2016- RECIPE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

The Supreme Court of the United States is the highestcourt of the United States. Established pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution in 1789, it has ultimate  jurisdiction over all federal courts and over state court cases involving federal issues plus original jurisdiction over a range of important cases. The U.S. Supreme Court is the final interpreter of constitutional law, the highest legal authority in our Nation. Once a judge ascends to our highest court, firmly seated to exercise life-long power, the judge is expected to embrace a duty of impartiality, rendering decisions reflecting “neutral” legal principles, not partisan politics.

      On September 17, 1787, thirty-nine delegates to the Constitutional Convention from 12 states signed and enacted into law, the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, a document establishing the most effective form of government ever known to man. Towards the end of his life, James Madison reflected in his notes on the Constitutional Convention that

[T]here never was an assembly of men, charged with a great & arduous trust, who were more pure in their motives, or more exclusively or anxiously devoted to the object committed to them, than were the members of the Federal Convention of 1787, to the object of proposing and devising a constitutional system which would…best secure the permanent liberty and happiness of the country.

     The U.S. Constitution states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Judges of the Supreme Court. Presidents historically tend to nominate Supreme Court Justices who share and support their ideological views. The Senate’s recent refusal to act on Mr. Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick Garland only heightens the role the presidential and congressional elections will play in determining the next composition of the U.S. Supreme Court. Scalia’s seat is only the first of several that are likely come open in the next presidential term. Ginsburg is 83, Kennedy will turn 80 next month and Justice Stephen Breyer’s 78th birthday is in August. Thomas, who was 43 when he joined the court, will turn 70 during the next president’s term.

    Once a judge ascends to a Supreme Court appointment, he is firmly seated to exercise life-long power, and is expected to embrace a duty of impartiality, rendering decisions reflecting “neutral” legal principles, not to be influenced by lobbyists or partisan politics. However, the political reality of how U.S. Supreme Court cases are adjudicated presents something quite different from this pristine ideology. Even in uneventful presidential elections, entanglements emerge between the Supreme Court and politics. But the 2016 election season has produced an alchemy that promises the presidential election extraordinary influence on the U.S. Supreme Court’s membership and decisions.

     The original Framers of our United States Constitution, envisioned that the President’s nomination of a particular Supreme Court justice might encounter a shove-back from the Senate, which has power to reject nominees. This is not “new” news: even in the early 1800s, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall propelled the Court into bitter political disputes, particularly those concerning the reach of federal power. Since then, the Court has dealt with issues touching an array of controversies: continental expansion, Native American rights, slavery, segregation, abortion, homosexual rights. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, political issues often become legal issues in the United States. And it is the Supreme Court’s job to settle the hardest ones.

      Highly politicized confirmation battles are therefore an integral part of the constitutional design. Significantly, this political quality to a judge’s job does not end upon confirmation. Although federal judges hold a duty of impartiality, our governmental processes send a different message. For years after confirmation, a judge carries the baggage of the confirmation ordeal. Why else do newspaper reports describe judges with a modifier: Judge X, a Bill Clinton appointee, Judge Y, a George H.W. Bush appointee, Judge Z, an Obama appointee? These media reports suggest that that the President will be getting something during the judge’s tenure. That “something” is presumably ideological loyalty, which the President might expect in return for the precious gift granted to the judge: a life-long, prestigious judicial appointment. Ordinary rules of human interaction suggest that the candidate’s duty of loyalty and gratitude to the President will linger after the judge’s initial oath in office.

    Whoever wins the upcoming presidential election, Donald Trump, or Hillary Clinton, hopes to enjoy this reward from his or her Supreme Court appointments. Sometimes justices disappoint their nominating President, but usually not. Consequently the upcoming November 2016, Presidential election, carries with it a Constitutional implication, much more far-reaching than just the policies and ideology of the individual who is elected as our next president.

     A number of this nations’ top constitutional analysts and scholars have expressed deep concern regarding Trump’s complaints about the judicial system and bold plans to use his presidential power collectively sketch out a constitutional worldview that shows contempt for the First Amendment, contempt for separation of powers and contempt for the rule of law; legal experts and analysts across the political spectrum say. Even as much of the Republican political establishment lines up behind its presumptive nominee, many conservative and libertarian legal scholars warn that electing Mr. Trump is a recipe for a constitutional crisis. “Who knows what Donald Trump with a pen and phone would do?” asked Ilya Shapiro, a lawyer with the libertarian Cato Institute.

   The clear culprit in our nations’ increasing constitutional crisis, is the rise of corporate lobbying and partisan politics, which have increasingly replaced our democratic “by the people, for the people,” constitutional system of governance, with a self-serving and heavy handed ruling class of oligarchs loyal only to their personal financial portfolios.

 Our Founding Fathers understood that governments can oppress people. They knew it from their own experience—and they knew it from their extensive scrutiny of governmental forms throughout history. Concentrated power was more than dangerous … it was life threatening. For this reason our Constitution was enacted to:

1.     Balance power between the three branches.

2.    Give each branch political checks on the other two.

3.    Give the federal government only limited power, and retain all other power in the hands of the electorate, “we the people.”

4.    Allow the states to check the power of the federal government.

5.    Members of each branch of government are chosen by a different method.

6.    Terms of office are varied by government position.

7.    The impeachment process was provided to stop potential abuses.

Concentrated political power frightened the Founders. They believed that only by limiting government could liberty survive the natural tendency of man to dictate the habits of other men. The balanced separation of power with checks was designed to prevent federal tyranny. Each branch was given delineated powers, and then each of these powers was limited and checked by another branch or entity. The system was purposely designed to slow governmental actions enough to allow due deliberation. This frustrates those who want the government to always “do something” about every problem, but it also hampers the government from doing something grievous that affects our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.

 The worldview out of which America was born centered on liberty to be generated by self-governance, this was not some vague abstraction. Our founding forefathers wanted to ensure that no powerful self-serving financial elite faction could ever take control of our government.  Our constitution was expressly constructed for the purpose of limiting federal power, with all real power, and real sovereignty, securely residing with the people. However, contrary to our forefathers express intentions, progressively, our federal government has accrued more and more power and authority, and each of our presidents have taken more and more of power to themselves. And the last couple of decades have seen an acceleration of executive aggrandizement.

Poll After Poll Shows That Both National Parties Are Increasingly Unpopular With The Electorate.

Most American people now realize we are likely to get burned by either Trump or Hillary, once they are elected, as the facts make it clear, each candidate is primarily loyal to their own pocketbooks, through accommodating the interests of the powerful lobbyists for the interests of; (1) BANKING INDUSTRY CONGLOMERATES; (2) BIG PHARMA; (3) THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX; and (4) MONSANTO; at the expense of the health and well-being of the American taxpayer and our national economy. Consequently many millions of liberals and conservatives have become disgusted by our current candidates and their self-serving policies.

In consideration of the Fact that several Supreme Court justices stand to step down, over the next presidential term, and the FACT that Trump has overtly expressed his determination to INCREASE presidential power, and DECREASE judiciary power, all providing evidence, that Trump is by far the most dangerous candidate.

Perhaps the most important thing to remember about executive power is that there is nothing to stop a president from initiating action, even if unconstitutional. The consequences — whether legal or political — come after the fact. If Trump issued an executive order to ban all further immigration, the directive would stand unless and until checked by Congress or the courts. Congress can pass legislation to overturn an executive order, or through its power of the purse, it can refuse to provide funding.

During the Presidential Debates, Donald Trump told Hillary Clinton that, “if I win, I am going to instruct my attorney general to get a special prosecutor to look into your [email] situation.” That would constitute an abuse of power. Presidents are not supposed to “instruct” their attorneys general to appoint a “special prosecutor” (now called an “independent counsel.”) The attorney general is supposed to make that decision apolitically, based on her judgment of whether the Justice Department can impartially investigate the case. By pledging that she would follow the advice of the FBI investigators looking into Clinton’s email controversy, Lynch tried to disentangle legal considerations from partisan ones. By promising that he will “instruct” his attorney general to appoint a special prosecutor, Trump is pledging exactly the opposite.

But Trump didn’t stop there. He not only said he would make his attorney general appoint an independent counsel, he also vowed to determine the outcome of that counsel’s investigation. If he becomes president, Trump declared, Clinton will “be in jail.”

Under the Constitution, presidents don’t decide who goes to jail (except insofar as they have the power to pardon). Courts decide who goes to jail based on their assessment of whether someone broke the law.

But Trump’s indifference to the limits on presidential power last isn't really surprising. He’s been advertising it since he entered the race.

Last September, after National Review editor Rich Lowry said that Carly Fiorina had “cut his balls off with the precision of a surgeon” at a GOP primary debate, Trump tweeted that Lowry “should not be allowed on TV and the FCC should fine him!” Legally, there’s a debate about whether the FCC can fine broadcasters for obscene or indecent behavior. But even if it can, the Commission is supposed to do so based on objective, apolitical criteria. Trump, by contrast, was proposing to use the obscenity laws to silence his critics in the press. Doing so would transform the FCC in the same way Trump proposed to transform the independent counsel: from an institution tasked with impartially interpreting the law into a weapon to be used against Trump’s political adversaries.

For Trump, this has been a theme. In May, angered by the “ridiculous questions” that Washington Post reporters were asking him, Trump warned that owner Jeff Bezos “is getting away with murder, tax-wise” and “we can’t let him get away with it.” In February, he warned that “if I become president,” Bezos and the Post are “going to have such problems.”

Putting aside the irony of Trump fuming about a billionaire who is “getting away with murder, tax-wise.” If Bezos and his company, Amazon, really aren’t paying the taxes they owe, that’s a matter for the IRS and the career prosecutors at the Department of Justice. They’re supposed to be guided by legal precedent. Trump, by contrast wants turn them—along with the independent counsel and FCC—into vehicles for retaliation against his critics and foes.

Trump leveled the same threat against Gonzalo Curiel, the San Diego judge presiding over the lawsuit against Trump University. “They ought to look into Judge Curiel, because what Judge Curiel is doing is a total disgrace,” Trump stated. It’s not clear who Trump means by “they.” There are procedures for accusing a judge of misconduct. But for a president to use those procedures to retaliate against a judge who is ruling against his financial interests would threaten the independence of the judiciary.

But the very notion that there are government agencies that operate independently of presidential whim seems alien to Trump. In September, without evidence, Trump accused Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen of keeping interest rates low at President Obama’s instruction, even though the entire point of the Federal Reserve is to insulate monetary policy from White House meddling. In March, Trump vowed that in fighting terrorists, he’d order the U.S. military to “take out their families.” But the military is supposed to follow the law. And the Geneva Convention, ratified by the Senate, prohibits targeting noncombatants. Nonetheless, when asked what he’d do if officers refused to carry out his illegal orders, Trump stated, “They won’t refuse. They’re not gonna refuse me.” In September, Trump pledged that, once elected, he’d install “different generals.” As Brian Palmer noted in Slate, that too runs afoul of our system of government. A president can recall generals from their individual commands. But he can’t simply fire them. “The president is the commander in chief of the armed forces,” Palmer explained, “not the CEO.”

Perhaps Trump’s unfettered vision of executive power stems from his particular experience as a CEO. After all, he hasn’t respected legal boundaries in that role either. Instead of keeping his charity and his for-profit businesses separate, he’s used the former to pay the latter’s legal bills.

But when CEOs don’t respect the legal limits of their power, it’s not that big a problem. It’s not that big a problem because CEOs must yield to judges because judges are agents of the state. And, at the end of the day, the state controls the guns.

When a president doesn’t respect the law, the Constitution is nullified.

Our Founding Fathers warned us about the dangers of allowing a two party system:

John Adams said:

There is nothing which I dread so much as a division of the republic into two great parties, each arranged under its leader, and concerting measures in opposition to each other. This, in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded as the greatest political evil under our Constitution.

George Washington agreed, saying in his farewell presidential speech:

The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public Liberty

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind, (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight,) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the Public Administration. It agitates the Community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion, that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the Government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in Governments of a Monarchical cast, Patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And, there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.