Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center的动态

While a series of U.S. flag inland push tugs were under construction, ABS was asked to verify compliance with Subchapter M. Due to the vessel’s configuration, the shipyard could not conduct the inclining experiment as there was inadequate space on the main decks for incline weights, and the deckhouse structures were not built to support incline weights. Find out how ABS and the shipyard devised an alternative solution to the inclining experiment by watching this Safety in Minutes video. Watch more Safety in Minutes videos to learn about potential safety hazards at: https://lnkd.in/gPJWeaQh ? #Maritime #MaritimeSafety #Shipping

NTSB Marine Investigation Preliminary Report - Contact of Containership Dali with the Francis Scott Key Bridge and Subsequent Bridge Collapse On May 14th, 2024, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released the Marine Investigation Preliminary Report entitled, “Contact of Containership Dali with the Francis Scott Key Bridge and Subsequent Bridge Collapse.”?Mike Schuler provides a very good summary of the report in gCaptain (an on-line publication for Maritime News)?https://lnkd.in/ewPP2unh. The gCaptain article contains a link for the preliminary report. This report is recommended reading for anyone who ever stood watch in the pilot house, or in engineering, while the ship was in restricted maneuvering.?While report states the findings, seafarers who ever stood the watch on deck can simultaneously imagine the horror of the quickness as the ship uncontrollably approached the bridge, while feeling the agony of slowness of the responses – restoring power, dropping anchor, communication, response of a tug , etc.?It is also easy to imagine the engineering watchstander’s sense of urgency knowing the ship was in restricted maneuvering but lacking the situational awareness of the ship’s position.??Again, quickness and slowness experienced simultaneously. Always remember, “The sea is selective, slow at recognition of effort and aptitude but fast in the sinking of the unfit.” — Felix Riesenberg ? ? Warren K. Vaneman, Ph.D., ESEP Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Hard to believe it’s been 5 years since USNI published this article of mine and 4 years since I rejoined Government Service to try and address the issues discussed here. Looking forward to the SURFOR Bridge Integration Summit next week. How far have we come? We will see! There will be great discussions, and perhaps a bit of disruption! From the article: “ Webster’s dictionary defines “root cause” as an “initiating cause of either a condition or a causal chain that leads to an outcome or effect of interest. The term denotes the earliest, most basic, 'deepest', cause for a given behavior; most often a fault.” In this case, the clear root cause was a poorly designed and supported system. A properly designed and technically supported ship control station would not have caused the confusion that resulted in the McCain collision.” 5 years later, this is still an important lesson!

This has been an issue I have fought/struggled/disagreed with for a very LONG (over 20 years now) time. Now, this is not in any way an attempt to exonerate the watchteams nor the BMC. The deck/CIC watchstanding/qualification/communication failures which got the ship into the position it was in were MANY & INEXCUSABLE. The rest of this is gonna upset some apple carts, but forgive me, I’m just an old, OOD/EMO with too much time on deck & big a mouth. The USN made (and continues to make critical and unfortunately life changing) mistakes when it comes to fielding IBNS and other such systems. There are reversals in the works, but it’s cost blood. Traditional steering systems (Ship’s Control Consoles in the pilot house, synchro/servo controlled pumps in Aft Steering) were simple, virtually the same from ship to ship, simple to operate after (because they were virtually the same) standard PQS qualification (from ship to ship), & relatively well understood by COs, OODs, bridge watchstanders & basically anyone with a SWO pin…(because they were virtually the same from ship to ship)…getting the common theme here? They were electro-mechanical (not digital). Essentially, they consisted of a ship’s wheel attached to a synchro transmitter, primary and back-up cables going directly to after steering (carrying the analog signals) connected to an analog synchro/servo setup which controlled a 4-way valve that fed hydraulic fluid one way or the other to move the rudder(s) left/right. There were also usually local control wheels in aft steering & hand cranks as last resorts. This system was not foolproof but it was incredibly easy to understand, troubleshoot & fix exactly because it was so simple & universally the same. When these systems were “upgraded” to digital in order to emulate “fly-by wire” type systems common on aircraft & commercial ships…multiple computers, touch screens, LANs, PLCs & control stations (all depending on the version of IBNS installed) were added. These “upgrades” added potential points of failure & cyber intrusion too numerous to count. They also made one system different from the next ship’s & near impossible for watchstanders from SN Timmy on the ship’s helm/lee helm to the CO in his chair or anyone with a SWO pin to qualify on/grasp in short order. This is exactly why reports like Loss of Steering etc were erroneously made, then misunderstood by every watchstanders from helm to EOOW, OOD & CO…why there was delay in initial controlling actions (that all were likely unsure of if they even still applied to that ship) - that would have surely demonstrated there was no loss of steering…& why a ship almost surely already in extremis lost any chance it may have still had to save itself & MOST importantly the lives of the sailors depending on their watch teams to make good decisions. So, BMC is not the only one at fault but he was smart enough to admit it & state what he should’ve done. Maybe back to the future ain’t such a bad idea?

Moran Towing expands with 4 Tier 4-compliant tugs, advancing low-emission ship handling on the US East and Gulf Coasts. #shipping #maritime

Watch: How A Small Tugboat Tows Mega Ships Check out this article ?? https://lnkd.in/dZHeEDct #Tugboat #Towing #Ships #shipping #shippingindustry #maritimeindustry #maritime #maritimesafety #MarineInsight #Merchantnavy #Merchantmarine #MerchantnavyShips

I had the towing experince in Danube River for more than 50 miles voyage with a 120 mt. 5300 GRT general cargo vessel with 7000 T cargo on board. Towing without vertical stern rollers was the most important part of the towing operation. U.S. Navy Towing manual is one of the best guide for towing operations. I just shared the part about usage of vertical stern rollers. ? “Vertical stern rollers tend the towline during heave-in and payout, and during long-distance straight towing by preventing the wire from sweeping across the deck and rail. Using vertical rollers may put the tug “in irons,” seriously limiting the tug’s maneuverability. The presence of the towline in the stern rollers limits the maneuverability of the tug because it moves the tow point from the H-bitts back to the caprail." ? “In Irons: An expression used by shiphandlers to indicate limited control in maneuvering the ship. In towing, this can be caused by a tow wire that is “captured” at the stern, reducing the effect of the rudder of the tug." #towing #salvage #offshore #MaritimeJobs #offshore #ahts #OSV #DSV #tug #tuglife #ASD #rigmove #rescue

points that pilots have to do before boarding the vessel - conduct a thorough risk assessment of the vessel and its environment including weather condition and navigational Hazard this assessment allows the pilots to determine the appropriate tugs configuration and safest maneuvering method. - Evaluate the vessel specification. - Coordinate with the port control to gather updates on any information about the port status. - upon arrival to the vessel check the both anchors, plimsoll mark, pilot ladder in accordance with SOLAS Regulation, hull condition and draft foreword, draft aft.

Navigating these large vessels with precision through the creek is always good fun. By skillfully harnessing the vessel's turning moment, one can effect a dynamic turn that both facilitates maneuvering and sheds speed efficiently. This approach minimizes the reliance on tugs and the vessels main engine, thereby reducing the risk of parted lines and enhancing overall operational safety.

Important Points Officer on Watch (OOW) Must Consider While Handling Ship’s Radar Check out this article ?? https://lnkd.in/dgctwRWF #OOW #ShipRadar #shipping #shippingindustry #maritimeindustry #maritime #maritimesafety #MarineInsight #Merchantnavy #Merchantmarine #MerchantnavyShips