Are Private Jets Safer Than Airliners?

Are Private Jets Safer Than Airliners?

When I talk to potential clients about buying a private jet, invariably I get asked if it is safer to fly on them, than with the airlines.

It the following criteria are met they are safer because of their more modern technology:

  • Well maintained aircraft
  • Well flown aircraft
  • Well trained pilots
  • Well rested pilots

While the airlines are more regulated and procedures are standardized sometimes a private jet operator is not as safe as flying with the airlines. The fact private jets are smaller is actually a good thing because if something does go wrong and they need to land immediately they need a shorter runway, opening more landing options.

When buying a private jet the choice of your pilots is really key. Hiring a pilot experienced on the specific type you are buying is not necessarily the best thing to do. I always tell people it is better to hire a good man and then train him to fly the airplane than viceversa. Your pilots need to fit your personality and know how to look after your guests. Also the myth that airline pilots don’t make good private jet pilots is a misconception, again all depends on the personality. You need a pilot that can think on his feet and think outside the box. As part of our service at Tyrus Wings we help our clients find the right pilots for their private jet.

Now I want to get into explaining a bit about the avionics that go into these aircraft. New technology in aviation is always first developed for the military and then gets into the private jets and a few years later into commercial aircraft.

Avionics in Private Jets Improving Flight Safety

Bombardier have recently introduced new avionics to their Global Express aircraft.

The Bombardier Global Vision flight deck is designed to deliver a completely new cockpit experience. By combining the best in technological advancements with superior designer aesthetics, it provides pilots flying Bombardier Global aircraft an unprecedented level of control and comfort. The Global Vision flight deck introduces the Rockwell Collins Pro Line Fusion avionics suite, providing an integrated flight deck to ensure interoperability between systems.

The Pro Line Fusion features four high-resolution 15-inch diagonal active matrix liquid crystal displays (LCD) arranged in a T-shape working in concert with the Head-up Guidance System (HGS), personalized formats of display information, an electronic checklist, maps with graphical flight planning, an integrated cursor control panel, a Synthetic-Enhanced Vision System, paperless operation enabled by Dual Electronics Charts, a Future Air Navigation System (FANS), Controller-Pilot Datalink Communication (CPDLC), a Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV) and a MultiScan Weather Detection system.

These avionics make life easier for the pilots and increase their Situational Awareness (SA). Recently most aircraft accidents were caused by Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). This is an accident in which an airworthy aircraft, under pilot control, is unintentionally flown into the ground, a mountain, water, or an obstacle. The term was coined by engineers at Boeing in the late 1970s. The pilots are generally unaware of the danger until it is too late. Accidents where an aircraft is damaged and uncontrollable (also known as uncontrolled flight into terrain) are not considered CFIT.

According to Boeing, CFIT is a leading cause of airplane accidents involving the loss of life, causing over 9,000 deaths since the beginning of the commercial jet age. CFIT was identified as a cause of 25% of USAF Class A Mishaps between 1993 and 2002.

Situational Awareness (SA) is a term used to describe a persons awareness of their surroundings, the meaning of these surroundings, a prediction of what these surroundings will mean in the future, and then using this information to act.

This can be simplified down into three key words:

Look - Think - Act

In aviation, there was a growing interest in understanding how pilots maintain awareness of the many complex and dynamic events that occur simultaneously in flight, and how this information was used to guide future actions. This increased interest was predominantly due to the vast quantities of sensor information available in the modern cockpit, coupled with the flightcrew’s ‘new’ role as a monitor of aircraft automation. The term ‘situation awareness’ (SA) was adopted to describe the processes of attention, perception, and decision making that together form a pilot’s mental model of the current situation (Endsley, 1995). Today, SA is one of the most prominent research topics in the aviation Human Factors field.

Situational Awareness is a key part of the decision-making process. It is important that we have a full idea about what is going on, to make the best decision possible each time.

Factors Affecting Situational Awareness

System Design - The ergonomics of a system are very important. If the information is presented in a user-friendly way, the individual will be able to gain the information they require more easily, improving situational awareness.

Stress and Workload - Stress affects our ability to process information. If we are in a high stress/high workload situation, we will not be able to process as much information. This could significantly affect our situational awareness. It is very important to actively manage stress, whether it be short or long-term.

Automation - An individual needs to keep themselves active in monitoring automatic systems. For example, in an aircraft, just because you have put the aircraft on autopilot, does not mean you can sit back and read a newspaper. You need to keep actively monitoring the flight instruments and controls. Automation can also be used in high workload situations to prevent mental overload, by removing the need for the pilot to control the aircraft.

Physiological Factors - Factors such as illness and medication can have a drastic effect on information processing, and therefore on situational awareness.

Preconceptions - Often when we have a a preconception about what is going to happen, we try and match information to this idea, instead of seeing what is actually going on. If we do not have a full level of situational awareness, this can lead to carrying out incorrect, and potentially harmful actions. Some examples of this would be succumbing to a visual illusion, or not following an air traffic control clearance correctly.

Abilities/ Experience/ Training - If you have trained for a situation, you are more likely to execute the correct actions when it occurs in real life. Also if your training is current, it is more likely that this will be an automatic response. This is partly because you know what the situation looks like and can anticipate what is going to happen. This is why in flight training, we repeat exercises where a critical response is required, such as Stalling and Engine failures.

Gulfstream’s PlaneView large landscape displays help pilots better visualize and instantly understand their aircraft position, flight conditions and surroundings in all phases of flight. The combination of enhanced data and easy-to-use formats reduces pilot workload and improves safety.

PlaneView displays navigation charts, moving maps and real-time weather conditions alongside the primary flight display. A Gulfstream designed side-mounted Cursor Control Device (CCD) allows pilots to scroll, point and click, and push a button to quickly call up checklists, approach charts and systems data, or alter the flight plan from the PlaneView screen.

Gulfstream in 2002 was the first business jet manufacturer to earn Federal Aviation Administration approval of its advanced flight deck, which was developed with Honeywell.


The PlaneView platforms are continually upgraded to incorporate the newest technologies, and because of the system architecture, it’s a simple process to push those updates to existing PlaneView flight decks.

That makes a PlaneView cockpit capable of receiving future navigation advancements that haven’t yet been designed.
The all-new G500 and G600 represent the dawn of a new era in flight deck design, integration, functionality, ergonomics and even aesthetics. Gulfstream’s Advanced Aircraft Program group has forever changed the way pilots aviate, navigate and communicate.


One of the first things pilots will gravitate toward is the new active control sidesticks. By replacing the traditional pedestal-mounted yoke with an active control sidestick, Gulfstream increased the visibility of the avionics suite and improved pilot comfort. And unlike other sidesticks on the market, Gulfstream’s active control sidesticks are digitally linked to provide both visual and tactile control inputs in concert to improve situational awareness in the cockpit.

The Gulfstream Symmetry Flight Deck? can best be described as intelligent, immersive and integrated. The cockpit is unlike anything else in aviation today. Flight crews immerse themselves in a workstation that is more an extension of self than ever before possible. The intelligent design leverages touch-screen technology to eliminate switches and replaces them with soft keys on 10 interchangeable touch screens. The proprietary Gulfstream Phase-of-Flight? technology behind the touch-screen controls intelligently and intuitively serves up the precise pilot interface needed for whatever phase of flight the aircraft is in at the time. This technology demonstrates once again why Gulfstream has become legendary for delivering tomorrow’s flight experience today.


Since Gulfstream has built a reputation as the most advanced business aircraft manufacturer in the world, it’s only natural that the next major advancement of flight control technology and integration would be pioneered by the same company that introduced the head-up display, the Enhanced Vision System and the Synthetic Vision System.

More than simply managing wired communications for certain flight controls, the G500 and G600 Intelligence-by-Wire? system incorporates flight control systems, active control sidesticks, autobrake, autothrottles, emergency descent mode, avionics and much more.

Gulfstream was the first civilian aircraft manufacturer to successfully develop and certify the nose-mounted infrared enhanced vision system (EVS), improving flight safety and situational awareness for pilots.

EVS feeds infrared images of runways, approaches and surroundings into the cockpit and onto the pilot’s head-up display, a transparent, drop-down screen between the pilot and the windshield. EVS proves most useful at night or when weather conditions hamper visibility.

Enhanced vision has become proven to the point that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in late 2013 proposed a new Part 91 regulation allowing pilots to touch down and roll out on runways using purely enhanced vision. The previous regulation mandated that pilots switch to natural vision at 100 feet/30 meters to land. Gulfstream has offered comments to the FAA on the proposed change and is monitoring progress toward its approval.
Anticipating and making change are motivating fundamentals for Gulfstream engineers. By evaluating and developing new sensor-based technologies, Gulfstream Vision Systems engineers expect to further improve safety by giving pilots a better sense of what they are flying into and where their aircraft is in relation to everything around it.

More About Why Planes Crash

Traditionally adequate procedures and crew coordination and communication (CRM) as well as control or surveillance by air traffic services may reduce the likelihood of CFIT. In order to prevent the occurrence of CFIT accidents, manufacturers and safety regulators developed terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS). The first generation of these TAWS systems is known as a ground proximity warning system (GPWS), which uses a radar altimeter to assist in calculating terrain closure rates. This system has now been further improved with the addition of a GPS terrain database and is known as an enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). This and the older system have mandatory pilot procedures and actions following any caution or warning event. Smaller aircraft often use a GPS database of terrain to provide terrain warning. The GPS database contains a database of nearby terrain and will present terrain that is near the aircraft in red or yellow depending on its distance from the aircraft.

Statistics show that aircraft fitted with a second-generation EGPWS have not suffered a CFIT accident if TAWS or EGPWS are properly handled (there are at least three CFIT accidents of planes with EGPWS/TAWS: Garuda Indonesia Flight 200, 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash, Miros?awiec air accident). As of 2007, 5% of the world's commercial airlines still lack a TAWS, leading to a prediction of two CFIT accidents in 2009. In the case of Mount Salak Sukhoi Superjet 100 crash, the TAWS was working but the pilot intentionally turned it off.


Aircraft Accidents caused by CFIT, are one of the accidents affecting the world in general aviation, usually is as a result of flying into IMC, on or a visual flight (VFR).

According to the statistics, 80% of all CFIT Accidents are involved in general aviation aircraft, with a fatal consequence in 75% of cases.
Generally there are two major accidents profiles after the Pilot get in to inadvertent entrance into IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions) on VMC (Visual Flight Conditions) flight.

  • Loss of Control: the loss of the spatial orientation by the pilot after inadvertently entering into clouds. Disoriented without visual references and inexperienced in instrument flight, lose control during the flight.

Final Unexpected: the pilot inadvertently enters into clouds without following an instrument flight plan, usually after trying to maintain visual below the ceiling until the increasing and the pilot try to stay below the layer cloud. The pilot tries to reach an area with higher ceilings regardless of the terrain ahead and just colliding with the mountain in a level flight attitude and high speed.

  • 17% of all GA fatalities are due to CFIT
  • CFIT accidents are fatal 58% of the time.
  • CFIT accidents occur 64% of the time in daytime and 36% at night.
  • 51% of CFIT accidents occur in IMC, 48% in VMC and 1% unknown.
  • Impacted terrain was flat 45% and mountainous 55%.

The technology like Bombardier’s Vision Cockpit or Gulfstream’s PlaneView makes it a lot safer for everyone on the aircraft.

Unstabilized Approaches

Many aircraft accidents happen after an unstabilized approach. An unstabilized approach is an approach during which an aircraft does not maintain at least one of the following variables stable: speed, descent rate, vertical/lateral flight path and in landing configuration. Unstabilized approaches account for most approach and landing accidents. For this reason, an approach should be stabilized by 1,000 feet (305 m) above runway altitude. Otherwise, a go-around should be considered by the pilot.

Most airlines have parameters built into their Standard Operating Procedures that indicate the parameters of an unstabilized approach and the action to take. When I was flying for Ryan Air we had some very strict parameters that sometimes would result in a go-around that could have been avoided. However, I do believe it is always better to be safe than sorry. So if next time you fly with an airline and the pilots decide to go-around, they are just playing things safe.

On average, 96 percent of unstabilized approaches do not result in a go-around, according to preliminary findings from a go-around study being conducted by the Flight Safety Foundation’s international and European aviation committees. “Data and anecdotal information are showing there are increased exceedances in aircraft performance and rates of violation of air traffic control instructions,” the FSF noted. Foundation President and CEO Kevin Hiatt said the data indicates that flight crews often continue an unstabilized approach “because the pilot has enough confidence in the airplane or the situation.” Using 2011 statistics, the FSF said data analysis shows that potentially 54 percent of all aircraft accidents that year could have been prevented by a go-around decision. “This is based on 65 percent of that year’s accidents being in the approach and landing [ALA] phase, and using our analysis that 83 percent of ALAs could be prevented by a go-around decision,” FSF director of global programs Rodolfo Quevedo told AIN. The foundation’s international and European aviation committees are still gathering data for the go-around study via the FSF website and LinkedIn.

According to Hiatt, the go-around study will be completed by the end of this year, and a white paper on this topic–to include guidelines for safe go-around operations–will be available on the FSF website by early next year.

Top Approach & Landing Accident (ALA) Causes

  • CFIT (includes landing short)
  • Loss of Control
  • Landing Overrun
  • Runway Veer off
  • Non Stabilized Approach

These account for 76% of all ALA’s

Interesting ALA Facts

Approach and landing (from outer marker in to landing) comprise 4% of the flight time, yet account for 45% of the hull losses

- The ALA rate for freight, ferry, and
positioning flights (no pax) is 8 times
higher than the rate for pax flights

The accident risk is 5 times greater for
commercial aircraft flying a non-
precision approach compared with
those flying a precision approach

In 75 % of the ALA accidents, precision ? approach aid wasn't available or not used

Pilot Fatigue

Fatigue and exhaustion are common reactions of the body and can occur in healthy individuals as a normal response to physical and mental efforts. Nonetheless, fatigue is considered a safety hazard because it reduces alertness and impairs performance. Insufficient rest and sleep opportunities, shift work and long duty hours make pilots and cabin crew particularly prone to fatigue.
Research shows that a fatigued pilot is more likely to make errors at critical moments. It is precisely at the moment when most people would feel ‘dead tired’ – at the end of a long working day – when pilots must be fully alert to make critical decisions and take evasive action, if necessary. Concentrating and ensuring a safe landing is, however, a difficult task, when pilots have been awake for many hours.

Fatigue has already been cited as a factor in several accidents and serious incidents in the last couple of years (e.g. Colgan Air, 2009, Air India Express, 2010). Most recently, in May 2012, an Air Berlin plane requested an emergency landing in Munich, due to pilot fatigue.

Fatigue has been cited as a factor in several accidents and serious incidents.

In 2007, an aircraft with 288 passengers on board came off the runway in Iceland when landing. The investigation showed that fatigue was to blame.

When tired, pilots are prone to have increased reaction times, short term memory loss, impaired judgment, poor decision making and decreased visual perception. Critically, they may not be aware of the extent of this.

Over 3 out of 5 pilots in Sweden, Norway and Denmark made mistakes due to fatigue

To assess the impact of fatigue, the surveyed pilots were asked to estimate the extent to which fatigue affects the safety of flight operations.

A large number of pilots attributed errors they have been involved in directly to fatigue. The surveys uncover that a majority of pilots declare to have made a mistake as a direct consequence of fatigue.


93% of the pilots in Germany acknowledge that they have already made mistakes due to fatigue. The survey results in theScandinavian countries emphasize similar concerns.

More than 3 out of 5 pilots in Sweden (71%), Norway (79%) and Denmark (80-90%) have a similar experience with mistakes related to fatigue.

Wrong setting of switches, using wrong data for performance calculations, failure to follow procedures in safety checklists, miscommunications or missing air traffic control instructions are examples of what these mistakes might be. Seemingly benign such mistakes can have significant consequences on the safety of flight operations.

For example, in Norway (34%), Denmark (43%-54%), Germany (14%), Sweden (21%) and France (55%) pilots acknowledge that fatigue has played a role in an incident or closely-avoided accident they were involved in.

Similar concerns were also highlighted by the National Sleep Foundation’s (NSF) in 2012. According to their Sleep in America poll, a significant number of transportation professionals say that sleepiness has caused safety problems on the job, with one in five pilots (20%) admitting to having made a serious error due to sleepiness.

In addition to direct consequences for the safety of flight operations, fatigue has consequences for the work-life balance of pilots and their ability to rest. A tired pilot needs time to recover from fatigue. The UK study among pilots revealed however that sleep problems are correlated with fatigue. As a consequence, fatigue can become self- perpetuating. Pilots may eventually end up in the vicious circle of being too tired to adequately rest or sleep, which in its turn will leave them even more exhausted.

What is Causing Pilot Fatigue?

67% of French pilots identify a series of morning departures as problematic and contributing to fatigue.

88% of the pilots in Denmark estimate the rest between work periods as insufficient and 83 % reiterate on the
long working hours.

69% of the pilots in Germany stated they were too tired to perform a full flight duty after having been called out off standby

In addition to a series of early or late duties, in the top 3 of the Netherlands survey, pilots note that there often
is a lack of resting places/possibilities.

More than 50% of the pilots polled in France have similar concerns. The lack of adequate rest areas is considered problematic and contributing to fatigue.

Let the Pilot be in Charge

As you have probably realised from what has been said so far the pilot is very much the one in control of the aircraft’s safety. Most people buying a private jet have a considerable amount of money. Unfortunately, sometimes this comes with a big ego and an attitude of money can buy everything…including the weather…

You have hired the pilot because he is competent and a pro at what he does. If your pilot reckons the weather is not good enough, don’t push him. You pay him a lot of money to keep you safe, don’t make him kill you! Upsetting the boss is not what private pilots want to do and pushing the safety barrier has more often claimed lives.

Your pilots will see, hear things and will be taking you to different locations on business. You want all this to stay confidential. You need to build loyalty, last thing you want is changing pilots every 6-12 months. Pilots like to talk and people love to hear pilot stories…

Here are my tips for Hiring & Managing Pilots:

  • Hire through a trusted network, not from an agency. This way you will know more about the personality.
  • An airline background guarantees they have more of a solid technical background. Airline pilots fly into more airports and fly with many different pilots.
  • Be prepared to pay for pilot’s type ratings, this offers you a wider range of candidates.
  • Don’t have them fly in uniform. When crews turn-up in hotels and walk through airports they always get a lot of attention. You want your pilots to keep a low profile.
  • Give your pilots planned days off and reasonable amounts of holiday time. A rested pilot is a safer pilot.

Morten Lange

TRI/E BD-700 XRS, Vision, Global 6500 / 5500, SFI/E CL350

10 年

Fabio, You bring up many good points that some potential owners seem to ignore when it comes to crewing. Especially crew rest is an issue often overlooked, and in the interests of safety, a FMS should be agreed between owner and crew - while everyone is comfortably seated in an office, and not at then back-end of a 16hr-day, where the crew will, finally, be pressed to admit that continuing the duty period would be unsafe. Anyway, Part NCC will address most of this when it is implemented in 2016. Are you all ready for this? While I, as a pilot, share your enthusiasm for all the new gizmo's that all new business jets come or can be specced with, their overall contribution to flight safety is far from a proven fact. GPWS & EGPWS got a big safety ROI, as they picked the lowest-hanging fruit, namely curbing CFIT. Any technology-led progress beyond that - short of truly disruptive break-throughs - tends to be more incremental, and often comes with its own new hazards. HUD & SVS are two good examples, from the Vision flightdeck, where these may seem like brilliant additions to the owner speccing the aircraft. SVS is great for additional SA in mountainous terrain, and the HUD can be a great boon - but without established operational practices, and consistent training in malfunctions, both have the possibility to cause as many threats as they eliminate. Another is the electronic checklist, where Segal (1994) suggests that 'manual electronic' checklists led to less cross-checking, made crews more reliant on non-verbal communication and showed greater variance in execution speed when comparing normal checklists to emergency checklists than was observed for paper checklists - again, hardly the expected outcome of a technological advance. A discussion about which new systems bring consistent safety advances - vs. perceived safety advances in the eyes of the buyer - would be interesting. Also, a discussion on to what extent buyers see these systems as 'mitigation strategies' for pilot workload and tiredness would be interesting - are some systems sold with the implicit subtitle of 'less workload - better SA - a more tired pilot can be just as safe in this aircraft as a less tired pilot in a competitor aircraft'? Or the classic, from a large business aircraft OEM sales brochure: 'From cold aircraft to off-blocks ready in 10min' - really?? Would I, as an owner, want pilots that routinely do that? Finally, you do mention training, but give little space to it in the body of your article. The training you as owner select for your crew is important - but make sure it is tailored to your operation, your procedures and your operating environment. Without a risk analysis and consistent mitigation through training, your crew going to the sim once or twice a year is mostly a 'tick-in-the-box' exercise. Crew training is one of the major cost centres in private aviation - yet one where we seem the least concerned about ROI. The result is binary - crew pass = good, crew fail = we give them another chance, or hire new pilots that can pass. Are owners really pleased with a pass/fail outcome? Are we interested in how much the crew has been able to 'take away' form a given training session, or are we content with a 'pass'? Have the threats that you operate under been addressed? Finally - it's worth remembering that the companies you pay top (some may say 'over-the-top') dollar for training your crew are in the business of revalidating crew licenses. They are staffed by excellent instructors and conscientious examiners - but will they have any interest in your crew being pushed to learn new things - or does that carry too much implicit risk of failure? The owner cannot be expected to be a repeat customer if his pilots have somehow failed the exercise, or if you run the risk of poor crew feed-back, so better to thread softly and not push the training envelope too hard... The funny thing is - we learn the most from our failures - or near-failures. Does the above system facilitate that? At 80k p.a. per pilot, would you feel entitled to some professional development of your crew? I know the pilots (if you have chose wisely, according to Fabrizio's excellent advise) would love developing their skill-set. So - is the current business aviation training system good enough? Or can we do better?

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