fp21

When President Trump announced new additions to the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list during yesterday's #SOTU, my ears perked up: my colleague, fp21 fellow Michael Becker, Ph.D., has just completed an evaluation of the FTO process. Curious to learn more about the FTO process? The timing of this article is perfect. Michael finds that the process contains several pathologies emblematic of broader challenges in the practice of American foreign policy. The current FTO process reflects outdated attitudes toward resource stewardship, deterrence, and risk assessment that pervade the current policymaking process. Michael explains that setting priorities and expending resources effectively in a complex geopolitical environment depends on accurate assessments of risk, but that’s simply not how our current foreign policy process works. He proposes a better approach, one that would require the State Department to implement modern risk analysis procedures for evaluating violent organizations. He suggests that a graded or multi-dimensional rating system should be implemented to allow resources to be directed toward the most pressing threats. The rating system should carefully account for sub-dimensions of risk, such as the directionality of a threat (is it growing, receding, or static?), its probability (how likely is it that the group will conduct an attack?), capacity (how much damage could the group cause?), and relative risk (how does the threat posed by one group compared to another, or to some baseline non-terrorism threat). Further, automatic sunset and probationary periods for FTOs could further rationalize the process. Michael's report is a great example of how evidence-based policymaking could look when applied to a specific government process. Check out the full text here: https://lnkd.in/ex--uNNU

Check out my newest article in War on the Rocks about STRATEGY at the U.S. Department of State (with coauthor Peter Lohman, who just finished a tour at the National Security Council, The White House). I know some folks in the national security arena are not in the mood to discuss reform, but I am convinced that experts need to drive the conversation about the future of our foreign policy institutions. Simply defending the status quo is insufficient. During a time of increased pressure on public servants, I recognize the challenges and risks here. I hope this article will be received in its intended spirit: as a constructive proposal for improving the quality of US foreign policy. As always, I welcome your thoughts on what we may have missed here. THE PROBLEM - The State Department emphasizes the art of foreign policymaking at the expense of disciplined methods. Continued gaps in diplomatic tradecraft and culture hinder turning expertise into policy action. - The State Department’s policy process is heavy on planning but light on coordinated action. Hundreds of "strategic plans" are developed every few years, but the plans typically fail to drive the day-to-day actions of diplomats. - Without a method of translating expertise into action, department staff are overwhelmed with information and pulled in divergent directions, challenging everyone’s ability to focus on the most important tasks. This might be termed "exhausted mediocrity." THE SOLUTION We propose a three step process to address this challenge: 1?? Policy design. Bureaus and embassies should specify a limited set of 6–12 months objectives to advance high-level goals (drawn from the National Security Strategy and political leaders). Goals must be proximate, concrete definitions of success paired with key results that could be reasonably assessed and achieved. The design phase must identify resources and action officers to power implementation. 2?? Policy Implementation. Turn design into action by executing the plan: deliver demarches, negotiate treaties, implement new projects, etc. With clear policy designs guiding their work, diplomats in the field would be empowered to solve problems that arise during implementation. 3?? Policy Adaptation. Officials should continually adjust policy designs based on evidence, feedback, and evaluations of progress gathered throughout implementation. (Clearly, these steps must be dynamic and iterative rather than strictly linear and sequential) Effective foreign policymaking does not merely spring from the Department’s wealth of knowledge and experience. While recent modernization efforts have rightly focused on helping the department develop, acquire, and retain expertise, that expertise needs an organizational culture that prioritizes action. Read the full article here: https://lnkd.in/eqRnykiH

This is a rare opportunity to renew American Diplomacy. ?? Authorized in 2023 and fully funded in 2024, the "The Commission to Reform and Modernize the Department of State" represents a rare bipartisan consensus: diplomacy remains an essential asset for U.S. national security but needs revitalization. The work will begin once the Biden Administration appoints the last few Commissioners. True reform and modernization requires bold new ideas. In this article, I reflect on four questions the Commission needs to consider to set itself on a successful path: 1. What is the State Department’s primary role? Should the Department of State assume the role of lead designer of U.S. foreign policy? Or should it defer strategic thinking to the National Security Council and others, and focus more on the execution of U.S. foreign policy? 2. What legal authorities are necessary? The distribution of authority within the Department -- from chief of mission authority to the centrality of bilateral relationships -- may be insufficient to manage the increasing number of actors and the complexity of international challenges in the world today. 3. What does effective decision-making require? Whereas the intelligence community has tradecraft, and the Department of Defense has doctrine, there is no comparable body of knowledge and practice for diplomacy. 4. What workforce is required for 21st-century foreign policy? Choices about hiring, recruiting, promotion, and job assignment procedures are some of the most important policy decisions the organization makes. These are complicated questions with no perfect answers. But the Commission is designed to address the structural weaknesses afflicting US diplomacy and propel the institution into the future. ?? Thanks to Just Security for the excellent editorial support, and for publishing this article.

My newest article explores ten principles for exercising expertise in foreign policy. As always, I'd love to hear from you about what I could have improved here. Full article here: https://lnkd.in/eYufaF_9

I'm excited to release this new report with fp21: www.fp21.org/curriculum. It argues that a new curriculum for foreign policy expertise is necessary to improve the quality of US foreign policy. The goal is not simply to equip policymakers with a grasp of history, but something grander: A curriculum must help create a culture of policymaking that can constantly evaluate itself and improve. Foreign policy expertise will thrive when policymakers are able to think more like scientists and seek to understand the effectiveness of their policies. Learning only occurs with feedback about the success and failure of one's actions. Guided by that principle, this curriculum aims to impart a much wider foundation to our officials than is currently offered (let alone required). If you've been following our work closely, you'll recognize this as a compilation of a series of articles I wrote about a curriculum for foreign policy expertise. When assembled into a single package, this demonstrates one of fp21's essential research commitments: good ideas alone are insufficient. We aim to get deeper into the weeds and think carefully about the implementation of our ideas and be in dialogue with the leaders who would need to take action on any such proposal. As always, we are eager for your feedback, suggestions, and comments. As the U.S. Department of State continues to sharpen its new Core Curriculum and the Foreign Service Institute prepares to name its first provost, we hope this report will encourage continued dialogue about what it will take for our officials to excel in an increasingly complex international landscape. Check it out here: https://lnkd.in/e_p-pa6h #ForeignPolicy #Diplomacy #InternationalAffairs

The U.S. Department of State invited public comment on its newly proposed R&D center, and fp21 and its friends were eager to help ensure this initiative is successful. Last week we convened 75 diplomats, policymakers, academics, and think tank leaders to brainstorm the newly proposed Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). The attached note serves as a summary of our discussion, and the public comment on behalf of the undersigned. We offered a number of suggestions: 1. How the State Department chooses to manage its new FFRDC is an essential question. The FFRDC must report to an office (or offices) of significant stature and influence. 2. The proposal suggests 3 lines of effort for the research: Diplomatic Innovation and Modernization (DIM), Global CyberTech Solutions (GCS), and Global Operations and Acquisitions (GOA).?We believe the wisest approach would be to have each function led by a different, relevant office at the Department. For instance, the the DIM function should be owned by a policy office at the State Department – perhaps Policy and Planning (S/P) or the Political Affairs undersecretariat (P). 3. That said, it was unclear that the three categories detailed above are ideal. We suggested instead the Department consider consolidating into two: a Policy Research center, and a Operations Research center. 4. Some FFRDCs managed by other agencies get to set their own research agendas, while others are tasked to take on specific questions from their host. The most effective model for the State Department would balance both of these approaches. Some independence should be granted for the FFRDC to take on big challenges that are not currently prioritized by leaders at the Department. But a mechanism should also be created for the FFRDC to solicit requests directly from their government agency and its staff. 5. Funding will be a key question. We hoped a dedicated budget line could be created for this research, and a diverse board of advisors should be composed to steer the research agenda and its resourcing. 6. We encouraged an inclusive design and implementation process that draws on the expertise and insights from a broad range of actors: career diplomats, political leadership, academic experts, policy-focused experts, and managerial/administrative experts.?Building trust and cooperation between actors will be essential to the FFRDC's success. There's a lot more detail in the full public comment. Check it out here: https://lnkd.in/e7UETD2G