2015+: Post-Withdrawal towards a 'Good-enoughistan' -- Excerpt from (Mis)Understanding Afghanistan.

“How are your brother?”, “How is your family?”, “When are you coming back?”, was the series of text-messages I received from an unidentified Afghan cell number while walking though Belfast in 2016 to get to the QUB campus.

My text response was met with an immediate phone-call where I recognised the voice of [REDACTED], an Afghan friend and colleague, whom I had long worked with over the years and had changed his number after joining an Afghan security protection unit upon losing his employment with NATO at the close of the mission: “How are you? How is your family? I hope you are well”, were his opening words on the crackled line.

We exchanged pleasantries, but he sounded off: “I am well. Are?you?okay?”, I asked. “I’m not sure”, replied an audibly concussed [REDACTED] who had just had his ‘bell rung’ after the vehicle he was escorting in front of him struck an IED just an hour earlier, “Are you coming back?”

We discussed the attack, my work at the university, and fieldwork plans to return to Afghanistan. “Its getting so bad here, man. My SIV [Special Immigration Visa to the US] was denied again this year. I don’t know how much longer, man; it’s really bad”.

He wanted to discuss my family, my hometown, the mountains, and what it’s like to go skiing. His confused concussed pace picked up as he told me the good news about his cousin who received his SIV and relocated to California: “Will you move there one-day? If you don’t come here, I hope I’ll move there; And we will be neighbours! This is my dream. I don’t think this place has any hope.” — Personal Account, 2016.

Troop Levels: <10,000 (and steadily decreasing)

On the First of January, 2015, the NATO 'International Security Assistance Force' (ISAF) mission transitioned to become 'Resolute Support' (RS) — decreasing international troop numbers to a cap of 10,000 — in formation of the newly mandated ‘Train, Advise, Assist’ mission where US/NATO forces in limited number would support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in operations to secure the country. (113)

In the initial 2015 ‘fighting season’ alone, the ANSF suffered more casualties in a single year than the entirety of international forces had in the previous 14 years of intense combat operations. (114)?According to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, the number of ANSF killed from the beginning of his presidency in 2014 until 2019 surpassed 45,000 — nearly half of the total number of US/NATO troops deployed to the country during the height of the surge. (114) This set the tone for embattled ANSF troops as the twice-elected Ghani government struggled to quell the Taliban insurgency and faced persistent risk of again becoming a failed state. (115)

Afghan public-opinion polling marked a steady decline in national mood following the departure of international forces: from 55% of the population who?‘felt their country was moving in the?right?direction’?in 2014 to 66% who?‘felt their country was moving in the?wrong?direction’?by 2016. (116)?

Afghanistan 'District Stability Assessments' reflected a similar downward trend showing a steady decrease in areas under 'Afghan Government Control or Influence' and increase in those under 'contested' or 'insurgent control or influence'. (117)

Despite these set-backs, troop contributing nations continued to retrograde and withdraw support. Amidst calls from ANSF members for combat enablers — such as intelligence coordination, air support, MedEvac, trauma hospitals, and veterans benefits for ANSF widows, children, and families to ease the minds of those on the frontlines — the 'Train, Advise, Assist' mission focused primarily on 'building capacity' for the Afghans to 'do it themselves'. Headquarters billets were often staffed with military officers with no prior deployments in an effort to 'gain needed operational experience' — to the benefit of their national militaries but not to those they were 'training, advising, and mentoring'. Best expressed by a frustrated Afghan army officer (in 2018 interview):

“They are sent here as mentors, but how? Most never seen Afghanistan [before]. Or combat! But US military has been here for twenty years! Where are those ones who know (referring to those with multiple deployment experience that he felt would be useful)? Why do they keep them from us? We need their experience; not to be giving them experience!” (118)

As the doors closed, the population-centric approaches that had been successful in the middle of the conflict also continued to retrograde — as did the population-centric intelligence programs that previously provided 'finger on the pulse' ground-truth monitoring to decision-makers on strategic level issues (and informed 'soft-power' mission enablers). The result of their disbandment left the Resolute Support mission with an entirely 'red-focused' Intelligence Community.

Perhaps not unrelated (if not as consequence), the remaining small-force of less than 10,000 troops (a significant reduction from the mission’s height of over 100,000) continued to be mostly intertwined in highly kinetic 'red-focused', or 'enemy-centric', counter-terrorism operations to ‘root-out’ and 'degrade' insurgent networks. Brokered 'peace talks' between the Afghan Government and the Taliban — an activity that can still be considered 'enemy-centric' — emerging as the sole 'soft-power' priority and effort to bring longterm stability to the country. (Notably, these talks occurred largely in an absence of understanding of how a negotiated peace settlement with the Taliban would be received or accepted by the Afghan population). (119)

In the absence of adequate understanding of the changing situation and population-centric intelligence to identify opportunities or pathways towards resolution, Afghanistan’s future had been left in limbo without any clear direction as US /NATO decision-makers deliberate on whether to redeploy troops or abandon the mission entirely.

Concluded by a counterinsurgent 'rule-of-law' adviser to the Afghan government who remained in Afghanistan post-withdrawal (*up until the last flights out in August 2021*):?

“Closing in on two decades of this war, knowledge of Afghanistan, its problems, its recent—let alone past— history is abysmal. We’re pretty much worse off than where we started. The focus now seems to be on achieving a ‘good-enoughistan’: a way to get out of here that makes some sense of all the blood and treasure lost so we can just leave, declare some sort of victory, forget this ever happened, and move on... There’s no plan; there’s just hope... Hope the Afghans figure it out and we can walk away.” -- Rule-of-Law Adviser with ten years deployed to Afghanistan, Interview 2018.

Excerpt from: (Mis)Understanding Afghanistan, Chapter 2: The Situational Context of US-Led ‘Counterinsurgency’ in Afghanistan (2001-2015), Pp. 142-143. **With additions from the conclusion.**

CITATION:

Gavriel, Alexei (2020) (Mis)Understanding Afghanistan: An Ethnographic Examination of 'Human Elements' Affecting the Nexus Between Understanding and Strategy in Population-Centric Conflict. Queens University Belfast. Doctoral Thesis.

Gavriel, Alexei (2020) "Chapter 2: The Situational Context of US-Led ‘Counterinsurgency’ in Afghanistan (2001-2015)". In (Mis)Understanding Afghanistan: An Ethnographic Examination of 'Human Elements' Affecting the Nexus Between Understanding and Strategy in Population-Centric Conflict. Queens University Belfast. Doctoral Thesis. Pp. 110-155.

NOTES:

113.?Dodwell and Rassler 2017.

114.?According to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, the number of ANSF killed from the beginning of his presidency in 2014 until 2019 surpassed 45,000 — nearly half of the total number of US/NATO troops deployed to the country during the height of the surge (See: BBC 2019).

115.?Coburn 2016.

116.?Asia Foundation Survey of the Afghan People 2008-2017. Accessed at:?https://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/ afghanistan/survey/

117. Kennedy 2019: np.

118. Interview, MK, Army Officer ANA 205 Corps, 2018.

118.?Now firmly available in the public record, see: the initial SIGAR report (SIGAR 2018); the ‘Afghanistan Papers’ released by The Washington Post (Whitlock 2019); and the SIGAR Inspector General’s response (Sopko 2019).

119. Furthered by SIGAR Inspector General John F. Sopko on necessity of the type population-centric that explains the intricacies of the conflict:?“The risks don’t automatically go away just because you sign a peace agreement... All we are saying to Congress and the administration is: Plan ahead.”?(In: Kennedy 2019: np.)