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The geopolitical orientations of former Soviet bloc countries, including those in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, are indeed influenced by a variety of factors, including historical ties, economic interests, security concerns, and cultural affinities. However, it's essential to avoid oversimplification and recognize that each country's relationship with Russia or the West is nuanced and can evolve over time. In the case of Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, their historical and geographical proximity to Russia has often shaped close ties with Moscow. These ties can be traced back to the Soviet era when these countries were part of the USSR. Even after gaining independence in 1991, many of these nations have maintained strong economic and security relationships with Russia, often due to shared economic interests, security cooperation, and cultural affinities. However, it's worth noting that Central Asian countries also pursue multi-vector foreign policies, balancing relations with various regional and global powers, including China, the United States, and regional organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On the other hand, Eastern European countries that were part of the Soviet bloc, such as Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), have generally pursued closer ties with Western Europe and the United States since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This shift towards the West has been driven by factors such as historical grievances against Russian/Soviet dominance, aspirations for integration into Western political and economic structures (such as NATO and the European Union), and a desire for greater economic opportunities and security guarantees. However, it's important to recognize that within each region, there are variations in attitudes towards Russia or the West. For example, some Eastern European countries may maintain pragmatic or historical ties with Russia despite their broader pro-Western orientation. Similarly, Central Asian countries may seek to diversify their foreign relations beyond Russia, engaging with various regional and global actors to pursue their national interests. In summary, while historical legacies and geographic proximity can influence the foreign policy orientations of former Soviet bloc countries, their relationships with Russia or the West are multifaceted and subject to change based on evolving geopolitical dynamics and national interests.

Two Nations, One Friendship: The #India-Russia Story From #Nehru to #Modi, India's leaders have maintained a robust relationship with #Russia, backed by historical camaraderie. Nehru was highly impressed with the Soviet Union and Indira Gandhi gave it a new height. We all know how the Americans and Brits created a hostile environment in 1971 and it was the Soviet Union that came in open support of India during the War with Pakistan and the result was the creation of Bangladesh. Despite Western pressures, this trust and collaboration have only grown stronger https://lnkd.in/gFUTNBSP

There are countless evidences that unequivocally demonstrate China's current support for Russia. We have classified them into 4 macro areas: diplomacy, propaganda, economics/finance and military, including help in intelligence. Not surprisingly, the Ukrainian war is proving to be a powerful catalyst for anti-Western forces. So, Beijing's strategy we can frame it in a grand deception: to make the international consensus believe that it is activating for peace and underneath operate to weaken the Western front, both on the eastern front (Europe + Indo-Pacific), and on the southern front (global south, Middle East and North Africa). On the other hand, the Chinese are very good at the art of deception. There are a thousand reasons to believe that Xi Jinping currently benefits from prolonging the war of attrition in Europe even in a logic of containing NATO (which is perceived by Beijing as an adversary even in the Indo-Pacific). The actal Germany/China relationship should be framed within this logic. Berlin is forced to pay dearly for its energy bill and is unable to exit hours from a recessionary phase in its economy. At the same time, Xi Jinping reminds Germany that it must increasingly unite with Beijing to save itself.

Is the U.S.'s Cold War Mentality Undermining West Asia's Security? According to insightful article below by former senior CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, the answer is yes. What might be added to this article's apt arguments is that since President Trump pulled the U.S. out of the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018 and adopted a policy of "maximum pressure" and assassination-backed deterrence, Iran's behavior across West Asia actually became more aggressive, as evidenced by the massive transfer of missiles and drones to its allies in the region over the past few years, which has changed the rules of war. Now that the U.S. and its allies have exhausted their use of punitive measures, incentives must be added to the policy toolbox. Diplomacy without incentives isn't really diplomacy. Given the destructive and long-term impact of U.S. invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and other countries during the two decades-long Global War on Terror, the country must think long and hard about strategies for addressing the Iranian challenge. "That [Cold War] framing included the notion of a single worldwide communist movement in which the chief impetus for action anywhere in that movement was seen as coming from its center—that is, the Soviet regime in Moscow. This notion contributed to misunderstanding the nature and roots of many local incidents and confrontations. It also artificially elevated the perceived importance of any conflicts in which communists were involved. A common American tendency was to perceive not just a local conflict but instead an entry on a scorecard of global U.S.-Soviet competition. "The Vietnam War was probably the largest and costliest of the errors stemming from that perception. When the United States entered the war in the mid-1960s, ordinary Americans and policymakers alike saw the conflict in Vietnam not as one of post-colonial nationalism but instead as a place to hold the line against the advance of global communism. The “domino theory,” envisioning an inevitable loss of other countries should South Vietnam fall to communists, was part of the dominant imagery.

Contemporary political events (e.g., Russo-Ukrainian crisis) prompted debates on Chinese bid for regional hegemony. Multifrontal offenses, that the US and its closest allies used, created space for internal dependency between Russia and China. During this crisis Russia and China exceedingly engaged in military, economic and diplomatic engagements. Successful military exercises like Joint naval drills, Northern/ Interaction-2023 and soaring trades overshooting all the bilateral targets show deepening relationship between these two nations. Offensive Realists may predict a catastrophic conflict as “the transfer of hegemony is rarely peaceful;? the old hegemon is unlikely easily to be reconciled to its loss of status and position”. Stephen M. Walt, renowned Harvard Professor, pointed that A Chinese bid for regional hegemony is likely to fail as history suggests hegemony may be desirable only in theory. Defensive Realists may argue when a state is tailoring to project power against others with revisionist ambitions, nearby powers typically band together to deter or defeat it. Many of China’s neighbors are already balancing more energetically: Defense budgets are rising sharply, and Australia, India, and Japan are coordinating with each other and with the United States. Walt also unveiled another barrier to regional hegemony; nationalism. “As Moscow is now being reminded in Ukraine, local populations will make enormous sacrifices to repel invaders”.

“…[The] goals and the lofty aims of freedom loving peoples are jeopardized…by [Communist] forces as sinister as those that operated in Europe and Asia during the 10 years leading up to World War II. The pattern is familiar-employment of subversive agents; infiltration tactics; incitement of disorder and chaos to disrupt normal economy and thereby to undermine popular confidence in government and leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of the people-all the techniques skillfully designed and ruthlessly implemented in order to create favorable conditions for the imposition of totalitarian ideologies…The Communists have the tactical initiative in the overall military situation. The Nationalist position in Manchuria is precarious, and in Shantung and Hopei Provinces strongly disputed. Continued deterioration of the situation may result in the early establishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in the evolution of a Communist-dominated China…Soviet aims in the Far East are diametrically opposed to and jeopardize United States interests in China in that their aims envisage progressive expansion of Soviet control and dominant influence. Realization of their aims in China would threaten United States strategic security. Time works to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, in achieving her aims, is being actively assisted by the Chinese Communist Party, which, by its actions and propaganda, is proven to be a tool of Soviet foreign policy…” ~ General Coady Wedemeyer September 19, 1947 in a report to President (Harry S.) Truman and Secretary of State (General George) Marshall

The sources of Russian conduct From Stalin to Gorbachev, Soviet leaders shared Putin’s desire for 'great power' prestige Nina L. Khrushcheva Oct 7, 2024 From Josef Stalin to Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet leaders shared Putin’s desire for “great power” prestige. This is not strictly a review of Sergey Radchenko’s recent book, "To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power." Rather, it is an invitation to find in the book a fresh take on the sources of Russian foreign policy conduct, in line with the American diplomat George F. Kennan’s famous 1947 assessment of the “sources of Soviet conduct.” By focusing on the logic driving Soviet leaders’ foreign policy decisions, Radchenko hopes to shed light on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s often-bloody quest to reclaim Russia’s status as a great power on par with the United States. From Josef Stalin to Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet leaders shared Putin’s desire for “great power” prestige. Leonid Brezhnev, who succeeded Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, envisioned a world “co-managed” by a Soviet Union and U.S. that respected each other as “equals.” But while the U.S. agreed to an equal relationship on paper, Radchenko explains, the Soviets felt as though they had been “forced into a humiliating position of delinquents, being presently taught by someone who (in all truth) was also not beyond reproach.” Putin has had a similar experience. Since coming to power nearly a quarter century ago, he has sought equality with the U.S.-led West. There was a time, for example, when he accepted NATO and even aspired to Russian membership. But Putin always believed that Russia’s size and historical role in global affairs entitled it to special treatment: Russia is not just another country and the West should act accordingly. That meant carefully weighing how its decisions might affect Russia’s interests and risk perceptions.

?? Today in 1939 ???????? Germany annexed Klaipeda from #Lithuania? Western ?????????????????????? lead to further demands from ???????????? And eventually caused World War Two. Imagine that happening today ?? Appeasing dictators by handing him land, And then expecting them to stop asking for more. ? Four countries had signed an agreement to assure Lithuania’s territorial integrity. But when push came to shove, they either tried appeasement or sided with the aggressor. Again, imagine that happening in the 21st century. ?? On 23 March 1939 Lithuania was forced to sign a treaty,?effective 22 March 1939, stating that Lithuania was 'voluntarily' transferring the Klaip?da Region to Germany. But Lithuania's suffering didn't even end after the war. As in 1945, the Soviet Union incorporated the region into the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. In truth, Lithuania remained occupied until 1989. They just changed occupier - from ?????????? to Soviets. ?? And the Soviets ???????????? some 50,000 Lithuanians during occupation. Imagine that happening today, Invading another country, ?????????????? anyone who resists And forcing the survivors to 'vote' in favor of annexation. We were too busy saying 'Never Again' To notice it's happening again. #History #Ukraine? #StandWithUkraine ????