2025 Geopolitical Predictions

2025 Geopolitical Predictions

Some of my geopolitical predictions for 2025 based on current trends, trajectories, available information, and possibilities – this is not a wishful list in any way, nor is it suggestive of personal preference:

1. If at all, there will only be a limited pause in the war in Gaza for a hostage exchange – but the current Israeli government will continue the war, even if in a limited fashion, to ensure that Hamas is never able to reconstitute in the Strip. This could result in the “Somaliazation” of Gaza, in which the coastal enclave is fragmented and subject to perpetual Israeli military rule.

2. Israel will assassinate, likely in a dramatic fashion, all of Hamas’s and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s leadership abroad, especially those in Tehran, Turkey, Lebanon, and elsewhere. This will render both groups even more disoriented since they’ll lose their talking heads abroad, though the operational impact on their fighters in Gaza will likely be more limited.

3. Rogue Jihadi elements will seek to reemerge in Syria and attempt to gain legitimacy by attacking Israeli forces in newly occupied parts of the country’s south, potentially sparking a new battlefront that reinvigorates the topic of the Golan Heights.

4. Hezbollah will attempt to reconstitute its collapsed leadership in Lebanon and, given the loss of its strategic smuggling partner, the Assad regime, will try to lay low and not reignite a war or another confrontation with Israel.

5. Yemen’s Houthis will face a new and sustained air and special operations campaign against their missile and drone launch capabilities that the United States and Israel will lead until free maritime navigation is restored in the Red Sea and Israel is not attacked regularly by the Iranian-backed militia.

6. With the incoming Trump administration, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia will become the most significant geopolitical heavyweights in the Arab world and will become anchors for US engagement in the region.

7. Saudi Arabia will likely opt for a limited defense agreement with the United States, without normalization with Israel, given how difficult it would be for Riyadh to walk back its commitment to Palestinian statehood as a precondition for peace with the Jewish State.

8. The region of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa will likely declare independence and receive support and backing from multiple parties, possibly the United States. After that, the strategically located territory will host several covert military bases for Israel, the UAE, the US, and Ethiopia.

9. Iran’s nuclear facilities will face increased cyber warfare and possible direct attacks by the US and Israel if Tehran decides to pursue nuclear weapons after its proxies have been severely weakened.

10. Libya will become a new flashpoint between the Turkish-backed government in Tripoli and the Russian/Emirati/Egyptian-backed government in Benghazi led by Haftar, especially after reports have confirmed the transfer of Wagner forces out of Syria and into eastern Libya, which might become Russia’s new warm-water hub in the Mediterranean.

11. Egypt will face compounding economic challenges that might inflame internal instability unless the government takes drastic measures to reverse the currency's devaluation and the mounting foreign debt crisis.

12. The war in Sudan will halt into a stalemate between the two warring parties without a clear resolution of the conflict and with no obvious winner or political horizon.

13. The risk of transnational terrorism in the Sahel region in Africa will continue to grow from Islamic State-affiliated Jihadi groups, particularly in West Africa, with no apparent or cohesive US or international-led strategy to counter this ever-growing threat.

14. Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, and Pakistan and Iran will continue to grow and fester, leading to serious confrontations that could escalate out of control around four different issues: border control, access to water, Taliban and Islamic State militancy, and Baloch insurgents’ attacks.

15. Turkey under Erdogan will seek close ties with the Trump-led US even as it continues to escalate with Israel and will score some victories in Eastern Syria against the Kurds as well as its efforts to grow its defense industries and ties with the Middle East.

16. Qatar will face aggressive positions by some hawks in the Trump administration who’ll seek punishment for Doha’s role in hosting Hamas, Aljazeera’s pro-Islamist violence propaganda, and the country’s overall regional posture, though the Trump administration is unlikely to pull out of the Al Udeid Air Base.

17. Jordan will face immense internal challenges from the Muslim Brotherhood and anti-monarchists who seek to destabilize the regime and undermine its rule, but the country will hold steady against such attempts and won’t collapse despite immense political and economic pressures.

18. The Palestinian Authority will have no choice but to engage the Trump administration in any effort to restart the peace process and ensure the survival of the fragile Palestinian political framework that will struggle with the lack of legitimacy, an ailing/corrupt/out of touch leadership, and an aggressive Israeli government that’s applying maximum security, political, and economic pressure.

19. The Trump administration will pursue an anti-BRICS economic policy to prevent the emergence of a new economic world order that challenges the hegemony of the US dollar. This policy will lead to some successes and some counter-reactions by nations like China and Russia, likely spiking the price of precious metals, Bitcoin, and other tangible assets.

20. 2025 will likely see the emergence of moderate voices throughout the Arab / Muslim worlds who will want to seize on the opportunity presented by the collapse of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” that’s been significantly weakened throughout 2024. This will translate into more Palestinians challenging Hamas and the armed resistance narrative (in the land, not the diaspora community or the “pro-Palestine” folks) and, similarly, throughout the region, including those who’ll acknowledge that the path forward requires radically different choices.

Eli E. C.

Creative or Analytical? Why not settle for both!

1 个月

I think for the most part that your analysis is pretty accurate.

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