Intel 471转å‘了
My career began in the trenches and progressed from there, so transitioning into an executive role was challenging—I always have that urge to get back in the mud. To scratch that itch, I narrowed my focus and dedicated a bit of my time each week to researching only malicious infrastructure providers. This has been a deep interest of mine since the heyday of AbdAllah and the Russian Business Network (RBN) in the mid-2000s. (Who remembers David Bizeul awesome “Russian Business Network Study†from 2007!!?) Often, the underground world of cybercrime must surface to interact with the above-ground world, and that’s where things get interesting. The real significance, however, lies in the opportunity to identify and track swaths of malicious infrastructure before it’s used for badness. These groups run front companies, have their own ASNs, and operate prefixes/netblocks—all things that can be identified and used proactively to defend against the long list of threats they facilitate. It’s an upstream approach. One example that has always stuck with me is that of the Hancitor loader malware. Back in the day, Hancitor was used to deliver some of the top malware families being used. For years, it relied on a single bulletproof hosting (BPH) service for a critical part of its infection chain. Visibility into Yalishanda’s BPH service essentially gave defenders an advantage—not just against Hancitor itself, but also against any of the secondary payloads it was distributing I don't get to spend much time in trenches day-to-day, but rest assured the Intel 471 team is all over these BPH services. #threathunting #threatIntelligence #cybercrime #malware #cybersecurity #networksecurity #incidentresponse https://lnkd.in/gaTwr8Q5