Abraham Accords will outlast Gaza war - opinion

The Abraham Accords seem in good health. They may yet come into their own in helping rebuild Gaza once the war has ended.

By NEVILLE TELLER - JANUARY 3, 2024

On December 4, Time magazine published the article “It’s time to scrap the Abraham Accords.” The author, Sarah Leah Whitson, a director of Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), argued that the Hamas attack of October 7 proved that the assumption on which the Abraham Accords were conceived – that the Palestinian issue was no longer important in Israel’s relationships in the region – was wrong.

She maintained that conditions for the Palestinian people had worsened since the accords were signed, and that the Gaza war has projected the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of global concerns. When signing the Accords, she claimed, the Arab leaders involved “hailed the agreement as a means to encourage and cajole Israel to take positive steps toward ending its occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory.”?

Now, she wrote, “because continued Arab adherence to the accords signals continued support for Israel,” DAWN is calling on the Abraham Accords countries to withdraw from the agreement.

Whitson was wrong

Both her assumptions and her conclusions are incorrect. The Israel-Palestine dispute had no bearing on the negotiations leading to the Abraham Accords and is unrelated to them. The purpose of the accords is to advance regional security and stability; pursue regional economic opportunities; promote joint aid and development programs; and foster mutual understanding, respect, coexistence, and a culture of peace.?

All the Arab leaders concerned have indicated that normalizing relations with Israel has not affected their support for Palestinian aspirations. There is a brief reference to this in the Bahrain agreement, while the Morocco document mentions “the unchanged position of the Kingdom of Morocco on the Palestinian question.”

Sheer logic dictates that none of the signatories perceive their support as involving the elimination of Israel. Since October 7 none of the four Abraham Accord signatory states has indicated any desire to withdraw from the accords.?

Sudan is in the throes of a devastating civil war. Government forces are on the back foot, as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces continues its advance. On December 19 it captured Sudan’s second largest city, Wad Madani. The future of Sudan, and with it the future of its normalization with Israel, hangs in the balance.

In the other accord countries – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco – public opinion undoubtedly favors Hamas, deplores the high civilian death toll in Gaza, and calls for a ceasefire. As a result, all three states have been walking a tightrope regarding their official attitude toward the Israel-Hamas conflict. All the same, the accords are holding firm.

At one time it seemed as though Bahrain might be wavering. On November 2, Bahrain’s parliament issued an unusual statement saying that the ambassadors of Israel and Bahrain had each left their posts and economic ties had been cut.

“The Zionist entity’s ambassador has left Bahrain,” parliamentarian Mamdooh Al Saleh said in parliament, “hopefully not to return.” But the parliament has no responsibility for foreign affairs, and it soon became clear that Bahrain-Israeli diplomatic and economic relations were intact.?

Israel issued a statement confirming that relations were stable, and one from Bahrain’s government mentioned simply that the envoys had left, without giving any reason.

Iran has long been engaged in stirring up Bahrain’s Shi’ite population against the Sunni monarchy. But Bahrain is home to the US Navy Fifth Fleet, and close US relations through the accords are a vital bulwark against Iran and too valuable to abandon.?

They also bring Bahrain closer to the wealthy UAE. So Bahrain is content to perform its balancing act – on the one hand seeking to keep the deal intact; on the other needing to reflect its disagreement with Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

The other two Abraham Accord states face the same problem.

Despite internal and international pressure over the mounting toll of the war in Gaza, the UAE does not plan to break diplomatic ties with Israel. It has sponsored two resolutions within the UN Security Council of which it is currently a member. The first, calling unequivocally for a ceasefire, was vetoed by the US. The second, after days of intense diplomatic effort, concentrated on enhancing the flow of humanitarian aid to the population of Gaza, and was approved on December 22.

As well as maintaining its links with Israel, media reports indicate that the UAE has been working to moderate public positions of Arab states, so that once the war ends there is the possibility of a return to a broad dialogue. In addition, the UAE has been in talks with Qatar about the possibility of a further Qatari-brokered deal involving the release by Hamas of some hostages in return for a break in the fighting.

The accords were partly based on a shared concern over the threat posed by Iran. Despite an effort at rapprochement early in 2023, the UAE continues to sees Iran as a threat to regional security. So there seems no prospect of an end to UAE-Israel diplomatic ties. They represent a strategic priority for the Emirates.

As for Abraham Accords signatory Morocco, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal recently scored a resounding own goal. On November 19, speaking from his luxury villa in Qatar, he addressed the Moroccan people by video. Urging them to cut ties with Israel and expel its ambassador, he declared: “Morocco can correct its mistake,” and called on Moroccans to take to the streets.

The reaction was an outburst of fury on social media from Moroccans condemning the intervention as a breach of the kingdom’s sovereignty. There has indeed been a wave of public demonstrations in Morocco supportive of the Palestinians and condemning the suffering of the Gazan population, but it is a curious fact of Moroccan life that they are all organized with the state’s blessing.?

The government provides logistical and security arrangements for demonstrators every weekend, and itself calls for de-escalation, access to humanitarian aid, and the protection of civilians in line with international law.?

On the other hand, Morocco has not the slightest intention of withdrawing from the Abraham Accords. This became clear on November 11 when, at an Arab Islamic summit in Riyadh, the delegation from Morocco, together with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Mauritania, Djibouti, Jordan, and Egypt, blocked a proposal to cut ties with Israel.

So in complex and shifting circumstances, the Abraham Accords seem in good health. They may yet come into their own in helping rebuild Gaza once the war has ended. That is when, in the recent words of Jared Kushner, one of their architects, they may become “more important than ever”.

The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020.

Cover photo: THE JOINT Arab Islamic Extraordinary Summit in Riyadh, in November: Morocco, together with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Mauritania, Djibouti, Jordan, and Egypt, blocked a proposal to cut ties with Israel. (photo credit: Ahmed Yosri/Reuters)

Abraham Accords will outlast Gaza war - opinion - The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)

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By Nosmot Gbadamosi

The highlights this year: Elections in key countries, Rwanda and Tunisia likely to entrench authoritarian rule, and democracy deferred in the Sahel.

Will the ANC Lose Its Hold on Power?

South Africa’s upcoming election is set to be the tightest race since the end of apartheid in 1994. The governing African National Congress’s voter base is eroding and the party is in danger of losing an overall majority. Though a date has not been announced, the election must take place within 90 days of the end of Parliament’s term in mid-May.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has been plagued by troubles for most of his five-year term. The “Farmgate” scandal, involving an alleged heist and undeclared cash in a sofa, proved to be the least of the party’s worries. Ramaphosa faced a possible impeachment hearing back in December 2022 after an independent panel concluded that he may have broken anti-corruption laws over the 2020 theft of $580,000 buried in the furniture at his Phala Phala game farm. But he was cleared by a watchdog organization and managed to avoid an impeachment.

However, the incident highlighted problems within the African National Congress (ANC)—a party marred by widespread corruption in government. Meanwhile, the country faces high unemployment levels, failing energy infrastructure, and soaring crime rates. The wealth gap between Black and white South Africans makes the country the world’s most unequal society, according to the World Bank.

Meanwhile, former President Jacob Zuma hovers in the background as a campaign spoiler and a symbol of the ANC’s failure to tackle corruption. Apart from Zuma himself, no one from the former president’s inner circle has gone to jail despite a raft of?investigations, known as the Zondo Commission, into alleged wrongdoing during his term. Zuma said last month that he would not vote for the ANC and extended his support for the newly formed Umkhonto we Sizwe party, named after the ANC’s defunct armed wing.

Yet many South Africans wonder why Zuma remains out of prison. The worst unrest in the country’s post-apartheid era erupted in 2021, after Zuma was sentenced to 15 months in prison for refusing to testify before the inquiry investigating systemic corruption and cronyism under his presidency. Much of the rioting took place in Zuma’s home province of KwaZulu-Natal, where he enjoys significant support. He spent two months in prison before being released on medical grounds. The release was later ruled illegal, but his return to prison in August 2023 lasted just a few hours. Zuma was then conveniently released under a program to ease prison overcrowding.

The ANC faces strong competition. The centrist Democratic Alliance—the largest opposition party, whose support is strongest among white South Africans—believes that it could make a bigger dent than usual in the ruling party’s numbers this year, due to the ANC hemorrhaging Black voters.?The ANC has only a 7 percent polling lead, according to the Democratic Alliance’s own polling. The far-left populist Economic Freedom Fighters party has drawn support from the ANC’s Black voters, becoming the country’s third-largest party over the past decade. Just 57.5 percent of South Africans voted for the ANC in the 2019 parliamentary elections, down from a record 69 percent in 2004.

Without Ramaphosa at the helm, one poll suggested that voter support for the ANC would drop to less than 40 percent. Even with him as leader, analysts predict that votes could go?below 50 percent, raising the likelihood of the country being led by a coalition government for the first time in the post-apartheid era. That scenario would not end the ANC’s power, but it would weaken its hold on the country’s institutions and force it to compromise with coalition partners—giving South Africans accustomed to one-party rule a taste of European-style parliamentary democracy.

But the Democratic Alliance has its own problems. Several high-profile Black politicians have left the party, a strong factor in a country where racial diversity matters. The first Black leader of the Democratic Alliance, Mmusi Maimane, resigned in 2019 and implied that the party was still being led by a white minority; he argued that the party was not the best vehicle to unite South Africa.

In local elections in 2016 and 2021, coalition governments between the Democratic Alliance and smaller parties that joined forces to run major cities, including Johannesburg, collapsed. A coalition between the ANC and the Economic Freedom Fighters could boost the ANC’s backing for a multipolar global order and intensify great-power competition in the region by further antagonizing the United States. The EFF has positioned itself as a Marxist-Leninist party and suggested nationalizing almost all institutions and redistributing land from the white minority—which still holds 72 percent of the country’s land—without compensation.

Africa will hold 18 elections this year, including in Algeria and South Sudan (which have yet to set a date). Here are the votes with major political and economic consequences for Africa in 2024.

Africa’s Election Year Ahead

Sunday, Feb. 25: Senegal holds presidential elections.

Monday, July 15, to Tuesday, July 16: National elections take place in Rwanda.

Wednesday, Oct. 9: Presidential and legislative elections in Mozambique.

Sunday, Nov. 24: Presidential elections are scheduled in Tunisia.

Saturday, Dec. 7: Ghana holds presidential and legislative elections.

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The Cost of the Ukraine War for Russia

In this report, RAND researchers present estimates of what costs Russia is incurring as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. As of September 2022, researchers estimated military costs reached $40 billion. Full-year 2022 gross domestic product losses amounted to between $81 billion and $104 billion and full-year financial capital destruction reached $322 billion. Direct military spending may amount to almost $132 billion through 2024. Over the long term, even with a stalemated war, Russia's economy and the standard of living of its people are likely to decline. The main factor sustaining Russia's economy is the export revenue it earns from oil and gas sales. Despite these significant economic losses, RAND researchers judged these costs to be sustainable for the next several years.

Key Findings

Russia has incurred direct military costs, gross domestic product losses, and financial capital destruction and stood to face a decline in the standard of living of its citizens

• As of September 2022, the direct military costs of the war might have reached $40 billion, or 84 percent of 2021 national defense spending. Of this $40 billion, operations and compensation amounted to $29 billion. Materiel amounted to $11 billion. Direct costs through 2024 were expected to amount to almost $132 billion.
• For all of 2022, gross domestic product losses amounted to between $81 billion and $104 billion. However, growth returned by the second quarter of 2023.
• Russia experienced $322 billion in financial capital destruction in 2022, as measured by the market value of companies on the Moscow Stock Exchange, but the market has revived in 2023.
• Russia can sustain these costs for at least several years. However, over the long term, even with a stalemated war, Russia's economy and the standard of living of its people are likely to decline.

Table of Contents

• Chapter OneIntroduction
• Chapter TwoOverall Costs
• Chapter ThreeDirect Military Costs
• Chapter FourThe Mechanisms of Russian Economic Decline
• Chapter FiveA Future of Likely Decline
• Chapter SixPostscript: The Costs of War by Late Summer 2023

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2400/RRA2421-1/RAND_RRA2421-1.pdf

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