7 WELCOME TO ENTRY-LEVEL MASKIROVKA

7 ?WELCOME TO ENTRY-LEVEL MASKIROVKA

This article is another excerpt from the book by Barrington Roy Schiller (#BarringtonRoySchiller) titled “ESPIONAGE, INTELLIGENCE, RUSSIA, AND ME.: Spies, Lies, and Russian Misinformation.?“

Kindle https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0CNR3ZTTN

Paperback https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0CNS4VKDB

In literal English, the Russian “maskirovka” is “a little masquerade” or a deception, and it comes as natural to Russians as drinking vodka. It is complex, a cultural Russian phenomenon that is expected and of no surprise when others also use it. Russians expect to be tricked and misled, and so are proponents of “Trust but verify”. Those in Intelligence gathering or law enforcement will recognise that as the English “ Don’t trust what you hear” or in some cases “what you see”.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces have carried this military theory, doctrine, and thought forward since the intervening years between the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s newly found revanchism.

Maskirovka is part of Russian society culture and an essential aspect of Russian military operations. However, that is a game that two can play in military doctrine.

These tactics aimed at deceiving the enemy through camouflage, disinformation, and misdirection are an integral part of Russia's military strategy, with historical roots tracing back to the Soviet era. The concept of maskirovka encompasses a range of activities designed to obscure intentions, capabilities, and actions. This strategy involves a combination of both physical and information-based methods to create confusion and uncertainty among adversaries.

The Russian "Maskirovka," meaning "military deception," has a rich geopolitics and national security history. Its application has been observed in various forms over time. Below, I have compiled a small table that highlights some of the earliest examples of Russian Maskirovka:

If you talk to Russians, they will tell you that Ukraine is a part of Russia, so they have a right to reclaim it.

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However, the Kyivan Rus, also spelt Kievan Rus, was founded by the Viking Varangian prince Rurik in 862, and the site of Kyiv had already been lived on for over 200 years by then, hundreds of years before Moscow.was founded in 1147. It also adopted Christianity as its official religion in 988. This period is marked by the rise of the Rus' state. The Rus was the Viking for “men with oars”, and Rurik’s successors were the ones that united the East Slavic tribes under their rule and created a powerful state that dominated Eastern Europe. The 11th-12th century is marked by the zenith of Kyivan's power and influence. Under the rule of princes such as Vladimir the Great and Yaroslav the Wise, Kyivan Rus became a major trade centre, culture, and religion nearly 300 years before Moscow was founded.

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The Russian Federation would have you believe that they alone took Berlin in 1945, and although they are technically correct, they omit to explain that there are several reasons why the United States, the United Kingdom, and France (the Western Allies ) waited for the Soviets for several days on the banks of the Elbe river and did not take Berlin in World War II. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allied leaders had already agreed that Berlin would be located in the Soviet occupation zone after the war.

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They had already decided to divide Germany into four occupation zones, and if the Western Allies had taken Berlin, they would have had to withdraw from the city again after the war. Eisenhower, however,? decided to focus on encircling and defeating the German army in the Ruhr Valley. He also ordered his forces to advance to the Elbe River, which formed the boundary between the agreed American and Soviet occupation zones in Germany. The Western Allies reached the Elbe River in April 1945. They halted their advance there and waited for the Soviets to capture Berlin. The Soviets launched their final assault on Berlin on April 16, 1945, but didn’t finish capturing the city until 8th May 1945.

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The Western Allies also wanted to avoid the appearance of imperialism, and they had political concerns about taking Berlin. They did not want to be seen as competing with the Soviets for control of the city. The decision by the Western Allies not to take Berlin was controversial. Some historians have argued that the Western Allies should have captured Berlin. They say this would have prevented the Soviets from expanding their influence in Europe and sent a strong message to the Soviet Union about the Western Allies' commitment to democracy and freedom. In Modern Russia, they ignore the four power agreements and claim they won the “Great War” almost single-handedly while quoting and blaming? America’s late entry into the war for the number of Soviet losses, and they make a big deal of Germany’s surrender to them.

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What the Russians omit to say is that in Reims, France, on 7th May 1945, General Alfred Jodl, representing the German high command, signed an unconditional “act of military surrender” and that a cease-fire would go into effect at 11:01 p.m. Central European time on 8th May.? This surrender was witnessed by General Ivan Susloparov of the Soviet Union, General Walter Bedell Smith of the United States, and General Fran?ois Sevez of France. When soviet premier Joseph Stalin heard that Germany had signed an unconditional surrender of all its troops in Reims, he was furious. He argued that since the USSR had sacrificed the most troops and civilians during the war, its most important military commander should accept Germany’s surrender rather than the soviet officer who had witnessed the signing in Reims. Stalin opposed the location of the signing, too: since Berlin had been the capital of the Third Reich, he argued, it should be the site of its surrender.

But Stalin’s third objection—that Jodl was not Germany’s most senior military official—would prove the most convincing to the rest of the Allies, all of whom remembered how the signing of the armistice that ended World War I had helped plant the seeds of the next world war.

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Stalin argued that allowing Jodl to surrender to Germany in World War II could open the door to a new myth like the myths that had led to WW2 after WW1. Worried that Germany could again insist that its surrender was illegitimate if anyone but Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the supreme commander of all German forces, personally signed the document, the Allies decided to restage the surrender.

?On 8th May 1945, Keitel headed to Karlshorst, a suburb of Berlin, to sign the document in front of Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov and a small Allied delegation.

However, Keitel had argued a minor point, hoping to add a clause giving his troops a grace period of at least 12 hours to ensure they received their cease-fire orders before facing any penalties for continuing to fight. Zhukov did not grant his request to add the clause but ultimately offered Keitel a verbal promise. This delay resulted in the document not being executed until after the cease-fire was supposed to begin—and the 9th of May had already arrived in Russia when Germany unconditionally surrendered again, and the second document was signed by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, representing the German High Command, Marshal Georgy Zhukov of the Soviet Union, Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder of the United Kingdom, and General Carl Spaatz of the United States. General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny of France and General Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States signed as witnesses. The second document confirmed and ratified the first one, and both declared the unconditional surrender of all German armed forces to the Allies.

For this reason, the Russians still celebrate the 9th May as victory day, and the Reims surrender wasn’t even reported in the soviet press until a day afterwards, leading some observers to believe that the second surrender was a propaganda move orchestrated so Stalin could claim a more significant part of the credit for ending the war. In the rest of the world, though, v-e (victory in Europe) day is celebrated on 8th May, when the cease-fire was officially slated to begin.

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Another Example Of Russia’s blatant “Bait and switch actions” (illegal advertising of goods, which are an apparent bargain, to substitute inferior or more expensive goods) is the Russian Federation’s use of the terms “Russia” and the “Soviet Union”. The Soviet Union was a “Superpower”, whereas Russia (The Russian Federation) is, at best, “a Great Power”.

Also, despite the Soviet Union no longer existing, the Russian Federation, as one of its components, has assumed the Soviet Union’s position on the Security Council. Even though “if there is no Soviet Union, there can be no seat on the Security Council”, and if any member of the Soviet Union is entitled to a place, then Ukraine is just as qualified as Russia.

Russia’s favourite claim, and Bait and switch, however, is their claim that Russia lost over 20,000,000 in WW2. The following graphic, however, shows that as a percentage of the population, Russia didn’t have the most significant loss in WW2.

So when the Russian Federation still claims that it lost more millions of its population than all others, it includes the population of many countries that it is now engaged in conflict with, and were there to be a war between West and East today, would fight AGAINST RUSSIA. Even in Russia, there is minimal discussion about how many were from the Moscow/European side of the Urals and the less wealthy Asian side from where? Russia’s cannon fodder usually comes.

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So, the Russians have taken this Maskirovka and turned it into a 21st-century Military precision art form.

In a warehouse in St Petersburg, Russia, “Glavset”, also known as the “Internet Research Agency (IRA)”, or the Troll factory, ?a Russian company linked to the late (is he?) Yevgeny Prigozhin of “Wagner Group” fame occupies the whole warehouse and engages in online propaganda to influence operations for Western business and political interests. There is an excellent film that portrays their work perfectly. “The Undeclared War” (TV Series 2022) Glavset was founded in 2013 and has been accused of interfering in the 2016 United States presidential election, the 2017 French presidential election, and the 2018 Catalan independence referendum, amongst others. The company has also been accused of spreading disinformation about Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, as well as the Hamas invasion of Israel. Glavset’s operations are coordinated by a team of managers who assign tasks to teams of trolls. The trolls are paid to create fake social media accounts and post content that supports Russian interests or sow discord in other countries. They also use AI bots to amplify their messages and spread them widely. Governments and organisations around the world have condemned Glavset’s activities. The United States has imposed sanctions on the company and its employees, and Facebook and Twitter have banned its accounts. However, Glavset continues to operate and is considered a significant threat to international security. By targeting specific individuals or groups with their messages, they spread disinformation about political events or social issues, organise and support trade Unions and strikes, and try to influence elections or other public opinion. Glavset’s activities are a severe threat to democracy and free speech.

Together with “Russia Today” RT, they undermine the ability of people to trust the information they see online and make it more difficult for them to participate in informed public debate. It is essential to be aware of Glavset’s activities and to be critical of the information you see online, especially in these days of video and audio deep fakes spreading misinformation to pander to the confirmation bias of those who already doubt that their governments have their best interests.

Maskirovka is not new, though. These instances illustrate the historical use of Russian Maskirovka, encompassing diverse tactics such as misinformation, misdirection, and camouflage. They serve as intriguing case studies for exploring the complexity and effectiveness of such strategies in the context of geopolitical and military manoeuvring.

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Year Event Description Source

?1708 ??????????????? Battle of Lesnaya During the Great Northern War, Russian forces created dummy camps to mislead Swedish forces, defeating them.

1812 Napoleonic Invasion of Russia Russian forces used scorched earth tactics and false information to lure Napoleon's Grande Armée into a harsh winter, causing its downfall. Including camouflage, erroneous radio transmissions, and dummy divisions against Nazi Germany

1941 Operation Barbarossa?????? Soviet forces employed strategic deception,

1979-1989 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Soviet forces utilised disinformation to downplay their involvement and intentions in Afghanistan, masking their true objectives.

2014 Annexation of Crimea Russia employed a combination of military presence, misinformation, and deniability in its takeover of Crimea, creating confusion among observers.

Clifford, D. (2018). "Deception in War." Zamoyski, A. (2005). "Moscow 1812." Glantz, D. M. (2001). "Barbarossa Derailed." Coll, S. (2005). "Ghost Wars." Galeotti, M. (2014). "The Spetsnaz Threat."

?Maskirovka has significantly shaped military operations and political manoeuvres in geopolitics and national security. It has been employed in various contexts, such as concealing troop movements, disguising the true nature of military exercises, and even manipulating public perception through disinformation campaigns.

One notable example of maskirovka was the Soviet Union's deception efforts during World War II. Operation Bagration, a massive Soviet offensive against German forces in 1944, was accompanied by an elaborate deception plan that included creating fictitious units, deceptive radio transmissions, and false orders. These measures aimed to divert German attention and resources away from the actual target of the offensive.

In the modern context, Russia's use of maskirovka has extended beyond the battlefield and into information warfare. The term is often associated with spreading disinformation and propaganda to manipulate public opinion and create confusion in the international arena. This approach has been evident in Russia's involvement in various global events, such as its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its interventions in conflicts like the Syrian civil war.

To delve deeper into the subject, it's essential to explore specific historical instances and contemporary applications of maskirovka, drawing on academic sources and analyses. The works of renowned scholars in military strategy and international relations can provide valuable insights. For instance, John J. Mearsheimer's work on offensive realism ("The Tragedy of Great Power Politics") and Timothy Thomas's research on Russian information warfare ("Russia's ‘New' Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power") offer comprehensive perspectives on this intricate topic.

In summary, maskirovka is a multifaceted concept deeply rooted in Russian military doctrine and strategy. Its historical significance and evolving manifestations in the contemporary geopolitical landscape make it a compelling subject of study and discussion for diplomats, scholars, and practitioners in geopolitics and national security.