The 10-20-70 Rule: Israel's Way to Improve its Reputation

[Edited version appeared in the Jerusalem Post]

By Ido Aharoni

April 29th, 2024

Ultimately ‘hasbara’ is a subjective mental state-of-mind, an aspiration to be exposed to acceptable messages and images. For many, good ‘hasbara’ simply means complete dominance of ‘our’ side, and the disappearance of the ‘other’.

‘Hasbara’ is the awkward Hebrew expression meant to describe the practice of self-congratulatory advocacy on behalf of Israel (to explain). ‘Hasbara’ assumes a binary worldview (we are right and they are wrong) and is often perceived as ‘public relations’ (PR). In times of great national anxiety, such as the one triggered by 10/7, ‘hasbara’ becomes an obsession. It is synonymous with a collective yearning for ‘good’ imagery and supportive messaging.

It is almost unanimously accepted, especially among Israel’s well-wishers, that the country chronically suffers from bad public relations. “Not enough hasbara”, people often complain. While most places in the world, including robust brands such as Paris and Barcelona, would agree that they could always use some more ‘good’ public relations, Israel’s problem runs much deeper. It is not just about PR.

Israel’s problem, in the first place, is one of positioning.

‘Positioning’ refers to actions, principles and processes that, if implemented, could improve the performance and perception of a place, organization or product. Positioning targets the consumer’s mind and is always measured vis-a-vis the place’s perceived competition. Good positioning is one that wisely relies on the place’s relative advantages and competitive edge, and requires the articulation of long-term vision concerning the country’s future. Unlike PR, which is an immediate and transactional tool, positioning is not a crisis management tool. It is based on thorough research and the ability to articulate an effective overall strategy.

One of the most common and discussed positionings in international relations, is the positioning of the underdog. The dichotomy ‘might vs. right’ implies that, more often than not, the underdog enjoys a built-in advantage. Humans emotionally connect with underdogs for the same reason they develop an attachment to babies, toddlers, and puppies: they are viewed as helpless creatures who need our help. We feel good when we care for the weak and the needy. The emotional mechanism that ties us to the underdog is so powerful that it makes it almost impossible for us to believe that the underdog can be wrong, let alone be brutal, vicious, or deadly. This concept could be described as the ‘purity of the underdog’. This common inability, to attribute to the underdog ill-intention and brutality, is the main reason for the frustration of Israel’s supporters with the world’s reaction to 10/7.??

This philosophy is not an American invention. Like many other questionable ideas, it came from Europe. French Existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre proposed solely examining the question of right vs. wrong through the eyes of the disadvantaged. Some conveniently interpreted this as an automatic justification to any action taken by the perceived oppressed. Sartre suggested one main criterion for truth: the least favored in society will determine true vs. false. As demonstrated by Western academia post 10/7, this simplistic and flat definition of humanism has also become self-intoxicating. At least, they feel good about themselves. Indeed, the ‘purity of the underdog’ concept leads to bizarrities such as ‘Queers for Palestine’ and feminists that view rape as a ‘legitimate form of resistance’.?

This is how Israel finds itself in an ongoing and acute reputational predicament.

In the comedy Tropic Thunder (2008), a powerful comic effect is achieved by breaking the concept of the ‘purity of the underdog’: the character played by Ben Stiller insists on going back into the village, where a battle is raging, to rescue an Asian toddler whom he sees as his “son”, since he feels a special emotional connection with him. “He is my boy”, Stiller’s character says, “he needs me”. Seconds later, we see Stiller running away from the village, with the cute toddler on his back, repeatedly and viciously stabbing him. “I was wrong”, he yells hysterically.?

Historically, even pre-statehood, Israel firmly held the positioning of the underdog. A series of dramatic events cemented Israel’s positioning as the ‘regional David’. The ongoing refusal of Arab/Palestinian leadership to accept any political compromise - 1937 Peel Commission and 1947 United Nations ‘Partition Plan’ - deprived the Arab world of the favorability that comes with the positioning of the underdog. Instead, the Arabs quickly became the ‘regional Goliath’.?

The horrors of the Holocaust, followed by the refusal of the British Mandate to take in Jewish refugees, the launch of the comprehensive and aggressive ‘Arab Economic Boycott’ in 1945, the 1967 Khartoum Resolution, with its ‘Three Noes’, and the geo-political predicament that led to the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War – all further fortified Israel’s positioning as the underdog.?

Occupying the positioning of the underdog is no guarantee for ‘good’ PR, but it did provide Israel with some benefits – such as the support of key international actors before the UN vote on the Partition Plan, important military figures (Orde Wingate, David Mickey Marcus, George Buzz Beurling, who came with over 3000 volunteers), iconic Hollywood stars and executives (such as Sam Spiegel, Kirk Douglas, Frank Sinatra, Sammy David Jr.) and, of course, a long line of philanthropists who helped creating the country’s new civic, educational and economic infrastructure.

But that changed in June of 1982.?

Israel’s decision to invade Lebanon, following a series of PLO attacks, including an attempt to assassinate Israel’s Ambassador to the UK, was viewed as controversial by the Israelis themselves. For the first time since 1948, Israelis were seriously doubting the necessity of a major military campaign. Their dissatisfaction echoed throughout the Jewish world and the intellectual elite. Images of the suffering of Lebanese civilians dominated global coverage and public opinion started to tilt against Israel, especially after the Sabra and Shatila Massacre. Israel slowly started vacating its position as the underdog. And it has been deteriorating ever since. The 1st Intifada (1987), the 2nd Intifada (2000) and the periodic inflammations with the Palestinians, produced an abundance of ‘bad news’ and crowned the latter as the underdogs. The required re-adjustment, from ‘David’ to ‘Goliath’ (albeit friendly and creative), was nearly impossible for Israel’s supporters.?

Despite losing the underdog position, the level of political support for Israel has remained relatively high, largely due to the lasting impact of 9/11. According to PEW (March 21st, 2024), a majority in the USA say Israel has valid reasons for fighting (and fewer say the same about Hamas). An examination of a wide range of studies, conducted in the past 22 years, indicates a relatively stable division of opinion in Western pluralistic societies: 10/20/70. Roughly 10% oppose anything Israel. In some countries and demographics it can be higher (such is the case with Gen Z). Among them are many members of the intellectual elite and, yes, many Jews. Roughly 20% report a strong emotional connection with Israel. These are Zionist Jews and Christians. The rest of the 70% are the real story. These are the uninterested and uninformed. They represent Israel’s reputational room to grow. Providing them with the opportunity to connect with Israel, is a critical mission for the country, as became so acutely evident post 10/7. People who know very little about Israel (and the little they think they know is always associated with tension, bloodshed and strife), will be more inclined to buy into a negative narrative, such as ‘Apartheid’ or ‘genocide’. On the other hand, people who know Israel first-hand, like Rep. Ritchie Torres (D-NY), will be less inclined to do so. Israel's goal should have been, therefore, heavily focusing on the 70%, providing them with the necessary ‘immune system’ to fend off false allegations.

But Israel didn’t do that.

Instead, official Israel almost solely focused on the agitators at the end of the spectrum, thus totally exposing the 70% to the other side’s vitriol. This is a failure of historical proportions, especially now when participants in social media feel compelled to voice opinions on matters they know nothing about, and the intensity of User Generated Content (UGC) has reached unprecedented heights.

What can be done now? Israel must invest heavily in the 70%, while combating the falsehoods of the 10%. In order to accomplish that effectively, several things must happen:

First, the establishment of a robust national cyber force. Experts estimate that such a force would require highly trained staff of at least 5000 people, if not more. The purpose of this cyber force would be to improve Israel’s presence in cyberspace by deploying both defensive and offensive tools. But more importantly, the main task would be to broaden the scope through which Israel is being perceived, to allow the 70% to become familiar with the human face of the Israeli people. Humanizing the brand should be the main purpose of this cyber force.

Second, Israel must provide massive assistance to the wide range of initiatives in the organized Jewish world, to pursue Jew-haters and antisemites. This effort refers to many members of the 10%, who engage in antisemitic activities, spread hate and threaten to harm Israel and the USA. They need to be named, shamed and pursued. This must be a long term deterring effort involving legal action and beyond.?

Third, Israel must invest heavily, at least the same amount of money invested by its adversaries, in changing the academic conversation. This can be done by investing in young academics in the humanities and social studies, endowing chairs and supporting existing organizations who are trying to tame the currently out-of-control DEI culture. The establishment of ‘Israel Studies’ centers in leading universities, was used by administrators as an excuse to exclude Israel-related content from mainstream academic venues. Israel must go back to basics and refuse to lock all Israel related content in one academic enclave.

Fourth, Israel must leave the uniform-wearing IDF officers out of the effort to boost its reputation. In many quarters of the Western world, especially among American liberals, military force is illegitimate (police too). IDF’s dominance in the realm of PR is one of Israel’s main reputational obstacles. The messaging used by the IDF is predominantly designed for domestic purposes. Even the speakers’ roster fails to accurately depict Israel’s diversity (severe under-representation of women and minority groups). Israel’s message must be imparted by civilians, preferably professional diplomats.

Fifth, massive investment in exposing Israel to trend-setters. Third-party endorsements are known to be far more effective than classic ‘hasbara’. This effort should be led by the Ministry of Tourism and Israel’s municipalities. This was done quite successfully in the past but on a much smaller scale. The method should center around Israel’s niche-strengths (such as religion, cuisine, sports, etc). Clearly, it’s an uphill battle, but Israel’s travel sector is known for its resilience and remarkably recovered before. It could quickly recover again, given effective steps are implemented.

All of the above will not change the course of Israel’s overall positioning, but could alleviate some of the country’s immediate reputational pains and serve as a strategic foundation for future challenges.?

Post 10/7, official Israel must realize that its reputation is an integral part of its national security. Ignoring the reputational crisis is costly. It is critical for Israel’s decision-makers to internalize that this is not about being right. Sadly, ‘truth’ and ‘fact’ became only an alternative. This is about being ‘attractive’ and ‘relevant’. There is not enough good PR in the world to overcome bad positioning. PR has great immediate benefits, but Israel needs to engage in an historical effort to nurture and boost its brand globally. If Israel will not invest in its reputation, on a scale never seen before (billions, not millions), the repercussions will be devastating and painful.?

*The writer served as Israel’s Consul General in New York (2010-2016), founded the Brand Israel Program after 9/11 and serves as faculty at both Tel Aviv University and Touro University.

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