737 MAX 8 (A COMPREHENSIVE CASE STUDY)

In early 2011, Airbus, a leading aerospace entity and enterprise based in Europe, announced its plans to manufacture a reliable and fuel-efficient narrow-bodied aircraft, the A-320 NEO. The aircraft came with a comparatively modest price tag of 110.6 million dollars. The specifications of the aircraft attracted the attention of numerous operators, which began to place their pre-delivery orders with the airbus. Individuals who are quite familiar with the aviation industry, may validate this fact that the number one competitor of Airbus, which is actively participating in the arena, is an American based aerospace enterprise which goes by the name of Boeing. Boeing back in the early 1980s announced its ambition to manufacture wide-body aircraft compatible with short haul flights. The product proved to be a great success, with numerous budget and first class airlines incorporating the newly designed and innovative aircraft into their fleet. However, when Airbus Unveiled its latest product back in 2011, many regional airlines began to place their orders. Boeing, after coming in terms with the fact that Airbus was actually snatching its potential buyers away due to its lucrative and cost-effective wide body aircraft, decided to introduce a cost-effective product of its own. Airbus had decided to manufacture the a-320 Neo from scratch rather than modifying the existing A-320. Boeing, however, was not in a state to manufacture an aircraft from scratch as it required ferocious brainstorming and coming up with a new design model which involved time constraint and other limitations. At the end, the engineers and the top management decided to introduce a modified version of the 737, which was later branded and advertised as Boeing-737-max-8.

The 737-max-8 made it to the skies back in mid-2018. Many regional carriers found the new aircraft reliable both in terms of technical and financial aspects. However, the worst was yet to come for Boeing. ?On 29th October 2018, a 737-max-8 operated by loin air took off from Jakarta, Indonesia. Behind the controls were 31-year-old captain bhavye suneja and co-pilot Harvino aged 41. The crew members began to experience flight control issues and snags once the aircraft got off from the runway. Both crew members were receiving conflicting data regarding airspeed and altitude. ?At about 500 feet above sea level, the stick shaker activated, and the captain’s control column started to vibrate quite violently, in order to make the flight crew aware of the fact that the aircraft was about to stall. Stall is an aero-dynamic condition in which the wings of the aircraft can no longer provide sufficient lift, and at this point the aircraft begins to fall from the sky like a rock. The activation of stick-shaker intrigued the flight crew, as the aircraft was still climbing and possessed the adequate speed required to continue the assent. ?Conflicting data and apparent stall warning triggered a master-caution alarm present in the cockpit. ?Master-caution is a device which acts as an alarm designed to divert the attention of the pilots towards a fault that requires immediate troubleshooting, and an indication that the fault poses a threat to the safe flight operations of the aircraft. None of the flight crew members were able to detect the cause behind the subsequent failures. The pilot asked his first officer to trouble shoot the problem by consulting the quick reference handbook. A quick reference handbook is a pilot’s bible and comprises all the issues and their respective solutions, which a flight crew may encounter during a specific flight. However, there was no mention of such fatal combination of failures in the QRF, which this specific flight crew was facing. The 1st officer requested the pilot in command to make a turn back towards Jakarta, but his request and efforts went in vain. The captain decided to fly his aircraft to a suitable altitude and then trouble shoot the problem. However, at 5000 feet above sea-level, the aircraft started to experience a nose down attitude, even though pilots were not providing manual trim. Manual trim is a procedure which upon being utilized leads to the stabilizer of the aircraft being bugged up or down. The pilot in control, i.e., 1st officer, struggled to keep the aircraft stabilized and continue the flight in a straight direct path. It seemed as if the pilots were fighting against an invisible system which forced the nose of the aircraft to pitch down. The aircraft finally crashed into the Java Sea minutes after takeoff.

This specific Boeing 737 Max 8 commenced commercial operations months prior to the crash. It was a brand-new aircraft, and in mint condition. Indonesian authorities scrambled to assemble an investigative committee to get the matter investigated. Both black boxes were recovered hours after the crash and were transported to a Lab facility situated in Washington, DC. The investigative team got its hands on the flight data recorded by flight data recorder a few days later. The FDR data painted a haunting and terrifying image. The investigators spotted numerous nose down attitudes during the course of the whole flight, despite the fact no manual trim down command was initiated by the pilot in control. It seemed as if the aircraft had a mind of its own and was failing to abide by the inputs and commands which the flight crew elected. The investigative committee summoned a representative from Boeing to explain the discrepancy in altitude and speed, plus the peculiar nose down attitude of the aircraft. The Boeing representative upon being summoned informed the team about a background system which supposedly kicks in when the angle of attack of the aircraft reaches an abnormal level. Angle of attack of the aircraft is determined by 2 sensors present in the nose section of the aircraft. These angle of attack sensors also play a pivotal role in calculating the speed of the aircraft. One angle of attack sensor provides air speed and altitude to the captain’s console while the second sensor provides air speed and altitude data to the 1st officer.

Back in 2011, when the engineers decided to modify the existing 737, a new issue arose during the redesigning process. Engineers at Boeing decided to install more reliable and efficient engines on the wings of the aircraft. Usually, engines on numerous other aircraft are mounted on the underside of the wings; however, installation of engines on the underside of the wings is subject to ground clearance i.e., the separation between the engines and the runway. The air frame and design of Boeing 737 is such that it does not support ample ground clearance which its counterparts enjoy. Thus, to preserve the inner structure of the engine and to prevent the over-sized engine from encountering runway scraping during takeoff and landing.?Thus, the engineers at Boeing came up with an ingenious idea to mount the engine on the edges of the wings, to prevent runway scrapping. However, this introduced another hazard. The presence of aircraft engines on the edges of the wings introduced a risk of wight shift, and a weight unbalance. This new aircraft structure and design could potentially lead an aircraft to lift at an alarming level with respect to the horizon and ultimately stall. ?To overcome this issue, Boeing decided to introduce a background software which is known as MCAS or Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System. The basic function of this background software is to compensate for the effect produced by the dangerous pitch-up attitude of the aircraft. However, there was no such mention of this software in the manual or the quick reference handbook. In fact, it was a software that the aviation sector was unaware of, and the implications generated by it were also unknown. The MCAS is supposed to kick in when the angle of attack of the aircraft reaches an alarming level. The MCAS is supposed to initiate when one angle of attack sensor detects a sharp increment in the angle of attack of the aircraft. Many background systems present in conventional aircraft rely upon numerous sensors. However, MCAS relied on only one of the two angle of attack sensors present in the nose section of the aircraft.

Upon studying the flight data record of the aircraft, investigators were able to identify severe fluctuations in the altitude of the aircraft shortly before it crashed into the Java Sea. 41 trim down actions were identified while studying the FDR corresponding to 43 trim up commands commenced by the 1st officer. However, one question remained unsolved and that is why MCAS was triggered in the first place even though the aircraft was flying perfectly and was in nowhere near stall condition. The investigators later learned that one of the angle of attack sensors was replaced days prior to the commencement of flight 610. Investigators believe that the angle of attack sensor was installed improperly by the ground control and technicians of the airline. The airline though refutes this claim, however there is sufficient evidence to support this theory. The MCAS activated when the out-of-order sensor provided faulty and unreliable data, and this explains why the altitudes and speeds being displayed on the two consoles were different. This also explains why MCAS kicked in even though there was no need for it to get activated as the aircraft was not experiencing a stall condition. The representative from Boeing informed the commission that Boeing had assumed that the pilots would be able to override the system if it ever kicks in during the flight. However, this was not the case with the loin air crew. The captain and first officer struggled for 10 straight minutes to maintain the stability of the aircraft, but their efforts proved out to be futile. The assumption that Boeing had made was optimistic rather than being realistic. The captain of flight 610 possessed exceptional airman ship qualities, however the first officer was quite the opposite. Investigators spotted numerous red flags in his track record and according to the training record, the first officer struggled while flying the aircraft manually. His knowledge regarding manual flight control was inadequate. The pairing of such an inexperienced 1st officer with a mediocre captain who possessed average and inadequate laurels sealed the fate of this flight. However, the activation of MCAS is the main suspect and culprit behind the crash of flight 610. Had the flight crew been aware of the existence of MCAS and the method to override it, the situation would have probably been very different. In the wake of loin air crash Boeing released a bulletin which advised the pilots to cut off the automatic trim if MCAS ever gets activated midflight. However, 4 months later another 737 Max 8 aircraft operated by an Ethiopian airline crashed minutes after takeoff. MCAS was also again blamed to be the number one cause behind the Ethiopian air crash, as it’s FDR also indicated a severe fluctuation in the altitude of the aircraft shortly before the crash. This time the flight crew was aware about the presence of MCAS, and method to override it but still the flight ended in jeopardy.

After the Ethiopian airline crash, regulators, and operators across the globe grounded the 737 Max 8s. Shortly afterwards, the Federal Aviation Administration of the USA followed the suite and decided to ground all the max 8s registered in the USA. The United States Congress organized and held an open congressional hearing into the matter regarding the two fatal crashes of the max 8s. The top executive of Boeing was held accountable and was found guilty of committing corporate fraud and malpractice. The top brass of the Boeing company paid no heed to the concerns raised by the engineers and experts working in the program. One specific Boeing employee in his email to his immediate boss clearly stated that the 737 Max 8 was a safety hazard, and he will never ever allow his family or loved ones to travel on the max 8. Many daunting and scary revelations were made by serving and former Boeing employees. After the congressional hearing reached its logical conclusion, the then Boeing’s CEO Dennis Muilenburg resigned in the wake of the calls made by senior aviators and senators. The fact that Boeing knew about the severe implications it’s software was going to have on the safety of flight operations, and made no efforts to rectify the issue, made the situation more grave. However, Boeing in the wake of Ethiopian Airline crash took drastic steps and initiatives which included mandatory simulator training and risk assessment. Boeing 737 Max 8s were certified for safe flight operations and were declared airworthy back in 2020.