Modern War Institute at West Point的动态

The Health-Wellness Angle - 1. I would have liked to have known how the 2-27 medical personnel were prepared in basic principles of tropical medicine, and how they pushed that information down to the platoon leadership teams, e.g., sargeants. Food borne diseases and heat related illnesses, while not 100% preventable, can be mitigated. 2. Did members of the joint forces experience similar rates of illness? I suspect, without evidence provided in the article (thus conjecture on my part) that the BMI of the non-US Joint forces were lower than the US. Has the medical team analyzed variables that might have contributed to higher risk of heat stress illness? Also is there evidence that weight training increases aclimatization and prevention of heat stress illnesses? 3. Acclimitization is an important preventive measure. Not sure whether working in the heat and then sleeping in air conditioned space is an evidence-based strategy. Was this reviewed? Having just returned from SE Asia - I can resonant with the climate. Seems like lessons from Vietnam might also apply. Any MAC-V studies from the 1960s?

The Battalion's preparation appears to have been half-assed; where was the Battalion Commander. Besides all the historical info available including just from Iraq and Afghanistan, there are are units operating in Africa & SE Asia for extended periods who could have been tapped for the fitness and equipment issues that would be faced. SF units operating in SE Asia for decades that could have prepped the Battalion regarding operating conditions. If I comprehend correctly this unit was no more prepared that the units at Kasserine Pass. But this unit had all the info they needed to prep properly for the mission and failed to deliver. The Command structure failed their people and put them in jeopardy. Should they be relieved?

Another great article from MWI WP. We have outsourced our physical training at the expense of NCO & Officer Leadership conducting hard, rigorous, planned training at the tactical level. Commit to the Hard Routine. The author is spot on. ?? “We must train differently. Traditional metrics are not the benchmarks for success. Being ready to win is all that matters. We learned this was not the preparation needed to meet this mission…What we needed was a time under load for longer durations on tough terrain. There is no replacing it. The only way to be ready to walk all night is to do it…The second factor that is hard to replicate is the heat and humidity. Ten days without respite was a shock to the system. Even for the fittest battalion, the environment proved exceedingly challenging.”

My big takeaway from a unit conducting land operations in Asia was his comments in training for the mission: “What we needed was a time under load for longer durations on tough terrain. There is no replacing it.”

I think this was both an honest band well thought out AAR and I think is it likely to make the next rotation or combat much more effective While some of the LL might have been garnered from a study of history it’s good to see the newest training facility is in line with the others Our Army must always strive to train hard - My thoughts Fred Stein

Love it!!! Can't say enough good things about this article. As Fred Stein (Col ret) said, this is a great AAR--excellent coverage of many if not all relevant factors to unit performance in this challenging environment. BZ!!

Read ORLL from 4th infantry Division, 173 AB Brigade, 9th Marines and other units that fought in Vietnam’s Central Highlands. Timeless lessons from the Green Monster!

Cash is a force multiplier (aka if it works, it's not wrong)?

?? alumni 1991-1993.

This is a good read. Appreciate 2/27 sharing these lessons identified.