SpecializedSec的动态

No company, regardless of its size, is immune to connectivity issues. Recently, CrowdStrike experienced an update error, and their efforts to address and resolve a connectivity challenge were truly impressive. Their proactive approach is a testament to the importance of robust operational strategies. At Switch Always On, we understand that uninterrupted connectivity of any magnitude for your business's success is of critical importance. That's why we strive to create advanced remote power control and management solutions. Our goal is to minimize downtime and ensure smooth operations. Kudos to CrowdStrike for their quick resolution! Let's all strive for operational excellence.

OS Development seems very slow to modernize. It concerns me that both Windows and Linux OS are so vulnerable to "out of bounds memory read" issues. With this demonstration of worldwide outage, we have a new threat vector to worry about now. Any widely used, and rapidly deployed software can take down your computing ecosystem instantly. Time to move to memory-safe OS. Who will get there first? #Microsoft #Linux #Apple

Crowdstrike: "On July 19, 2024, two additional IPC Template Instances were deployed. Due to a bug in the Content Validator, one of the two Template Instances passed validation despite containing problematic content data." Translation: "Build passed, ops problem now!" While the scope and impact were breaking news, the story is an old classic. If all that stands between your code and production deployment is an automated regression test, those test cases need to be as well maintained and verified as anything else that you're producing. It's a process and priority issue that's easy to fix, and companies have failed for far smaller mistakes.

Manual testing remains a cornerstone of quality assurance, especially highlighted by incidents like the recent Falcon Sensor update. Automated tests are crucial for efficiency, but manual testing brings unique value by simulating real-world user interactions and catching nuanced issues that automated scripts might overlook. Human testers can think creatively and critically, adapting to unexpected scenarios and exploring edge cases that may not be predefined in automated tests. They can identify usability issues, ensure the intuitive flow of the application, and provide a user-centric perspective that enhances overall product quality. In complex systems like CrowdStrike’s Falcon platform, the blend of automated and manual testing ensures robustness and reliability. Manual testing serves as a vital complement to automated processes, safeguarding against oversights and enhancing the resilience of software solutions. At Delta Software Solutions, we recognize the indispensable role of manual testing. That's why we're offering 1600 man-hours of free QA support to assist in your efforts, ensuring comprehensive testing coverage and helping to prevent future disruptions. Together, we can build more resilient systems and foster greater trust and satisfaction among users. Best regards, Govardhan M. Founder, Delta Software Solutions

?? Heads up! CrowdStrike's Falcon update caused Windows crashes. They've fixed it and shared the scoop on how to prevent it. ??? Dive into the details here: https://lnkd.in/gGPGs4kZ

CrowdStrike released a preliminary post incident review. So what happened? On Friday, July 19, 2024 at 04:09 UTC, CrowdStrike released a content configuration update for the Windows sensor to gather telemetry on possible novel threat techniques. The problematic Rapid Response Content configuration update resulted in a Windows system crash. If you came online after the update was revert, then you weren’t impacted. What Went Wrong and Why? CrowdStrike delivers security content configuration updates to our sensors in two ways:?Sensor Content?that is shipped with our sensor directly, and?Rapid Response Content?that is designed to respond to the changing threat landscape at operational speed. The issue on Friday involved a Rapid Response Content update with an undetected error. #SoftwareEngineering #Crowdstrike https://lnkd.in/g-jnk236

Since the first moment, we at CrowdStrike have been transparent and open in reporting what occurred to our customers and partners. We understand that the disruption has significantly impacted the daily lives of many people, including our own, and we once again apologize for it. Today, our users and the IT community are eager to understand what caused this failure and, more importantly, what steps we will take to ensure this never happens again. I encourage you to read our #PIR (Preliminary Post-Incident Report) here. https://lnkd.in/gnDk6QQp #CrowdStrike #OneTeamOneFight

Crowdstrike PIR has been released. While our company was not affected, this truly could have happened to anyone. To the many companies that were affected, sysadmins everywhere, we look forward to your continued progress and sleepless nights and the recovery of those companies who were brought down. Check out the PIR for an interesting read. We have a lot to learn for our own environments along with the clients we manage. This just stresses the fact of performing test in sandbox environments, and pushing updates much like these with staggered deployment strategies to minimize affected assets and users. I’ve even seen some talks about utilizing different tools in different levels of infrastructure to minimize risk if an incident much like this happens but that’s a whole other can of worms. https://lnkd.in/gnUKum5p

The Preliminary Post Incident Review from Crowdstrike is now out. You can read it here - https://lnkd.in/gVjQ3Nuh In this they talk about what was effectively a "pattern update" that caused the bigger issue of the BSOD's. From what I am reading, they did not have any staggered deployment process for this Rapid Response Content and that is how this issue failed to be caught on the way out the door. If that is indeed accurate, then it would appear that their QA process had not considered this could be an issue in the past. In my own mind, I would have thought they would have already had a staggered release of ANY update just to be sure that they catch things before they go out the door. Bear in mind that this one update was available for 90 minutes. 90 minutes and in that time it crashed 8.5 million computers. I'm looking forward to reading the full root cause analysis which they are working on now. The downside of this issue is this... the bad guys now know a LOT more about how Crowdstrike sensors work. That is not a good thing for any of us.

CrowdStrike: continues to focus on restoring all systems as soon as possible. Of the approximately 8.5 million Windows devices that were impacted, a significant number are back online and operational. Together with customers, we tested a new technique to accelerate impacted system remediation. We’re in the process of operationalizing an opt-in to this technique. We’re making progress by the minute. We understand the profound impact this has had on everyone. We know our customers, partners and their IT teams are working tirelessly and we’re profoundly grateful. We apologize for the disruption this has created. Our focus is clear: to restore every system as soon as possible. We will continue to provide updates as information becomes available and new fixes are deployed. To get assistance, follow updates in our hub: https://lnkd.in/gjcCMXwU