Ros Poplar的动态

https://lnkd.in/gRjebHk2 Time for the Navy to get back to basics ... As a surface warfare officer (SWO) for 30 years with three at-sea commands, I witnessed firsthand the surface navy’s waning emphasis on basic warfighting skills and crews’ ability to fight their ships. Unfortunately, in an effort to save resources, the Navy has relied too heavily on simulators rather than hands-on training. As a destroyer executive officer, I was dumbfounded when, as a result of political pressure, my ship was not permitted to conduct a live-fire naval gunfire support qualification, but our combat systems team was “qualified” using a land-based simulator. There is no substitute for the sound of real gunfire and the adrenaline that comes with live ammunition. In addition, in a career spent at sea, I saw basic shiphandling skills erode. Where once ships maneuvered at close quarters, over time this was discouraged by Navy leaders, and younger commanding officers became timid and risk averse as a consequence. This occurred to the detriment of the core pride of being a SWO: being able to maneuver your ship to the edge of the envelope so that in combat or in extremis you were confident you could steam into harm’s way and return safely. As a commanding officer, I would tell the crew their quality of life was not the number of in-port duty sections they were in but rather their ability to fight the ship and survive. I believe we have strayed from this most basic requirement of being a sailor. A practice I learned from my second commanding officer, Captain Ralph K. Martin, an expert mentor in the USS?Lewis B. Puller?(FFG-23), was having the ship’s in-port duty section get the ship underway while the rest of the crew was mustered on the fantail. This built their confidence, and they knew that in an emergency sortie, they could steam the ship out of harm’s way without the commanding officer or executive officer embarked. One day when we set the special sea and anchor detail. Captain Martin had the 1JV sound-powered phone talker (a personnelman first class) get the ship underway from pierside in San Diego without coaching—talk about a confidence-building measure for both him and the crew! In our minds, we were invincible. Two of the surface warfare maxims that were drilled into my head as a young ensign by commanding officers who had seen combat were “You get what you inspect” and “Never do in wartime what you have not done in peacetime.” It appears, based on the collisions at sea and other preventable accidents, that surface warfare as a community has lost touch with its roots in an effort to embrace other programs and issues that are not critical to sailors’ survival. One can only hope the Navy will do a course correction and get back on track soonest.

I am most pleased that no Navy aviators were hurt. Some of the nonsensical comments about the preparation of the crew are not only unfortunate - they are vile. If you want to point blame - look at the politicians and force commanders that place these crews in no win situations. However, many of the force commanders are in no win situations as well. New crews can become disoriented and confused in complex situations. Equipment does malfunction and so do crews in complex and potentially disasterous situations. Complex decision-making, with catastrophic consequences, and confused information with incredibly short time lines creates the environment for misjudgments. Politicians - stop the flag waving exercises. Deploying force in a combat situation means using the full power of that force to end the combat - and this should only be a last resort.

Great article that highlights the enormous authority and responsibility of Commanding Officers under combat conditions. I acknowledge I know none of the granular details of this incident, but am familiar with the human element of combat and the fog of war. Errors are inevitable and unfortunately occur. I am hopeful we will continue to recognize leading under time competitive conditions is never flawless. We have an opportunity to learn and get better without diminishing the trust in our front line commanders. https://lnkd.in/eChZwsFG

"Hobson’s choice is a fallacy in this incident. The Navy must acknowledge the difference between peace and combat. In the profession of arms, both commanding officer authority and accountability must be preserved in equal measure for warships to be fully ready for combat in the future." This article looks at the recent shootdown of the F/A-18 by the USS Gettysburg and the USS Vincennes downing of an airliner in 1988, and asks to balance both local rationality and accountability. I agree with the sentiments of this author - trying to overcome the biases rooted in (national and military) culture will not be easy though. It is interesting that there is a distinction made between peacetime and wartime operations. Yes, there will be increased stress due to threats to life and uncertainties in wartime operations. At the same time, the errors we make are heavily influenced by context. If there are considerable organisational, financial, political and reputational stressors at play (like most militaries have at the moment), then errors are more likely and we shouldn't focus on the severity of the outcome if we are to learn, as severity as an outcome can't link back to the quality of the decision at the time it was made. I am thinking of the recent loss of the HMNZS Manawanui in October last year. I also learned the background of this fallacy while reading this article. https://lnkd.in/esg_cdb3 #humanfactors #justculture #incidentinvestigation #lfuo The Human Diver - all things #humanfactors #nontechnicalskills in #diving Human in the System - #notjustdiving

The US Navy is extending the service life of 12 aging destroyers, a strategic decision aimed at enhancing operational readiness and addressing current global security challenges. These Flight I Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, originally slated for retirement between 2028 and 2032, will now remain in service until at least 2031, with some potentially active until 2036. This extension is particularly significant in the context of the Navy's need to balance a shrinking fleet with increasing operational demands, especially as new ships take time to enter service. The decision to extend these destroyers comes amid rising global tensions, notably in regions like the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. The Navy has faced challenges in asset allocation, pulling aircraft carriers and other resources to deter threats while relying more on destroyers to fill gaps left by the retirement of older Ticonderoga-class cruisers. With four cruisers already decommissioned in 2024 and more set to follow, the destroyers will play a crucial role in maintaining naval strength and readiness. This proactive approach not only reinforces the Navy's commitment to sustaining its battle force but also highlights the importance of leveraging existing capabilities to meet future challenges. The extended service of these destroyers ensures that the Navy can continue to project power and respond effectively to various threats, from conventional military confrontations to emerging hybrid warfare tactics. The destroyers, equipped with advanced systems such as vertical launch anti-submarine rockets and Tomahawk missiles, are pivotal in anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare. Their proven track record includes successful missions to protect maritime interests and allies, particularly in conflict zones like the Red Sea, where they have intercepted threats posed by drone attacks from Iran-backed groups. Moreover, this decision aligns with the Navy's broader strategic goals to reach a fleet size of 355 ships, necessary for countering the growing capabilities of adversaries, particularly China, which is projected to have a fleet of 400 ships by 2025. The extension of these destroyers is not just about maintaining numbers; it's about ensuring that the U.S. Navy has a robust and versatile force ready to respond to a dynamic security environment. As the Navy continues to adapt and modernize its fleet, the decision to extend these destroyers reflects a commitment to both current and future operational needs, ensuring that U.S. maritime forces remain a formidable presence on the global stage. #USNavy #Destroyers #ArleighBurke #NavalStrategy #FleetModernization #MilitaryReadiness #GlobalSecurity #DefenseCapabilities #StrategicDefense #OperationalFlexibility #MaritimeSecurity #U.S. Navy Please select ?? if you thought this post made a great point, offered a new idea, or shared helpful insights or advice.

">>ba?? comments SEWIP Block 2, part of the SLQ-32(V)6, aboard?USS?Porter. AN/SLQ-32(V)7?– Adds onto (V)6 with the SEWIP Block 3, which upgrades electronic attack (EA) capability. As of 2022, it is in low-rate initial production.[6]?Select DDG Flight IIA vessels will receive AN/SLQ-32(V)7 as a part of the USN DDG MOD 2.0 program.[7]?USS?Pinckney?(DDG-91) is the first U.S. Navy surface combatant to receive the AN/SLQ-32(V)7 upgrade.[8] All versions of the SLQ-32, with the exception of the (V)4, are interfaced with the?Mk 36 Decoy Launching System, able to launch?chaff?and?infrared?decoys under the control of the SLQ-32. A growing number of systems are being upgraded to incorporate the Australian-designed Mk 53?Nulka?decoy launching system.[4][8] The original modular design was intended to allow upgrades of the system from one variant to the next by simply installing additional equipment as required. Starting in the early 1990s, a program was begun to upgrade all SLQ-32s in the U.S. fleet. Most (V)1 systems were upgraded to (V)2, and most (V)2 systems were upgraded to (V)3. This was normally carried out during a major ship overhaul. SEWIP Block 2 was tested on?USS?Freedom?in December 2014,[9]?and as of 2022, the latest U.S. destroyers are fitted with (V)6. In 2023, USS?Pinckney?became the first destroyer fitted with SEWIP Block 3.[8]"

The US Navy is taking proactive measures to address readiness concerns and improve overall amphibious ship readiness. Adm. Lisa Franchetti has initiated a comprehensive investigation into the maintenance and readiness issues of amphibious ships, following the prolonged deployment delay of the USS Boxer. Led by three-star admirals, the investigation will focus on identifying challenges and lessons learned, with initial recommendations expected in May. The USS Boxer experienced delays and mechanical issues due, in part, to poor leadership. Adm. Franchetti highlighted the Navy's proactive approach in containing delays and mentioned potential delays with the USS Wasp. This investigation signifies the Navy's commitment to ensuring ship readiness and improvement efforts. #USNavy #AmphibiousShips #MarineCorps #ShipReadiness #DeepDive #Maintenance #ReadinessIssues #LessonsLearned #USSBoxer #Leadership #Recommendations #AdmLisaFranchetti #ProactiveApproach #USSWasp #NavyReadiness #ImprovementEfforts

In U.SA.F. investigation reports, the "purpose" and "opinion of the investigator" are a serious contradiction. PURPOSE "In accordance with AFI 51-307, this Accident Investigation Board conducted a legal investigation to inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding this Air Force aerospace accident, prepare a publicly releasable report, and obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverse administrative action." OPINION "Under 10 U.S.C. § 2254(d) the opinion of the accident investigator as to the cause of, or the factors contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report, if any, may not be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from the accident, nor may such information be considered an admission of liability of the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions or statements." By relieving the Group Commander, the investigation achieved its purpose. Was that the opinion of the investigator and the primary reason for conducting the air accident investigation?

This is the Army's long-range assault aircraft of the future. Can you name it? Write you answer in the comments and check here ?? https://lnkd.in/erXWhpVJ to see if you are right! #ContinuousTransformation

1). Credit to President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino Jul 27, 2015 Aquino’s 6th State of the Nation Address ? https://lnkd.in/gjAEDEAR 2). Credit to Jose Cielito Reganit February 18, 2018 Navy frigate deal: What we need to know https://lnkd.in/geGjp-Ax ------------------- 1). To better watch over our territory, we have also acquired 12 FA-50 fighters to replace our F5 fighter jets that were retired in 2005. The first two units will arrive in December, and the rest of the deliveries will be completed by 2017. We have also acquired war ships such as the BRP Gregorio del Pilar and the Ramon Alcaraz, seven of 13 AW-109 helicopters, six of eight Bell-412 helicopters, 617 troop carrier trucks, and 50,629 assault rifles. Our target is to obtain two more frigates, six Close Air Support Aircrafts, 142 armored personnel carriers, and other new items such as 49,135 units of force protection equipment, 2,884 grenade launchers, and an additional 23,622 assault rifles. In total, we have completed 56 projects for modernization, and I have approved 30 more. Compare this to the 45 projects completed by the three administrations that came before us combined. (Picture of the Maestrale was flashed during the SONA). 2). The project was stalled at the Critical Design Review (CDR) stage after the Navy and HHI raised conflicting concerns on the combat management system (CMS) to be installed on the frigates. The CMS is what most call “the brain of a naval combat vessel”, a computer and software system package that integrates all the sensors and weapons systems of the ship into a single system to assure “knowledge superiority” over potential enemies, shorten decision-making cycles, and execute rapid and accurate weapon engagement, especially during combat or security operations. HHI, citing a provision in the contract, claims “sole right” to choose the CMS maker and selected fellow South Korean company Hanwha Systems as the preferred supplier. ● April 1, 2017?- Vice Admiral Ronald Joseph Mercado wrote a letter to Lorenzana stating the opinion that “Remarks” provisions in the contract are grossly disadvantageous to the PN and to the AFP/DND, saying: “This remarks, if permitted, are akin to a buyer (PN/DND) with his/her own money being told by the seller HHI on what to buy.” ● April 6, 2017?- Col. Dela Paz wrote a memorandum to Lorenzana, stating that the Thales offer, although compliant of the technical specifications, is not commercially competitive in view of the price difference of USD 14,050,000.00 as compared to the offer of HSC Naval Shield. ● April 20, 2017?- Dela Paz informed the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Logistics that Lorenzana has approved the recommendation for the continuation of the Frigate Acquisition Project with the HHI-selected maker of the CMS.