a-Culture, Economic Development and the Third World # b-Metaphors of Global Inequality. part 2

1 - Iulia Nechifor [Studies and Reports of the Unit of Cultural Research and Management - No. 6]

2 - Michael P. Marks Department of Politics Willamette University [Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association Seattle, Washington, April 17–19, 2014]

A. Determinism: development assistance - behaviour of elites in power 

In fact, finance is not granted unless development initiatives meet the criteria that those providing it have set for themselves and others. This choice is determined by the cultural frame of reference of the funding agencies concerned. What these understand by progress, poverty, democracy, liberation, emancipation, justice, human rights, participation, etc., will determine what is deemed to be worthwhile and thus deserving of financial support. Given these circumstances, the problems that affect this process stem not from “ill-will” but from the unconscious use by funding agencies of their own cultural references to determine eligibility. 

Development projects, which aim at changing the situation for local populations, are implemented in a way that those providing the finance deem rational. One of the reasons for the failure of a large percentage of such projects is that those behind them project their own ideas and interests on to them, while seeking to retain the greatest possible room for manoeuvre. This is one of the characteristics of those who control finance, whether they be foreign funding agencies or local elites. There is another problem as well: these ideas and interests are often contradictory, they are subject to constant change and, what is more, they fragment development. The result is that the “grass roots”, the great mass of the population, are placed at the mercy of these contradictions.  

One telling example of this might be the phenomenon of “evaluation”, as the very word incorporates the idea of “value”. Evaluations of development projects have to determine the “value” of what is done with the funds granted by the “North”. The standards on which evaluation is based are generally grounded in concepts such as effectiveness or economic life. According to specialists in this area, however, 45 it is rare for donors to make clear at the outset what it is they mean by “effective” or, to use a more recent word, “sustainable”. It is equally rare to begin by considering and specifying how the recipient interprets these concepts in practice. The recommendations of many evaluation exercises thus generally conform to the donor’s frame of reference, and the vicious circle is closed: “evaluation is carried out to make donors feel secure, and reinforces their position of power, even if, in a limited sphere, it raises certain questions. What evaluation centres on is not the dynamics of local development, with its own logic, but measurement of the immediately visible impact of the aid being provided”.

In fact, all that is generally studied are the short-term effects (there are few evaluations ten years after the end of a project, for example) and, above all, the effects planned for. Of course, the greatest lessons, both positive and negative, would be learnt from long-term and secondary effects. The donor can thus retain the “power” to choose which forms of behaviour will be entailed by “projects” and other cooperation plans. So, for example, financing may be available for a school, but not for the construction of a temple. Recipients have the power only to refuse the aid or to direct it as discreetly as possible in accordance with their priorities, by investing it in aid funds for productive activities only, or indeed for their own personal interest. 

The negative impact of outside influences is also seen in cases where democratic systems are imposed on developing countries. This problem has taken on a new dimension since the collapse of the communist bloc and the end of the East-West stand-off. A powerful wave of democratic reform shook developing States at that time. These pressures, in the form of popular demonstrations, referendums and local or national elections, were exerted to obtain faster democratization, and undermined many restrictive political regimes. The movements concerned had a variety of origins.  

First of all, pro-democracy demonstrations have firm roots in these self-same States. African populations, for example, had already demanded more democratic freedom before the upheaval in Eastern Europe, as is exemplified by the case of Senegal, where the government authorized the formation of opposition parties towards the end of the 1970s and that of Sudan, which went through a brief period of parliamentarianism and democratic debate in the mid-1980s. Economic crisis gave a new impulse to the democratization movement, as a large part of the population correlated economic difficulties with the absence of basic freedoms. 

These strong internal pressures for multi-party politics, however, were supplemented by pressure from the main international donors, which insisted that they would take account of progress in political freedom and good government when considering whether to grant aid. Although most ordinary people and members of elites manifestly believe that introducing a multi-party system is a step forward, others are still uneasy about what seems to them to be excessive optimism, given the specific circumstances of States, ethnic differences, the absence of a democratic political culture, etc.

It is now becoming clear, in fact, that economic progress has not followed political progress, as had been expected. Certain analysts are convinced that the failure of development policies is due to a “failure to instrumentalize political systems”,47 giving rise to “evils” such as patrimonialism, patronage, nepotism, etc. When these aspects are referred to, what is being discussed is the relationship between the policies adopted by the elites in power and their consequences on the state of local development.  

B. Determinism: attitude of elites in power - internal sociocultural dysfunctions  

Analysis of this relationship brings to light the existence of a twofold dynamic in the power relations between the existing authorities and local populations, particularly in Africa. On the one hand, elites often seek to associate themselves with the cultural foundations of their society in order to acquire political legitimacy and govern as they see fit. On the other, the fact that their governance is generally totalitarian and imposes exogenous development models means there is a danger of social and cultural dysfunctions unleashing situations of identity crisis that will lead to tragic consequences.  

The cultural foundations of power  

The political element, which has been recommended as a remedy for Third World development following the success of the role played by the State in stimulating rapid growth in Asia, has had unforeseen effects in most of the countries of Africa, where the State counts for much less than ties of kinship and traditions of predation dominated by what J.F. Bayart terms “the governmentality of the belly”.48 The way some heads of State are turning to the cultural roots of their societies in order to legitimize their power is revealing, as it helps account for the importance of cultural aspects in the structuring of hierarchies within developing countries. 

Analysing these relationships, Michel G. Schatzberg4” shows that, by contrast with the West, where the idea of power is essentially transformative (the ability to get something done by someone), in Africa this concept is linked to the consumption of resources and “eating” (if you can eat, you are powerful, and the more you eat, the more powerful you are, there being a close correlation between the language of food and that of corruption), to references to witchcraft and other occult forces (the spiritual world is also a world of power and politics) and to the principle of unity and indivisibility (there can be only one “father” in the great family of the nation, and it is unlikely that the political “father” currently in power will be willing to share his rights and responsibilities with other “members of the political family”).  

Crafty politicians understand these spiritual facets of power and deliberately use them to manipulate public opinion. Thus, the metaphors and language of fatherhood and the family are often used in Africa because they refer to deep-rooted cultural conceptions of what constitutes a legitimate political order. Thus, in the case of Madagascar, for example, the nature of the State cannot be understood without taking account of the contractual relationships between the people and its leaders, relationships “rooted in consanguinity and alliance between the holders of power and the people”.

Other analysts believe that the cultural factor also accounts for the profound contradictions between rational ways of exercising power and the promptings of society: “... the emergence of numerous variants of patronage and corruption is not due solely to a tendentious interpretation of the colonial heritage, but also owes something to the survival of forms of behaviour that one might term ‘traditional’. This leads us to think that these ‘evils’ need to be qualified in the light of their ambivalence, which is linked to the emotional charge involved in the relationship between the forces of tradition and modernity”.

Recourse to the study of political mindsets down through history, of sociology and of anthropology thus appears to be necessary if we are to achieve a better understanding of the “traditional” standards of political life and to adapt the principles of governance and democratization to local situations, in the interests of “the community”; failure to do so leads to deep crises, often resulting in interethnic wars. 

C. Power and sociocultural crises  

Under the effects of political and economic experience, training abroad and “subservience” towards “donors”, elites (in political or some other type of power) seek to copy foreign models, seen as signs of “modernity”, and to use much of their countries’ wealth for their own personal ends.52 Addressing this, B. Badie spoke of the “cleaving of the world”:  

“The crisis of State legitimacy has been instrumental in reinforcing the dependence of the Princes of the South on those of the North, in aggravating their tendency towards patrimonialism and, because of this twofold process, in diverting the bulk of international aid into private hands. This practice of exclusion has sometimes seemed to serve a dual purpose: for the Princes of the North, it is an effective way of turning developing States into ‘clients’; for the Princes of the South, it is also a good way of entering the club of States, which enables them to benefit from the appearance of power. But the price to be paid is heavy: over and above the stagnation that ensues in terms of development, this conception of relations between States has hastened the cleaving of the world - the split, now manifest, between the world of States and that of peoples and social movements. In developing countries, the governed are increasingly cut off from official governmental structures, and are losing the taste for citizenship, preferring to take refuge in substitutive identities [...I The international is thus becoming a language of protest, bringing together the ideas of domination, exploitation, conspiracy and the systematic destruction of cultures.“

In these circumstances, indigenous cultures are a completely subversive power at the very heart of national government. Leaders enjoy wealth, influence and power at the expense of the majority. Generally, the latter “cling on” to the standards of their traditional culture and find it difficult to cope with conditions imposed by the central authority. Logically, there is a permanent conflict between those who feel reverence for foreign methods and those who are exploited by them. Analyses show that, in most developing countries, this has been instrumental in swelling the disenchanted mass of people who live in destitution. The everincreasing number of the dispossessed has led over time to political and economic upheavals, the case of Zaire being one of the most revealing. According to certain analysts, it is “the cultural alienation of African elites on the Western model”, and “bloodsucking elites, the agents of underdevelopment”, that lead to disastrous economic effects.

It follows from these examples that the three-way relationship between development assistance, elites in power and local culture is a complex and ambiguous one, but one which has major consequences for the state of development of the Third World. The imposition of exogenous economic and political models that are incomprehensible to the local populations, the rise to power of a wealthy ‘minority whose aim is to serve its own private or ethnic interests rather than those of society as a whole, the undermining of established communities; these factors ultimately come together to create a state of heteroculture, a loss of collective bearings, and a crisis of identification mechanisms. 

Rejection of these models imposed from outside or by the coercion of home-grown elites is manifested in the modem world by the rise of Islamism, which is often regarded as one of the ways whereby people can return to their roots, to basic values. This situation of crisis means that the debate on the strategies and directions to be followed in the name of development is still an open one.  

The limits of current development models

As we have now seen, the dysfunctions that maintain the division between North and South are varied in origin and extremely complex in nature. Different world development strategies,. the involvement of financing bodies, bilateral, regional and international cooperation relationships, the work of non-governmental organizations, etc., have certainly played a large part in improving living conditions and initiating economic progress in numerous developing countries; the progress seen in the States of Latin America and the “Asian miracle” are proof of this. The social costs of this process have been enormous, however, while in many countries the state of development is still very low. This situation means that there is a need to consider how well suited the demands of development are to local needs and to take stock of the changes entailed by the transformations that are required if this end is to be achieved. 

The dichotomy between endogenous economic development and exogenous economic development  

The concept of endogenous development is treated in the programmes of UNESCO and in studies carried out by numerous human sciences specialists as an important axis in the complex, multi-faceted process of development. The endogenous approach requires that account be taken of the sociocultural context in which development takes place, and of specific conditions connected with the culture concerned. This approach seeks to respond to the real needs of the target populations. It is based to a great extent on their degree of creativity, their values and potential and their forms of cultural expression, and its objective is to enable them to realize their ambitions. The endogenous approach enables the populations concerned to play an active part in their own technological development, while safeguarding the integrity of their sociocultural structures.

This ideology, which is often considered idealistic, comes into competition with what is known as “exogenous development”, meaning by this the development model of the industrialized societies, which is at the same time the aspiration of the elites in power in these countries and the objective of the work of different bilateral and multilateral bodies and institutions which, by different means (development assistance, structural adjustment programmes, etc.), propose or impose this form of progress towards material betterment. 

One feature of Third World societies, for example, is that their experience of industrialization is affected by extremely onerous constraints connected both with the event of independence, which by definition is something very recent, and with the very powerful enticements of foreign models. 

The convergence of these two phenomena explains why, in a very brief initial stage, traditional cultural models were undermined, while subsequently, over the course of the 1960s and more as time went on, there was a return to these cultures, which manifested itself in the questioning of imported models; finally, we are now seeing the beginnings of less frenzied efforts to stabilize different original models of development. It is clear that this process of interchange between an emerging cultural code and a system of interactions that is now coming into being can only be understood by reference to social structures and events. It is essential to bear in mind that any given culture derives not from a model created out of nothing, but from specific historical contexts, which enable us to understand the conditions under which one particular model of interaction or another came into being and then stabilized into system-organizing cultural models.  

The following diagrams55 show the differences between the two starting situations, which in fact represent two different cultural models: 

Theories, concepts and models of development that have come out of the European and American experience and that are built on a “quantitativist” European logic, therefore, do not apply to the realities of the countries that are now developing. For new styles of development to emerge, however, it would be necessary to accept the possibility that new, original forms of development might be found, ones that differ from what are claimed to be universal theories. The classic example of this is provided by the informal sector. 

Composed of “microbusinesses” covering all areas of activity (food selling, manufacture of consumer items, repair, transportation, etc.), this sector reportedly employs more than half the urban population in sub-Saharan Africa, and the figure is in some cases close to 80%.56 The fact that the State sometimes encourages this kind of activity has been criticized by Western donors. But to try to subject this informal sector to the rules of the formal sector inevitably means suppressing it, and thus considerably increasing unemployment and aggravating the nutritional situation of the poorest. If the informal sector could give birth to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rooted in the local fabric, Africa could perhaps have a chance, at last, to find a path to development that was in keeping with its culture.

Third Worldism: what is the reality, and what does it mean today? 

The expression “Third World”, which appeared in France at the time of the Bandoeng Conference (1955) from the pen of G. Balandier and A. Sauvy, designating the three quarters of the human race that was outside the Western world of development, was intended to illustrate the idea that international affairs were not just for the great powers, and that account would henceforth have to be taken of the huge numbers of people living in colonized countrieswho had until then been mere bit players on the international stage. The expression “Third World” prefigures the use of the word “South” and refers to divisions other than the horizontal one between East and West. 

Anyone who looks objectively at perceptions of the world over the last quarter of a century cannot fail to notice the remarkable change that has taken place in the way international relations are viewed, particularly those between the North and the South. 

Over several “development decades” in the “new international economic order”, the relationship with countries in the South has undergone profound transformations: the idealistic image of the planet as a “global village” united by bonds of solidarity has gradually given way to major divisions in the spheres of politics, economics, society, culture, etc. 

if the North sets the “standard”, the ultimate stage to which most non-industrialized countries aspire, the latter, in the South, are still largely in a state of “underdevelopment”. This situation is the result of several combinations of certain major factors, of which the most important are:

Widespread food shortages (over the last 30 years, a picture of the “geography of hunger” has been built up). While the stocks held by developed countries and the availability of transport mean that acute famines are confined to situations of political anarchy and war with economic blockades, chronic malnutrition, by contrast, is found everywhere, even in countries that are self-sufficient overall, owing to extreme social inequalities. Countries that can provide less than 2,500 calories a day per inhabitant must be regarded as failing to meet their essential needs. In fact, 75% of the world’s population are in this position, and 25% provide only 2,000 calories per inhabitant per day.  

The rate of natural population growth in the Third World ranges from 2% to 4%, the overall fertility index from three to eight children per woman. East Africa is the region that holds all the records, with a fertility index of eight children per woman, and a growth rate in the index of 10 inhabitants per square kilometre per year.  

Industrialization is limited and incomplete everywhere. There are countries that have virtually no industries at all, and others where there are powerful ones, but nowhere has a complete and homogeneous industrial fabric come into being, which means that industrialization is reliant on costly imports (by contrast with Europe in the nineteenth century, where industrial growth was a cumulative process that propagated itself without tapping into outside resources). It must be noted, however, that there is now a major contrast between the new industrial countries of Asia, which have succeeded in setting a growth dynamic in train, and most of the other countries where, despite textile and metallurgical industries, etc., industrialization has not taken off. 

Agriculture is dominated by the divide between food crops and cash crops, which compete for resources: land, investment and skilled labour.  

The school enrolment rate is low and varies between countries (from 20% in Mali to 80% in Algeria), but the figures need to be treated with caution, given the variation in teaching quality and the number of hours of teaching per week or year. 

Cities are two-tiered: functioning city centres, which are often very modem and expensive, contrast with poor suburbs, even shanty towns, where people from the countryside settle in large numbers, without real jobs and without resources. Swollen cities are a burden, and their glaring social inequalities sum up all the tragedy of the Third World. The economic consequences of this situation are made all the more serious by the fact that cities generate consumption patterns in which imports tend to play a very large part.  

By contrast with nineteenth-century Europe, the national integration of countries is not a driving force: they are too small, or are deeply divided into rival regions or ethnic groups. This is generally the case in Africa, and is one of the main features of the extreme political violence seen in Third World countries. 

The heavy weight of debt is still acting as a drag on development in numerous developing countries. The debt relief measures taken, particularly by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have helped to give investors confidence in the newly industrialized countries of Asia and Latin America, but the problem is a long way from being solved, especially in Africa.  

This brief outline of the main features that characterize the Third World today throws into relief the simultaneous appearance of two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, there is the tendency towards the globalization of trade and the creation of a “global economy”. On the other, there is the rise of identity-related demands, particularly in Africa. There, the disintegration of the State has led people to turn back to their traditions, their religion, their language, their tribe, etc. The implosion of States has changed the objective of wars; now, it is not so much countries that turn warlike, but subnational elements in revolt against the uniformity of the nation-state. Formerly a force for unification, nationalism now sows division.

In Africa, the list of socio-ethnic conflicts leading to civil war is a long one: Rwanda, Burundi (clash between Tutsis and Hutus), Senegal (struggle for the independence of Casamance), Mali, Niger (armed rebellion by the Touaregs), Chad, Sudan (rivalries between Muslims and Christians), Algeria (war between the State and Islamists), Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, etc. These struggles for tribal influence, often sustained and exacerbated by the political powers since independence, help to explain the widespread practices of favouritism and corruption, whose beneficiaries are determined by the ethnic origin of the leaders. 

These situations show that the ethnic factor, and thus cultural references, are still inextricably rooted in African societies. Generally speaking, some analysts see this as creating “regrettable” obstacles to economic development, with the climate of political instability leading to the proliferation of famines and the creation of a “general state of tension that does not encourage international investment”.

But the increasing prevalence of these internal conflicts could lead the analysis further. The East-West rapprochement has accentuated the North-South divide and led to a loss of collective bearings: for the countries of the South, the socialist State was one of the landmarks of modernism, and they leant on this potential ally and its criticism of capitalism when expressing their demands and their global vision of the world in economic rhetoric (exploitation, unfair trade, development and underdevelopment, etc.). The division of the world, then, did not centre on ethnic or religious criteria, but on degrees or forms of development. 

This system of common reference points has now collapsed, something that has been manifested in the way culture has been placed back at the centre, with the exaltation of identities, cultural borders, differences. These aspects, which are sometimes regarded as “excesses of culturalism”, are in fact a reaction to an excessive concentration on economics. The return to cultural values thus represents “a difficult but necessary stage in the process of globalization: where the economy has turned the world into a walled garden, culture seems to be the refuge of identities and particularism, placing the necessary international contradictions on ground where they can still be expressed”.

The restoration of culture to this central position, and its most serious manifestation, the rising strength of Islamism, now poses major risks to the North-South rapprochement, since cultural confrontations can be more savage and harder to manage than economic confrontations: “Whereas economic differences were by definition surmountable in development theory, cultural differences and identities are reinforced by their permanence and continuity. Development was a common realm of discourse and meaning, but the exaltation of cultural identities, pushed to the extreme, is multiplying situations in which communication between different types of discourse is impossible. Meanwhile, cultural stereotypes are confirming ordinary people in France and Europe in the feeling that their opposition to the ‘others’ in general, and to ‘Arabs’ in particular, is insurmountable. To see others as being irremediably different is to cast them as barbarians, but it is also to turn oneself into a savage and shut oneself into a closed and moribund world. It is the return to inward-looking whiteness and Christianity that is now the biggest threat to Europe”.

The Third World, then, raises a number of issues for international society and collective security. On the one hand, these issues may contribute to tensions on the international stage stemming, as we have just pointed out, from identity crises and xenophobia, but also from rivalry for influence among the great powers in areas of decolonization (indirect conflicts, military aid, military presence, intervention diplomacy, etc.), or from efforts to conquer economic or commercial markets (free trade zones, commercial aid policies, etc.). On the other hand, though, they can be factors for stabilization and harmonizatidn in international society: the Third World could become one of the main stages for action on disarmament, and a place where developed, industrialized States act to foster economic progress.  

The dialogue of cultures, a stronger dynamic of cultural cross-fertilization, and efforts by the North to understand and acknowledge the right to cultural difference, should be the priorities of the modem world.

Viewed from this angle, the role of international and regional cooperation and development institutions becomes extremely important, since what dialogue between cultures requires before anything else is awareness the world over of the importance of the cultural factor both for the advancement of the human race in all fields (economic, political, social, etc.) and for the maintenance of peace. 

Metaphors of Global Inequality

Abstract

Metaphors are a powerful source of information for scholars as they devise theories ofinternational relations (IR). Many of the assumptions that inform theories of IR and the conclusions drawn from them are premised on foundational metaphors. In the study of global inequality metaphorical categories frame the analytical debate. Global inequality has been conceived of metaphorically in a variety of terms including the concepts of “core and periphery,” “dependency,” “North and South,” and “developed and less developed states.” Even the term “global inequality” has metaphorical qualities. Each of these metaphorical constructions provide tacit information that influences the way the topic is studied and how explanations are formulated to explain relations between parts of the world with differing amounts of wealth. Critical interrogation of metaphors of global inequality can yield new information that may re-frame the problem of the distribution of wealth and re-formulate theories to explain its role in international relations.

Metaphors of Global Inequality

Of all the areas of international political economy that rely on metaphors to convey abstract ideas, perhaps the most interesting is the study of relations among actors of unequal wealth. This is for the simple reason that the very act of defining the relationship among these actors is fraught with difficulties of terminology and lexicon. As is always the case in any area of international relations theory (or any field of abstract study), it is possible to approach inquiry in this area using as literal, precise, and unadorned language as possible keeping in mind that no form of human communication is free from metaphors. Thus, one could study matters in this realm using precise and explicit terminology such as “relations among international actors of unequal wealth.” Of course, this term is not devoid of metaphors by any means— “among” employs a spatial metaphor, “unequal” uses a metaphor of measure, “actors” treats states and other international entities as individuals—but it tries to spell out an empirical subject matter without making reference to conceptual metaphors that imply more judgements about the factual data in question than the relatively straightforward metaphors that “among,” “unequal,” and “actors” do.

1- Rather, as this paper will suggest, the competing metaphors that are involved in the definition of empirical concepts involve a range of metaphorical images, the meanings of which impart distinct judgements about the nature of relations among international actors of unequal wealth. Scholars face a number of choices when they put a label on any abstract concept. The difference between this area and other areas of international relations theory is that scholars seem to have been unusually conscious about the implications of whatever label they choose to describe the relations at hand. As we shall see, none of the choices that have been made about describing relations among international actors of unequal wealth have been entirely free of conceptual bias owing to the very way in which the field has been defined.

The Ordinal Worlds Metaphor

By the ordinal worlds metaphor I mean the terms “First World” and “Third World” (and toa much lesser extent “Second World”) that are used to refer to wealthy and less wealthy parts of the world. Numerical metaphors (including ordinal metaphors) are not found widely in international relations theory, although they are used in other areas of theory and practice such as physics and the law. The term “Third World” was coined in 1952 in an article in L’Observateur by Alfred Sauvy. 2 Sauvy based this term on the French concept of the “Third Estate,” that is the economic class comprised of the “commoners.” Having classified less economically advanced countries as “third” in rank, it was only natural that a “first” and “second” had to be defined. The “First World” came to describe countries of advanced economic development, while the “Second World” took on a somewhat different meaning applied to the Soviet-dominated communist countries. In this sense the term implies both political difference as well as economic characteristics.

The reason why “First World” and “Third World” qualify as metaphors and not literal expressions of how wealth and economic activity are distributed throughout the world is that there is no way to “count” which parts of the world come “first,” “second,” “third,” or anywhere else in a ranking of where wealth and economic activity are concentrated. These are merely convenient expressions meant to capture the way that on a scale of economic development certain areas are more advanced than others (although it should be noted that the terms “development” and “advanced” are themselves metaphors fraught with their own problems as the next section will explain). Obviously wealth is unevenly distributed throughout the world and economic activity takes place to various degrees and in varying types of economic pursuits (e.g., agricultural production, industrial manufacturing, the provision of services, financial transactions, etc.) and it is convenient to come up with some way of providing a scale that gauges these varying levels of wealth and economic activity.

As simplifying terms go, “First World” and “Third World” appeal to people’s ability to think in terms of ordinal rankings. However it should not be surprising that such starkly oversimplified terms such as “First World” and “Third World” can obscure and mask the wide range and type of economic activity that results in unequal monetary distributions. As with the other metaphors that will be dealt with in this discussion (e.g., the “core” and “periphery” metaphors, “North–South” relations), “First World” and “Third World” provide spatial imagery that is at odds with the actual global distribution of wealth and economic activity. While the “First” and “Third” parts of the metaphor are ordinal in nature, the “World” terminology evokes a geographic place, that is, a self-contained universe or “world.”

Yet while wealth and economic activity can take physical forms, they are also abstractions that defy geographic boundaries. Money itself is simply an accounting principle—a store of wealth—and banking and financial transactions, increasingly electronic in nature as they are, are not constrained by physical borders. So to speak of distinct geographic “worlds” that are set off from each other on the basis of the distribution of economic transactions is a gross oversimplification.

Additionally, like the “core” and “periphery” metaphors and the metaphorical images of “North” and “South” discussed below, “First World” and “Third World” also imagine as homogenized that which actually is economically diverse. Within the seemingly coherent “First World” are communities that are deprived of economic benefits, while in the seemingly uniformly impoverished “Third World” there are areas of quite appreciable wealth. We can acknowledge, as is true for “core” and “periphery” and “North–South” relations, that “First World” and “Third World” are ideational conceptions of concentrations of economic activity, but as metaphoricalimages they cannot help but lead scholars to focus their analytical and research energies on literal parts of the world that are meant to embody “First” and “Third” world characteristics. Thus, the “First World” is commonly associated with places such as Europe and North America while the

“Third World” is seen as a large portion of the rest of the world. A scholar who applied for research grants to study the “Third World” by examining the economic life of impoverished immigrant communities in, say, Sweden, would likely have to offer a more convincing justification for such a grant proposal than someone studying similar “Third World” economic phenomena in Mozambique. Such is the simplifying set of expectations that the “First World” and “Third World” metaphors create.

Ordinal rankings also can have the effect of suggesting quality in addition to mere numerical classifications. Someone who comes in “first place” in a contest obviously has done better than someone who has come in third. This is not necessarily the connotation Alfred Sauvy had when he coined the term “Third World” after the fashion of the French “Third Estate.” Sauvy’s intention was to make an analogy between the economic condition of certain countries relative to the wealthier and more industrialized countries to which they were compared. Nonetheless, proponents of economic development in the “Third World” have objected that the “Third World” label stigmatizes the regions and countries in question and assigns to them a status of inferiority. Such is the nature of metaphors; they bring meaning to a situation but they can also problemetize an issue or frame a concept in such a way that it is in need of a solution. It is for this reason that the “Third World” metaphor has been challenged in recent years in favor of ostensibly less pejorative linguistic constructions such as those focusing on “development.”

Concerns about the connotations (both overt and subtle) of the ordinal worlds metaphor have 5 been raised by scholars who specialize in this area. In the inaugural issue of the journal Third World Quarterly which debuted in 1979 questions were raised in a forum about why the term “third world” was chosen for the journal’s name over other possible monikers. As Leslie Wolf-Phillips (1979, 105) points out in that forum, when Sauvy coined the term “third world” in 1952 he did so in a Cold War context: “It may be that in the 1950s the phrase tiers monde was used more in the sense of ‘Third Force’ rather than ‘Third World,’ indicating ‘non-alignment’ rather than ‘underdevelopment’.”3

Wolf-Phillips continues that this sense of the term has been verified by William Safire in his The New Language of Politics (1972) in which Safire supplements the “force” metaphor in “third force” with additional metaphorical imagery implying a meaning of political alignment rather than economic development. Safire defines tiers monde as: “Third Force:...a weight added at the fulcrum of the balance of power; a group of nations, or an ideology, between the communist and the western camps” (Safire 1972, 67 quoted in Wolf-Phillips 1979, 106). Wolf-Phillips (106) observes that with 4 the easing of some Cold War tensions in the 1960s and the emergence of newly independent countries as a result of European de-colonization tiers monde took on the new meaning of poorer countries relative to the industrialized world. It is interesting to note that as the shift took place from political alignment to economic status the metaphorical imagery associated with ordinal rankings also shifted from that of “force” to that of “world,” perhaps conveying that people associate politics with notions of physical capabilities as captured in the word “force” while the term “world” is associated more with notions that economic activity is physically contained within metaphorical “worlds.” Wolf-Phillips goes on to observe that as political alignment as expressed in the phrase “third force” was replaced by economic conditions as expressed in the phrase “third world” this led scholars and practitioners to experiment with alternate language such as that involving the 6 metaphors of “development.”

Metaphors of “Development”

Metaphors in the study of relations among international actors of unequal wealth include the metaphorical expressions of “developed,” “less developed,” “developing,” and “least developed” regions, as well as the metaphorical concept of “development” and “underdevelopment” associated with the theories of the same name. In her historical review of terms referring to the “third world,” Leslie Wolf-Phillips (1979, 106) avers that the “phrase ‘under-developed’ was probably first coined ‘officially’ in the 1951 UN document Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries” however the Oxford English Dictionary finds a reference in a January 1949 speech by U.S. President Harry S. Truman in which he proclaimed “we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Oxford English Dictionary).

As a literal expression, and in its simplest sense, the verb “develop” means “to bring from latency to or toward fulfillment” (American Heritage Dictionary, 511). The term can be applied to any number of processes, for example, it can refer to sexual maturity. In this sense, the term connotes a process of completion, and thus the same American Heritage Dictionary (ibid.) defines the adjective “developed” as “advanced in industrial capability, technological sophistication, and economic productivity.” Linguistically, then, the transition from the verb “develop” to the adjective “developed” represents a metaphorical application of a generic process to a specific quality associated with a discernible empirical realm. The qualities of “fulfillment” associated with the 5 verb “develop” are metaphorically applied to the realm of industrial production where they take on the new quality of “technological sophistication and economic productivity” (ibid.).

The metaphorical translation of qualities from the realm of processes to descriptors occurs with other definitions of “developed” as well. Secondary and tertiary definitions of the verb “develop” include “to expand or enlarge;” “to aid in the growth of; strengthen;” to improve the quality of; refine;” “to cause to become more complex or intricate; add detail and fullness; to elaborate” (American Heritage Dictionary, 511). As with the primary definition, these are largely generic processes. Yet when they are translated as an adjective in the term “developed” (“advanced in industrial capability, technological sophistication, and economic productivity”) a metaphorical process has taken place that the qualities of one realm (processes of growing or coming to completion) are applied to a separate realm of industrial production and new meanings (“technological sophistication and economic productivity”) are the result. When it comes to researching the relationship between “developed” and “less,” “under,” and “least” developed regions, the implications of the metaphorical complications that arise when moving from verb to adjective become apparent. Whereas fulfilment or completion as processes can be value-neutral (the development from larvae to pupae in insects, for example, represents little more than an organic transition), developing “industrial capability, technological sophistication, and economic productivity” can be seen either as desirable or less desirable qualities.

The American Heritage Dictionary (511) defines “developing” as “having a relatively low level of industrial capability, technological sophistication, and economic productivity.” So as an analytical concept, the metaphor of being “developed” or underdevelopment” implies something about the desirability of certain qualities that the literal processes of the verb “develop” largely leave out. Because the metaphor of “development” brings to mind improvements over some underdeveloped state of being, theories of development and underdevelopment typically proceed on the assumption that development is a more desirable state than underdevelopment. As I discuss elsewhere (Marks 2011), metaphors in human language frequently have the unintended effect of creating problems that must be solved. With regards to the metaphors of “development,” clearly a state of development is seen as preferable to what is deemed metaphorically as “underdevelopment.” Indeed, some scholars and practitioners have come to see the metaphor of “under-development” as a pejorative preferring instead “developing” or “less-developed” which implies room for improvement. Using more literal language (or as literal as is permitted given the 6 ubiquity of metaphors in human communication), one could describe the economic conditions of areas of the world with lesser amounts of economic activity and commodified wealth with any number of descriptive terms.

One could say, for example, that they are based on “sustainable agricultural production in which a variety of crops are grown and stored to maintain the lifestyle and culture of self-supporting groups.” Obviously this sounds less like a problem for both practitioners and theoreticians alike than if the situation is described metaphorically as “underdeveloped.”

Likewise, scholars and government officials probably would be far more alarmed about communities whose economic structure is based on (using literal description) “unsustainable commodified manufacturing in which wealth is expressed in terms of monetary instruments that are unequally distributed throughout society” than by a metaphorical description of a “developed” economy. As obvious as this observation sounds, it is worth reminding oneself regularly that theories such as those that apply to “development” can support only those hypotheses and predictions that can be imagined by the metaphorical concepts that inform their very assumptions. This is no less true for theories of “development” than any other area of study in international relations theory.

The implication that “development” follows a linear trajectory is perhaps an inevitable result of what Patrick Breslin (2004, 2) identifies as the mechanistic Newtonian metaphors that frame much of the theorizing about economic development, particularly in areas of the world where economic activity has not produced comparable forms of wealth as “more developed” parts of the world: “Given the pervasive influence of Newton’s paradigm, it was only natural that when attention turned, for a variety of reasons in the 1950s, to the problems of poverty in the poor countries, those problems, and assumptions about how to solve them, were understood within a linear framework.

This way of thinking was reinforced by the success of the Marshall Plan—the first great experiment in fostering economic development.” For Breslin, the problem is obvious: Economic activity does not follow a linear logic of “development” which takes regions in poverty and inexorably transforms them into regions of wealth by way of a mechanical process of inputs and outputs as would be suggested through Newtonian metaphors of physics. Rather, what is more useful for Breslin (4–5) are metaphors of “chaos” and “complexity” which, while no less grounded in theories of physics,reflect the multitude of variables that can have an impact on outcomes. Breslin (6–7) writes:

“To use the language of the new sciences, a development project is an intervention in nonlinear and complex adaptive systems. When it has been planned with linear methods and expectations, chaos theory suggests what can happen…What would a nonlinear development model look like?

Metaphors from chaos and complexity studies suggest that it would look very much like what we call grassroots, participatory, bottom-up development.” Thus changing the language of development from metaphors of mechanical linear progression to chaos and complexity fundamentally alters scholars’ understanding of economic activity and the policies that bring it about.

A variation on the “development” metaphor is the metaphor of countries that possess high 10 degrees of technological achievement or economic activity as “advanced” industrial societies. “Advanced” in this context is both a spatial and a temporal metaphor. As a spatial metaphor “advanced” implies something located further along a linear path (for example, one can “advance” a game piece in a board game with a beginning and an end; pieces that are more “advanced” than others are closer to the end of the game). As a temporal metaphor “advanced” suggests a state of being that has been around long enough to acquire qualities not possessed by actors or processes that have not achieved the same state (for example, one can speak of “advances” in understanding about scientific principles; these advances come with time since a new discovery advances a theory compared to what the theory was able to say given a limited knowledge base in the past).

As with the metaphors of “development” and its variants, the metaphor of “advanced” can lead scholars unwittingly to equate economic “advancements” with some sort of improvement. Consequently, use of the term “advanced industrial societies” can create the same sort of theoretical propositions as theories that are based on the assumptions of desirability of economic “development.” “Advancement” as a metaphor glosses over the details of economic activity that characterize metaphorical “advanced” industrial societies. Rather than being seen as spatially and temporally further along, literal descriptions of these societies would demonstrate that they simply have different characteristics than societies based on other forms of economic activity. Comparing different types of economic systems rather than communities that are more or less “advanced” is a qualitatively different theoretical endeavor than one that relies on metaphorical constructions for its starting point.

The Metaphors of “Core,” “Center,” and “(Semi)Periphery”

The metaphors of “core,” “center,” and “(semi)periphery” employ common spatial imagery to the study of relations among international actors of unequal wealth. Literally, of course, countries and regions that represent the “core” or “center” of international economic interactions are not located at some definable site that can be located geographically at a polar point surrounded by a tangible “periphery.” Rather, what is meant by these terms is that economic activity and wealth are concentrated within certain communities that exert economic and political control over global economic interactions.

The Oxford English Dictionary cites the first use of the term “periphery,” meaning “the outlying areas of a region, most distant from or least influenced by some political, cultural, or economic centre” in Andre Gunder Frank’s Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (1969, 227) in which Frank contrasts the “periphery” to the “metropolis,” which “sucks capital out of the periphery and uses its power to maintain the economic, political, social, and cultural structure of the periphery.” Frank’s “metropolis,” a term invoking urban locations, was replaced by Immanuel Wallerstein with “core,” for example, in Part I of Wallerstein’s The Capitalist World Economy (1979) which focused on “the inequalities of core and periphery,” while other authors substitute “center” for “core” (see, for example, Cardoso and Faletto 1979).

The obvious problem of the “core” and “periphery” metaphors (and their variations) is that clearly the world’s geography does not indicate that there is any definable “center” of the world (leaving aside, of course, the earth’s geological center within the planet’s core). Land, sea, and the distribution of human populations simply do not form in such a way that economic and political communities form in concentric circles. Another issue involved with the imagery of these spatial concepts is the fact that those individuals who possess concentrations of wealth typically associated with the “core” or the “center” are in fact spread out widely throughout the world. Major urban areas associated with high levels of economic activity and wealth accumulation, for example, also typically harbor pockets of economic need.

Likewise, countries that commonly are associated with the “periphery” can be home to economic sectors that are highly lucrative to those engaged in them. The so-called “semiperiphery” presents the same problems of spatialization as it is difficult to locate portions of the world that are part- or half-way between the center and the periphery.

Obviously scholars who speak of “core,” “periphery,” and there variations are not so naive as to think that these terms refer to geographic locations. These are clearly metaphorical images meant to connote concentrations of wealth, not clearly identifiable physical locations. These scholars would be the first to point out, for instance, that poor people in the richest and poorest countries of the world represent the global “periphery” despite being scattered throughout the world (just as “core” economic activity takes place in Paris and Dakar alike). So the purpose of this discussion is not to “disprove” the core–periphery thesis. Rather, the point is that, like all metaphors, the metaphors of “core,” “periphery,” and their variations bring to mind images that can invite misleading conclusions. Despite the fact that world systems theorists are the first to point out that “core” and “periphery” refer to instances of economic activity, the shorthand of the spatial images suggest avenues for research that involve empirical evidence of a geographically divided economic and political universe.

 Thus, it is not surprising that when researchers set out to study the “core” they focus on entire parts of the world (e.g., Europe, North America, Japan, etc.) that certainly do contain high concentrations of wealth but also pockets of poverty. Likewise, when scholars research the “periphery” they tend to focus on parts of the world (e.g., Africa, Latin America, large portions of Asia) that contain communities of little wealth but also centers of intense economic activity.

Thus, “core” and “periphery” do tend to be associated with distinct geographic regions despite the 13 fact that they are meant only to refer to institutions and people involved in economic activity and the concentration of wealth. In a world in which increasing number of economic transactions are conducted electronically, the geographic implications of the “core” and “periphery” metaphors are of decreasing relevance.

As Paul Chilton (1996, 62) observes, the “core” or “center” and “periphery” metaphors and their variations share some common traits with the “container” metaphor and its variants that are typically associated with states. The “container” metaphor envisions states as hard-shelled entities that are set off from one another. If there are any interactions among container-like states, they must take place across definable boundaries. “Core” and “periphery” also bring to mind the strict spatial imagery associated with the “container” metaphor. The “core” or “center” is what is on the inside of the global distribution of wealth while the periphery lies at the outer reaches. There is a distinct sense of division between the two. As is true for all metaphors, however, there can be multiple interpretations.

 Thus, while Chilton sees synergies between the “core,” “periphery,” and “container” metaphors that reinforce the fiction of state sovereignty, Ian Clark (1989, 44) argues that, in conceptualizations of hierarchy in international relations, “outside a statist perspective, [hierarchy] may be analysed in terms of centres or cores, semi-peripheries, and peripheries.” Thus, for Chilton the core-periphery metaphor is evidence of statist thinking, while for Clark this metaphor is an alternative to the statist point of view. These different types of analytical conclusions highlight the imprecision of metaphors in the development of useful theories.

The Metaphors of “North” and “South”

Interactions among international actors of unequal wealth also have been deemed metaphorically as “North–South” relations. This term is meant to refer to the fact that the majority 14 of economic activity and wealth is located above the equator while lesser amounts of economic resources are allocated to regions further south. In addition, the rhetorical division of the world into 9 one of a “North–South” divide was in some respects a purposeful endeavor by leaders in the “South” to reorient the “East–West” conflict of the Cold War in order to rectify the economic exploitation and political marginalization of former European colonial states (see Berger 2004). However the expression also carries a metaphorical connotation since scholars who use this term explicitly assert that they mean to convey more than a literal geographic division of economic activity. Through this metaphor disparities in the global distribution of wealth are reduced to and imagined as a binary opposition between two distinct geographic poles.

As with the “core” and “periphery” metaphors and their variations, the “North–South” metaphorical imagery oversimplifies the complexity of the global distribution of wealth. Obviously, economic activity is unevenly located around the world and even within regions of relative economic wealth or poverty there are great variations within close proximity to each other. The terms “North” and “South” (curiously capitalized inasmuch as map directions typically are denoted in lowercase letters) suggest the same sort of compartmentalized images that the “core” and “periphery” metaphors imply in which there is little fluidity between two spatially separated realms. Just as north and south are fixed directions on a map, the metaphors of “North” and “South” in international relations theory suggest a permanent state of economic affairs. Furthermore, as polar directions, “North” and “South” imply a dyadic relationship quite possibly involving an oppositional component. The imagery also suggests a one-dimensional dynamic in that the relationship between “North” and “South” is defined on a linear axis.

The Metaphor of “Dependency”

Within the language of unequal international economic relationships there is the metaphor of “dependency.” The American Heritage Dictionary (501) defines “dependent” as “contingent on another; subordinate; relying on or requiring the aid of another for support: dependent children.” The same dictionary (ibid.) defines “dependence” as “the state of being dependent, as for support; subordination to someone or something needed or greatly desired; trust; reliance,” and “dependency” as “dependence; something dependent or subordinate.” Like all metaphors, the metaphor of dependency (as found most prominently in the theory of the same name) provides images with which to imagine a particular aspect of international political economy.

Generally speaking, and especially as depicted by Dependency Theory, the condition of dependency in international relations is thought of as an exploitative relationship between international actors of unequal wealth. If the terms “dependent,” “dependence,” and “dependency” 10 were used in their literal sense alongside additional descriptive terminology the connotation of exploitation would not necessarily be implied. As the definitions provided above indicate, conditions of dependence can be desirable because of the supportive qualities they offer.

A dependent child, for example, is supported and sustained financially by his or her parents or guardians in what many if not most people would describe as a relationship of nurturing and care. In its most basic sense, something that is dependent on another is merely contingent on a certain set of circumstances. Therefore, in the generic sense, to be dependent is simply to occupy a position along a chain of cause-and-effect, as in a “dependent variable.” A “dependent variable” in a causal chain of events is not being “exploited” by the independent or intervening variables that precede it. 

The negative connotations associated with dependency in the study of international political economy demonstrate in part one of the perils of metaphors in international relations theory, namely, metaphors that are broad and with the potential for suggesting multiple meanings can be interpreted in any number of ways some of which reflect the personal perceptions of scholars themselves. Many of the broadest metaphors in international relations indicate this phenomenon.

For example, the metaphor of “system” is used throughout international relations theory and differs in meaning from paradigm to paradigm. Because a “system” can mean many things, its suggestiveness as a metaphor is subject to multiple interpretations. The same is true with the metaphor of “dependence,” the literal meaning of which has a variety of definitions. Since the term can mean a range of things literally, it is not surprising that its meaning as a metaphor is multiform.

Obviously not all scholars are predisposed to see the relationship between an international actor of limited wealth with an actor of greater wealth as exploitative in nature, but since many do, the “dependence” metaphor gives them an opportunity to theorize this exploitation in a systematic fashion.

As typically constructed, the dependency metaphor depicts a situation in which international actors of lesser wealth are trapped in a permanently subordinate position because their choices are contingent on the economic advantages that international actors of greater wealth have over them. Cardoso and Faletto (1979, 22), for example, depict dependence in part as a situation in which local classes or groups in Latin America are involved in “enforcing foreign economic and political interests.”

In this view, the image that appears encourages scholars to quantify the extent of those economic advantages as opposed to other ways of measuring the relationship between the two sets of actors involved. For example, if a metaphorical picture of dependence emerged that highlighted the trust or reliance elements of dependence contained in the dictionary definition of this term, 17 scholars might put more effort into measuring confidence-building institutions that make economic growth contingent on growing prosperity in both sets of partners.

This is not necessarily to say that the predictions of Dependency Theory are wrong, but rather that with different metaphorical sense attached to them they would be based on analysis that triangulates a range of ways in which relations between international actors of unequal wealth are constituted and constructed. This requires examining the multiple ways that a broad metaphor such as dependence can be interpreted.

“Global Inequality”

Finally we come to the term “global inequality” which, when compared to other expressions discussed above, sounds less like a metaphor and more like a literal expression to describe what scholars envision when they use those terms. Etymologically speaking, however, even a the literal sounding “global inequality” is metaphorical in what it imagines. In particular, the term “inequality” is a metaphorical way of expressing measurement for something that is hard to measure. Wealth is subjective. Obviously, we can discern some absolute measures of wealth such as the gross economic output of a country, per capita income, distribution of wealth throughout society, etc. But beyond that, how people measure their economic well-being, and how they judge whether or not the they have achieved a certain standard of living, depends on custom, culture, convention, and personal taste. It is not for nothing that Patsy Cline sang “And yet the hand that brings the rose tonight is the hand I will hold, for the rose of love means more to me more than any rich man’s gold.”

In all seriousness, studies of global inequality are often built on the same assumption that metaphorically frames investigations into “North–South,” “core–periphery,” and “First World–Third World” relations, namely, the image of undifferentiated regions possessing wealth that can be measured in an absolute sense irrespective of how that wealth is defined or locally distributed. The metaphor of “inequality” presumes an ability to quantify amounts in ways that do not differentiate among different ways of measuring prosperity. A rich person in the year 1000 would be considered by the standards of the year 2000 to suffer a meager existence, lacking as it does the modern “luxuries” of electricity, indoor plumbing, and mechanized transportation, not to mention modern medicine and means for creating a reliably plentiful food supply. By the same token, in the contemporary world, conceptions of global “inequality” make little accommodation for differing standards of living that depend on custom, culture, and choice.

Furthermore, there is a linguistic bias built into notions of equality as applied to the social world. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the meaning of the word “equal,” as borrowed into English from the Latin root ?qua-lis, connotes magnitudes and numbers that are “identical in amount; neither less nor greater than the object of comparison” and things that have “the same measure; identical in magnitude, number, value, intensity, etc.” The OED goes on to explain that in this sense the term “equal” often is expressed “with latent notion of ‘at least equal’; hence not equal to means usually ‘less than’, ‘inferior to’.” Here then lies the metaphorical notion of measure that frames the study of global “inequality.” In matters of the distribution of wealth among all individual and corporate actors on earth (including states, other political divisions, and private organizations), equality is an impossibility and thus what frames the issue for scholars is a focus on the metaphorically imagined condition of those who have “less.”

After all, in mathematics, in the expression 2 + 2 = 4, what is on each side of the equals sign may represent an equal amount, but it is not the same. Two plus two may equal four, but two plus two is not the same as four. They are separate and distinct numerical quantities. On one side are two sets of two; on the other is a single set of four. Cumulatively four equals the sum of two and two, 19 but it is not the same collection of items as two sets of two are. For mathematicians this is not a “problem” as much as it is simply the solution to an arithmetic question. There is no expectation that what is equal is necessarily the same, let alone there be anything problematic about two quantities that are unequal in their amount.

For scholars of global “inequality,” however, the impossibility of distributing wealth “equally” around the world is complicated by the “problem”that results from imagining that there can be equality and the reality that even if such equality could be achieved it would still appear “unequal” since it is unrealistic to expect that equality of wealth would be experienced the same on a global scale. “Inequality” thus becomes less a literal substitute for metaphors such as “North” and “South” and more a metaphor itself for the lack of sameness in how individuals experience wealth.

However, as the math analogy above demonstrates, one does not necessarily expect a sameness where there is equality. For example, at one time the United States and the European Union represented roughly equal amounts of wealth. However, how that translated into economic opportunity was not the same.

The United States, comprised as it is of a single economy, provides greater opportunity for the free movement of economic assets, including human labor. Although the European Union has made strides towards complete economic and monetary union, it is still comprised of separate economies that complicate the free movement of capital and labor. Thus, equality of wealth between the United States and the EU does not necessarily mean that economic circumstances are the same. “Inequality” is an invented “problem” just as “equality” does not necessarily provide a “solution.”

To this, scholars of international relations would argue, of course, what is the purpose of studying something unless it is a “problem?” This is precisely the point. Academics who study 20 metaphors have long noted that one of the functions of metaphors is to create in the minds of people “problems” that need to be “solved.” It is therefore not surprising that in many introductory 12 international relations textbooks, the topic under discussion here is presented as the “problem of global inequality.” As the etymology of the word “equal” suggests, “inequality” is more than 13 merely a numerical situation of two or more sums not of the same value, but a condition in which one thing is less than another.

However, the “problem” for most scholars of international relations actually is not “inequality” but economic deprivation, or better yet, poverty and, as Paul D’Anieri (2011, 305) points out, “poverty” and “inequality” are not the same thing: “In contrast to ‘poverty,’ ‘inequality’ is inherently comparative; in measuring inequality, the question becomes, ‘How much wealth or income does one person have compared to someone else?’ It is very possible that a person’s income is growing, but more slowly than that of others. As a result, income is increasing but so is inequality. Does this mean poverty is increasing or decreasing?” (emphasis added). D’Anieri’s observations and question are useful because they highlight the fact that while poverty may be measured in an absolute sense, inequality is inherently relative. Whether or not poverty or inequality are a “problem” depends on not only on one’s perspective relative to one’s own situation over time and to other individuals’ condition at present but also on the perspective of observers who make their own determinations about what is a “problem.” 

” The “problem” of poverty can be solved by providing individuals who lack resources with additional resources that bring them out of poverty while the “problem” of inequality can only be solved not only by eliminating poverty but also by providing individuals with the same amount of resources providing they value them in the same way.

Used as a metaphor for conceptualizing any number of qualities of the human condition, “inequality” implies an undesirable situation that requires a solution that is unique from a separate undesirable situation—“poverty”—which can be solved in distinct ways. There are no intrinsically better ways for solving inequality versus poverty since they represent analytically distinct empirical problems. However, the metaphor of “inequality” privileges one way of thinking about a problem and thereby a set of solutions that emanate from it. The metaphor of “inequality” presumes what is missing from global economic interactions is an outcome of sameness as opposed to an outcome of improved economic conditions over time for any one individual which is suggested by the separate concept of “poverty.” Thus, not even the seemingly literal term “global inequality” resolves the dilemma of conceptualizing specific aspects of international political economy that are complicated by the other metaphors (e.g., “third world,” global “south,” “periphery”) that scholars employ in this area of investigation.

Concluding Thoughts About Relations Among International Actors of Unequal Wealth

In addition to the common metaphors discussed above there have been other metaphorical images that have been attached to countries in terms of their economic conditions relative to wealthier states. Although typically associated with political neutrality vis-à-vis the Western and Eastern blocs during the Cold War, the term “non-aligned” also can refer to countries that often are included among states possessing lesser amounts of economic wealth. The term “non-aligned,” of course, is associated with the “non-aligned movement,” that is, the “international anti-colonialist movement founded in Belgrade in 1961 to promote the interests of neutral (esp. Third World) countries not aligned with the superpowers of East or West” (Oxford English Dictionary). As is true for many metaphors in international relations theory, “alignment” is a spatial metaphor inasmuch as the process of “aligning” is to “to range, place, or lay in a line” (Oxford English Dictionary). Metaphorically, in politics “alignment” is to “bring into line with a particular tradition, policy, group, or power” (ibid.).  

In a metaphorical sense then “non-aligned” countries occupy a physical space that is not associated with states that possess economic wealth or power. Non alignment implies a sense of being set apart, either by choice or by circumstances, from countries that, by virtue of wealth and ideology, have gotten into line with each other or, to use yet another metaphor, have formed a “bloc.”

Another term that has been advanced to describe countries of less economic resources is“threshold” states or countries. In particular, the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (a United States government corporation) have instituted the Threshold Program designed to provide economic assistance to poorer countries around the world. As the word implies, “threshold” countries are those that, metaphorically speaking, are on the verge of making reforms that would create greater levels of economic prosperity. Originating in Old English meaning “the sill of a doorway” (and hence metaphorical in its origins), a threshold in common parlance is “the beginning of a state or action, outset, opening” (Oxford English Dictionary). As applied to countries deemed worthy or economic assistance, the metaphor of “threshold” implies that, with some help and assistance, threshold countries that are on the verge of improvement could commence on such a path. In light of its association with aid-granting agencies the metaphorical connotations of “threshold” countries seem particularly appropriate. It is somewhat surprising in this context that the term has not caught on with scholars inasmuch that referring to countries on the “threshold” implies the possibility for economic improvement more so than static metaphors such as “periphery” or “dependent” states. 

The futility of prevailing metaphors of global inequality is not lost on journalist Dayo Olopade (2014b) who, citing Bill Gates in the 2014 annual Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation letter, writes that terms involving “development” are no longer useful for describing global economic conditions. Olopade (ibid.) goes on to observe just how misleading metaphorical terms describing 16 world economics can be:

Only when employing a crude “development” binary could anyone lump Mozambique and Mexico together. It’s tough to pick a satisfying replacement. Talk of first, second and third worlds is passé, and it’s hard to bear the Dickensian awkwardness of “industrialized nations.” Forget, too, the more recent jargon about the “global south” and “global north.” It makes little sense to counterpose poor countries with “the West” when many of the biggest economic success stories in the past few decades have come from the East. All of these antiquated terms imply that any given country is “developing” toward something, and that there is only one way to get there.

Olopade’s alternative, which she elaborates on in her 2014 book, is to refer to economies as either “fat” or “lean.” In countries with “fat” economies, that is, countries with large amounts of accumulated wealth, “plenty is normal. Abundance is the average…Problem solving is well beyond the basics of sanitation, vaccination, and electrification” (Olopade 2014a, 12). Yet “fat” economies are plagued with the problems of being “fat,” such as an inclination for financial instability (as illustrated by the financial collapse of 2008), hyper consumption, and a dependence on imported sources of energy (ibid.).

By contrast, “lean” economies, those in places such as sub-Saharan Africa, grapple with 24 problems of disease, unemployment, lack of adequate medical resources, and limited access to reliable sources of energy (ibid.). Yet, “these difficulties obscure more than a few silver linings.

Individual Africans waste less food, owe less money, and maintain a regional carbon footprint that is the lowest in the world” (ibid., 13.). Thus, for Olopade, the terms “fat” and “lean” are far more descriptive in highlighting the qualitative differences in economic practices and conditions around the world than previous metaphors that seek to quantify a certain economic standard to which countries strive. Such a standard fails to acknowledge the different ways in which people live.

In fact, most of the metaphors discussed above have a sort of finality to them that does not capture the processes of change that are inherent in international political economy. One of the natural qualities of metaphors is that they provide terms of convenience. Yet convenience can have a price, in this case to fix a meaning in place so that it can be referred to without the necessity of repetition. Terms such as “Third World,” “periphery,” and “South” may identify a set of economic conditions at a particular time, but they are also terms of classification which, like other terms of classification—for example, those found in biology to classify the various kingdoms, phyla, genuses, species, etc.—group together a class of items, objects, or individuals which are then hard to conceive of outside of those groupings.

This obviously can be problematic in the realm of global economics in which the economic conditions of regions, countries, and localities are constantly changing relative to their prior conditions and to the conditions of others. Metaphorical terms, in their linguistic convenience, are resistant to the changing conditions of that to which they refer.

On the other hand, Vicky Randall (2004, 43) warns us that “we should not be too preoccupied with semantics. Obviously the specific phrase ‘Third World’ is largely anachronistic in the wake of the collapse of what, in the original schema, was held to be the Second World, that is the Soviet Union and its satellites, although a case could possibly be made for continuing to distinguish for the moment between the (former) Second and First Worlds because of the enduring consequences of their very different histories.”

On the other hand, these terms persist and, as metaphors, evoke the same sorts of responses and generate the same sorts of research agendas when they are anachronistic as when they possessed some geopolitical relevance. In fact, as Randall (ibid.) concedes, a “Third World-type category...draws attention to what continues to be a major axis of economic and political inequality” and “Third Worldist ‘discourse’ potentially provides a powerful rhetoric and rallying-point.”

So the metaphorical qualities of terms such as “Third World” continue to provide both analytical and political functions. Ironically, one of the terms to describe changing economic conditions around the world in recent years is also one of the more literally descriptive, namely, the concept of “Newly Industrialized Countries.”

This term both describes the economic condition of the countries in question in a fairly straightforward fashion, but serves the purpose of a metaphor in its abbreviated state—NICs—by providing a succinct reference point that economizes on language by substituting literal language with an evocative term. To a certain extent, then,debates over the metaphors of the international distribution of economic resources and political influence can be circumvented with more literal terminology designed to be analytically useful in the study of “global inequality.”