palestinian issue in order for the Saudis or other Arab states to agree to normalization.

?What Does the Future Hold?

?Despite the initial euphoria, predictions by Jared Kushner and other American ??and Israeli policymakers that the Abraham Accords will spark a sweeping domino effect of bilateral regional peace agreements with Israel appear premature. Kushner, for his part, has insisted that other Muslim countries will sign peace treaties with Israel in the coming months, and that all twenty-two Arab League states will gradually normalize relations. Trump himself has said he expects between seven and nine countries, including Saudi Arabia, to do the same. Despite these initial hopes and reports of ongoing discussions between the parties, there is good reason on the part of unnamed Arab leaders for their hesitation to sign peace treaties or commercial deals. Only days after the Israel–UAE deal was announced, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan insisted that Israel must ?rst reach a settlement with the Palestinians based on the API. As previously noted, Kuwait and Qatar have rejected normalization without a resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian con?ict. The pressure brought by Pompeo on his visits to Oman and Sudan proved insuf?cient to prod them across the threshold. On the other hand, his stop in Bahrain proved successful.

?Despite continued American efforts to persuade Sudan to agree to normalization, Khartoum initially refused to normalize relations, even in exchange for its removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.31 This opposition came despite additional offers of foreign investment by the US, Israel, and also, interestingly, the UAE. The primary reason for Sudan’s initial apprehension was the fragility??of its provisional government, held together as it is by actors spanning the domestic ideological spectrum. Normalization with Israel could be a destabilizing factor that may renew con?ict in that country. However, a month after the initial Sudanese rejections, Khartoum changed its mind and agreed to normalization with Israel after the US has formally initiated the process of removing it from the blacklist.

?Clearly, there are many variables to be considered by Arab rulers in the midst of the current regional realignment. Understandably, they ?rst want to see how the Israeli–Emirati and Israeli–Bahraini gambits play out both whether de?nitive peace terms can be ?nalized and, more importantly, fully implemented, and whether there will be signi?cant backlash either in the two countries themselves or in the region.

?Recently, there has been uncertainty about the consummation of the Israel–UAE deal because of con?icting reports as to whether Jerusalem will withdraw its opposition to the sale of F-35s to Abu Dhabi. Apprehension has been particularly apparent in Israel’s security establishment, highlighted by Defense Minister Benny Gantz’s comment that it is “not good for Israel” if other countries obtain the F-35. Despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s public denials that he supports the ?ghter jet deliveries, it was reported in The New York Times that he had privately given his approval to the plan. This uncon?rmed report was corroborated in late

?October when Netanyahu and Gantz announced that they would drop their objection to the F-35 sale. Moreover, according to that same source, in addition to the F- 35s, the Emiratis will receive the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jet ?ghter and Reaper drones. All of these armaments pose considerable threats to Israel’s QME, which is codi?ed in US law. An additional obstacle is whether the US Department of State or Congress, upon conducting their mandated reviews, will ?nd that Israel’s QME has been undermined. There is already skepticism around the prospective F-35 deal among Democratic members of Congress. In particular, Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY), who, it has been suggested, is a likely candidate to be the next chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has announced his outright opposition to the deal. In the Senate, both Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch (R-ID) and Ranking Member Bob Menendez (D-NJ) have expressed concern over the potential arms agreement. Recently, Democratic lawmakers have taken formal legislative action as well. In late October Menendez and Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) introduced a bill that would constrain the Trump admin- istration’s efforts to sell the F-35’s to the UAE.

?Even if Congress does not approve the sale, President Trump could potentially circumvent State Department or Congressional authorization processes, but such a move would entail signi?cant controversy and raise questions of constitutionality. Another potential off-ramp may be for the US to provide the UAE a variant of the F-35 that has less sophisticated capabilities or alternatively to provide Israel with additional weapons capabilities, either of which would maintain the QME. This option is quite probable; The Times of Israel reports that Israeli leaders are lobbying the US to provide a “downgraded” version of the F-35 to the UAE. No matter what route the US chooses to take, however, time will be on its side in September, US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman told reporters that it would take about “six or seven years” for the UAE to receive the ?ghter jets.

The Arab states will also want to wait to see the results of the US presidential elections, as well as the composition of the new administration and its foreign policy positions. Regardless of who wins in November, Arab governments undoubtedly seek greater clarity as to what they can expect to receive from the US and from Israel in return for their backing of the present initiatives. Whatever happens, the Middle East is undergoing a dramatic rebalancing of power one that will encourage unprecedented alliance formations and create new horizons for both Arabs and Israelis.

Step towards Global Peace and Stability

The agreement represents a big development in the Middle East politics. Though growing the region's economic development, improving strategic advancement and establishing stronger interpersonal links would lead to direct linkages between two of the most diverse cultures in the Middle East and developments in economic life, stability in the Middle East.

Israel has developed a very delicate situation in the MENA region for negotiating with the Gulf States. It could have been also used as a chance for the US to push key players to turn it into a real step in the peace process, despite its negative impact, if US Administration is to be a genuine peace maker.

?