2002-2005: Focus on Kabul -- Excerpt from (Mis)Understanding Afghanistan

“After they [the Taliban] fell, things started returning to normal... Local leaders, tribes, started taking charge... it wasn’t lawless at all; and we began working with them [local tribal leaders] to start turning services back on and seeing what needed to get done... We started with the power-grid; [that] the Taliban had literally severed and stuck a sandal through [to stop the flow of electricity].” (Discussion moves to the end of the deployment). “I had been working through [REDACTED, a prominent tribal figure] but when State Department showed up, this all changed. I was told we would’t be working with people like that... ‘too much blood on their hands’; and they wanted to drop a ‘democracy-in-a-box’ and basically [exclude] anyone [not up to our standards]... We were going to do it ‘our’ way; not ‘their’ way.” — Special Forces Civil Affairs Officer, Kandahar 2002, Interview. (39)

Troop Levels: 5,000

While the Taliban and AQ were making their last stands, Afghanistan's future was being decided in other parts of the world. In New York, the United Nations Security Counsel passed resolution 1386 authorising the formation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, envisioned as a small peacekeeping-like force to provide security in the absence of government and train Afghan security forces. (40)?In Bonn, Germany, representatives from across Afghanistan convened to select a provisional government and interim leaders.

Although Afghanistan had seen invasions of foreign powers throughout its history, the American invasion broke historical patterns. (41)?The British invaded to?replace?an existing regime. The Soviets invaded to?support?an existing regime. The US invaded at a time when the state structure ceased to function and, in the absence of a client political elite in Kabul to rely on, would require to?create?a new one. (42)?

The Bonn Accord comprised the ‘Rome Faction’ of previously exiled King Zahir Shah royalists, the Pakistan-based Peshawar Mujahideen faction, and representatives from the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance who had just defeated the Pashtun-backed Taliban with American assistance. (43)?Pashtun groups had less representation. (44)?

The collapse of the Taliban in Ghilzai Pashtun areas (east) left a leadership vacuum that ignited factional infighting. Durrani Pashtuns had been absent from Afghanistan's political scene since the 1978 overthrow of Daud Khan, the last Durrani leader (of Muhammadzai royal lineage). Despite their underrepresentation, the Loya Jirga was quick to select a Durrani Pashtun of royal Sadozai lineage, Hamid Karzai, as head of the new Afghan government — a compromise that members expected would lead to immediate consensus in a situation where non-Pashtun Northern Alliance commanders were ruled-out for fear that they would be rejected by Pashtun groups who would be more willing to accept authority of the new government if headed by one of their own, regardless if Ghilzai or Durrani. (45)

The formation of the Kabul government would be completed through four further processes: first, a national assembly, or Loya Jirga, would be convened to ratify the decisions made in Bonn; second, a Constitutional Jirga to select the form and function of the government would be held in 2003; third, presidential elections would be held in 2004; and, following, parliamentary elections held in 2005.

The Loya Jirga included 500 representatives of Afghan political factions (less the Taliban), to which 25 percent was comprised of women — a segment of the population strictly excluded from the political sphere under the Taliban regime. (46)?

Key to the 2003 Constitutional Jirga was the debate of whether to implement a highly centralised government with a powerful presidential office or a decentralised federal parliamentary system with a prime minister.

Arguments in favour of a federal system cited Afghanistan's regional diversity: where a near-century of centralised rule under the Iron Amir had been detrimental to the regions and the growing autonomy of the regions after two decades of lawlessness and civil conflict. (47)?Fears that this could pave way for future dissolution of the country presented argument for a strong centralised Kabul government — an option favoured by the international community that viewed the reign of Abdur Rahman differently, as a period of external stability despite its internal volatility, and was ratified by the Constitutional Jirga. (48)

Shortly after, the 2004 Presidential Elections and 2005 Parliamentary Elections were held, popularly supported by a high voter turn-out (including women) with 8 million votes cast.

Hamid Karzai won with 56 percent, retaining his position as President and marking the first time a national leader had been chosen by an electorate. (49)?

Karzai's political legitimacy was viewed differently by the international community and the population.

To the international community, Karzai's legitimacy was confirmed by popular support in a democratic election. Viewed much differently in Afghanistan, the elections only secured Karzai’s position to prove himself as a leader. (50)?

Although Parliamentary Elections were concluded in 2005, the reach of the Kabul government to the countryside extended barely beyond the capital. Fissures from the formation of a centralised government began to surface early. Focused on Kabul, neglect of regional areas immediately began to take effect in the first few years of governance. As problems emerged, local leaders were disempowered to invoke change. Local Afghans had few mechanisms to raise their complaints to the Kabul government who were upset by the slow progress of much needed aid and development. (51)?Ineffective to resolve local problems from such a distance, the legitimacy of the Karzai government began waning in neglected regions of the country.

From 2002 to 2004, ISAF’s mandate restricted the force to Kabul to stabilise the capital during the formation of the Karzai government. NATO nations began taking lead of the mission as US forces were being diverted to the war in Iraq starting in 2003. (52)?The ISAF mandate was expanded from Kabul to the rest of the country with adaptation of UNSC Resolution 1510 (to be conducted in four stages from 2004 to 2006). (53)

ISAF plans for Afghanistan's regions embraced the ‘Provincial Reconstruction Team’ (PRT) strategy where NATO nations would form civil-military teams in provincial capitals that combined the provision of security (the military), governance (state department or foreign affairs), and development (aid) under one roof. (54)

In 2004 and 2005, ISAF expanded to take control of the country’s north and west regions. (55)?ISAF Mission Stage 1 ‘to the north’ was commenced in late 2004 as Germany led the expansion by overtaking responsibility for PRTs in the northern provinces by October 2004. ISAF Mission Stage 2 ‘to the west’ began mid-2005 taking control of PRTs in Herat, Farrah, Ghor, and Badghis provinces.

With the completion of the first two stages, ISAF had obtained responsibility for fifty percent of Afghanistan's territory, establishing nine PRTs by September 2005. The first two stages completed relatively peacefully in the north and west regions where the population lived under the authority of local power-holders. The final two stages to the south and east met a different situation, between 2004 and 2006, as ISAF began expanding responsibility to the rest of the country — a move met by heavy fighting in the southern provinces. (56)

Excerpt from: (Mis)Understanding Afghanistan, Chapter 2: The Situational Context of US-Led ‘Counterinsurgency’ in Afghanistan (2001-2015), Pp. 123-127.

CITATION:

Gavriel, Alexei (2020) (Mis)Understanding Afghanistan: An Ethnographic Examination of 'Human Elements' Affecting the Nexus Between Understanding and Strategy in Population-Centric Conflict. Queens University Belfast. Doctoral Thesis.

Gavriel, Alexei (2020) "Chapter 2: The Situational Context of US-Led ‘Counterinsurgency’ in Afghanistan (2001-2015)". In (Mis)Understanding Afghanistan: An Ethnographic Examination of 'Human Elements' Affecting the Nexus Between Understanding and Strategy in Population-Centric Conflict. Queens University Belfast. Doctoral Thesis. Pp. 110-155.

NOTES:

39.?Interview, LG, Special Forces Civil Affairs Officer, Kandahar 2002. Reflective interview 2018.

40.?UNSCR 1386 authorised the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force including the deployment of a multinational force in and around Kabul to help stabilise the country and create the conditions for self-sustaining peace. Combat operations to this point had been under the banner of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), an operation that would continue and run parallel to the ISAF mission focused mostly on counter-network activities (degrading the capability of hostile networks). The separation of the OEF and ISAF missions was driven by internal NATO politics regarding agreements of troop mandates and use-of-force policy.

41.?Barfield 2010.

42.?Barfield 2010.

43.?Rubin 2004.

44.?Notably, the Taliban was not represented in this process (See: Semple 2009.)?

45.?Barfield 2010.

46.?Oates and Helal 2004.

47.?Barfield 2010.

48.?Barfield 2010; Farrel 2017.

49.?Eighteen candidates ran in the election, although only four were serious contenders: (1) Karzai - Pashtun, Interim Government leader; (2) Qanuni - Panjshiri Tajik,?Hizb-i-Nuhzat-i-Milli?Afghanistan party; (2) Dostum - Uzbek,?Junbesh-i-Milli Islami?party; Mohaqiq - Hazara, aligned with the Shia?Hizb-i-Wahdat?party. Karzai won support in both eastern and southern Pashtun areas as well as garnered large support amongst Tajiks. Hazara and Uzbek candidates won support mainly only amongst their own ethnically dominated areas. (See: Reynolds 2006)

50.?Barfield 2010.

51.?Giustozzi 2005.

52.?Farrell 2017.

53.?UNSC 1520 was signed on 13 October 2003. Masadykov, Giustozzi, and Page (2010) overview the unfolding ISAF mandates.

54.?The PRT strategy from its onset was highly criticised for having an exceptionally high client-patron ratio. NATO nations also struggled to establish the governance and aid portions of their PRTs as these civilian government departments lacked expeditionary capability for engagement in a warzone. (See: Johnson and Mason 2009.)

55.?2004-06-28 ISAF Mission Stage 1 'to the North' announced at the NATO Istanbul Summit. 2004-10 ISAF Mission Stage 1 'North' was complete with PRTs occupied in northern provinces (led by Germany). 2005-02-10 ISAF Mission Stage 2 'to the west' announced. 2005-05-31 ISAF Mission Stage 2 'to the west' begins as ISAF takes control of PRTs in Herat and Farrah. 2005-09 ISAF Mission Stage 2 'to the west' completes with ISAF taking control of PRTs in Ghor and Badghis, totalling nine PRTs in North and West, fifty percent of Afghanistan's territory. 2005-12-08 ISAF Mission Stage 3 'to the south' announced by NATO.?

56.?Fissures also became apparent within the NATO alliance between countries willing to commit soldiers to combat operations and volatile areas (US, Canada, UK, Australia, Netherlands) and those unwilling (France, Germany, Spain, Italy). These fissures are aggravated by the divide within the NATO alliance regarding the US invasion of Iraq. (See: Farrel 2017.)