AEROTHRIVE

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To all AEROTHRIVE colleagues, partners, and friends observing Eid — May your celebration be filled with light, gratitude, and harmony.?Eid Mubarak! ??? ??

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Faucett Perú Flight 251 CFIT ends in Fatal Crash On February 29, 1996, Faucett Perú Flight 251, a Boeing 737-222 registered as OB-1451, was operating a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Lima to Arequipa and Tacna. While conducting its approach to Rodríguez Ballón International Airport in Arequipa, the aircraft collided with terrain approximately 8 km from the airport. All 123 passengers and crew on board were fatally injured, making it the deadliest aviation accident on Peruvian soil. Flight 251 departed from Jorge Chávez International Airport in Lima at 19:10 local time. The flight proceeded without incident until it began its descent into Arequipa under instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), including rain, mist, and thunderstorms in the area. The flight crew was executing a VOR/DME approach to Runway 09, a non-precision approach requiring careful altitude management. During the final approach, the crew requested an increase in the brightness of the runway lights, indicating they were struggling to establish visual contact with the airport environment. Air traffic control responded that the lights were already at full intensity. At approximately 20:25, the aircraft impacted terrain at an elevation of 8,200 feet, below the airport’s field elevation of 8,405 feet. The impact occurred approximately 2 km short of the runway and 8 km off course from Arequipa. The aft section separated on impact, while the fuselage continued forward and struck a second ridge. The empennage came to rest in a ravine between the ridges. The Peruvian authorities, assisted by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Boeing, and Pratt & Whitney, conducted a comprehensive investigation. Both the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were recovered. The FDR provided useful data, but the CVR was found to be severely damaged and inoperative, with evidence showing it had not been properly maintained in six years. Investigators determined that the crew had received an outdated barometric pressure setting for their altimeters, which led them to misjudge their altitude. Believing they were at 9,500 feet, they were actually flying at 8,640 feet—placing them approximately 850 feet below the prescribed approach altitude. The aircraft thus descended below the minimum safe altitude and impacted terrain. Additional factors contributing to the accident included the absence of a functioning ground proximity warning system (GPWS) and the decision to continue descent below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) without visual confirmation of the runway environment. Subscribe to our Aviation Safety Newsletter NOW and get the hot stuff free and without delay: https://lnkd.in/eGZqhPHR! Visit https://AEROTHRIVE.com for professional training courses, audits and solutions in aviation safety, compliance, quality and operations!

189 Killed during Fatal Birgenair Flight 301 Crash On February 6, 1996, Birgenair Flight 301, a Boeing 757-225, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean five minutes after departing Gregorio Luperón International Airport in Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic. The aircraft, operating a charter service to Frankfurt, Germany, via Gander and Berlin, suffered a loss of control due to erroneous airspeed readings. All 189 occupants were killed. Investigators attributed the accident to a blocked pitot tube, which provided incorrect airspeed data, leading to misinterpretations by both the flight crew and automated systems. During the takeoff roll, the captain noticed that his airspeed indicator (ASI) was malfunctioning but proceeded with the departure. The first officer’s ASI displayed normal readings at this stage, but once airborne, additional warning messages—such as rudder ratio and Mach airspeed trim alerts—caused further uncertainty. The autopilot, receiving speed information from the captain’s faulty ASI, responded as if the aircraft were accelerating beyond safe limits. It pitched the nose up and reduced engine thrust in an attempt to decelerate. Meanwhile, the first officer’s ASI, which was accurate, showed decreasing speed, consistent with a developing stall. Confusion escalated when the captain, believing both ASIs to be unreliable, attempted to troubleshoot electrical systems instead of focusing on immediate flight control. The overspeed warning, triggered by the faulty pitot data, further reinforced the misconception that the aircraft was flying too fast. When the crew reduced thrust in response, the 757 entered an aerodynamic stall, indicated by the activation of the stick shaker. The autopilot disengaged, and the aircraft began descending in an unstable flight attitude. The first officer and relief pilot proposed actions to counter the stall, but these were not followed. The captain only applied full thrust in the final moments, but by then, the aircraft was already in a deep stall with inadequate airflow to the engines. The left engine flamed out, while asymmetric thrust from the right engine caused the aircraft to enter an unrecoverable spin. It inverted and impacted the ocean at high velocity. The investigation determined that one of the three pitot tubes had been blocked, most likely by a mud dauber wasp nest. The aircraft had been parked for 20 days, and pitot tube covers had not been consistently used. The obstruction caused the captain’s ASI to display an increasing speed, leading both the crew and autopilot to take inappropriate corrective actions. Subscribe to our Aviation Safety Newsletter NOW and get the hot stuff free and without delay: https://lnkd.in/eGZqhPHR! Visit https://AEROTHRIVE.com for professional training courses, audits and solutions in aviation safety, compliance, quality and operations!

The Air Africa An-32 Crash: 348 fatalities and over 500 injuries On January 8, 1996, an Antonov An-32B, operated by Moscow Airways on behalf of Air Africa, overran the runway during an attempted takeoff from N'Dolo Airport in Kinshasa, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The aircraft, excessively overloaded and poorly crewed, failed to achieve sufficient airspeed and crashed into the Simbazikita street market just beyond the runway’s end. The resulting impact and fire caused between 225 and 348 fatalities and over 500 injuries — one of the deadliest ground-impact accidents in aviation history. The flight was laden beyond safe operational limits, carrying cargo allegedly intended for delivery to the UNITA rebel group in Angola. This load exceeded the aircraft’s maximum takeoff weight, drastically reducing performance. Compounding this, N'Dolo Airport’s short, non-paved runway provided insufficient distance for the overweight An-32 to reach rotation speed. The aircraft lifted momentarily but remained below critical flight parameters, unable to sustain climb or control. Investigators uncovered a network of regulatory violations surrounding the flight. Air Africa lacked valid operational clearance, having borrowed falsified documentation from Scibe Airlift — a company connected to influential local figures. The aircraft itself was leased through a convoluted arrangement involving Scibe’s Belgian sales agent and Moscow Airways. This layered structure obscured clear accountability for ensuring regulatory compliance, contributing to the illicit nature of the flight. The Russian flight crew, comprising six members, were found to lack proper certification for the aircraft type. Further, witness testimony and court proceedings indicated the pilots may have been impaired during takeoff. Four of the six crew members survived the crash, though they narrowly escaped an enraged crowd at the accident site. Both pilots were later convicted of manslaughter and received the maximum allowable sentence of two years imprisonment. The immediate aftermath saw Kinshasa’s medical services overwhelmed. With local hospitals lacking capacity, humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross assisted in managing casualties. Many victims were burned beyond recognition, leaving only 66 bodies formally identified. The legal and financial consequences extended beyond the flight crew. Air Africa and Scibe Airlift faced fines totaling $1.4 million to compensate families of the victims and survivors. Both companies ultimately ceased operations, unable to recover from the financial and reputational damage. Subscribe to our Aviation Safety Newsletter NOW and get the hot stuff free and without delay: https://lnkd.in/eGZqhPHR! Visit https://AEROTHRIVE.com for professional training courses, audits and solutions in aviation safety, compliance, quality and operations!

Way to go!!!

Runway Excursion of Tower Air Flight 41 On December 20, 1995, Tower Air Flight 41, a Boeing 747-136 registered as N605FF, veered off John F. Kennedy International Airport’s Runway 4L during takeoff. All 468 occupants survived, though 25 sustained injuries. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) identified the captain’s delayed decision to abort the takeoff as the primary cause. During the takeoff roll, the aircraft deviated left. The captain responded with right rudder and tiller inputs, which proved ineffective. Despite procedures advising an immediate rejected takeoff (RTO) when directional control is lost, the captain only initiated the RTO after significant deviation, by which point recovery was no longer possible. Investigators found Tower Air’s procedural guidance for Boeing 747 operations on icy runways insufficient. The airline’s manuals permitted rudder inputs during early takeoff but lacked specific direction on recognizing and responding to yaw instability under such conditions. The NTSB also noted that Tower Air’s flight simulators inaccurately replicated the 747’s ground handling on slippery runways, affecting pilot preparedness. Further examination revealed organizational deficiencies within Tower Air. The airline’s General Operations Manual failed to outline proper oversight responsibilities for training and operational supervision. Flight data recorder (FDR) malfunctions went unnoticed due to inadequate maintenance checks, depriving investigators of reliable performance data. Flight attendant training was also lacking, contributing to inconsistent cabin safety commands during the emergency. The NTSB concluded that Tower Air’s management and procedural shortcomings, combined with the captain’s delayed RTO and improper tiller inputs, directly contributed to the accident. The investigation prompted reassessments of 747 simulator accuracy, airline operational oversight, and runway-specific takeoff procedures to prevent similar incidents. Subscribe to our Aviation Safety Newsletter NOW and get the hot stuff free and without delay: https://lnkd.in/eGZqhPHR! Visit https://AEROTHRIVE.com for professional training courses, audits and solutions in aviation safety, compliance, quality and operations!

Ice Contamination and Overload: The Aerodynamic Collapse of Banat Air Flight 166 On December 13, 1995, Banat Air Flight 166, an Antonov An-24B, crashed shortly after takeoff from Verona-Villafranca Airport, resulting in the deaths of all 49 people on board. The aircraft, chartered from Romavia, was scheduled to fly to Timi?oara, Romania. The subsequent investigation identified a combination of severe icing, the decision to skip de-icing procedures, and significant overloading as key factors leading to the loss of control. The aircraft was parked at Stand B6 during continuous snowfall, with an outside temperature of 0°C. As snow accumulated on the aircraft’s surfaces, no de-icing was performed before boarding the 41 passengers. The captain, despite weather conditions requiring de-icing under both the aircraft’s flight manual and company operations procedures, chose to proceed without it. By the time Flight 166 was cleared for takeoff, departure delays had prolonged its exposure to freezing precipitation. A preceding Air France aircraft, which had undergone de-icing, returned to the apron after exceeding the standard eight-minute de-icing holdover limit. Flight 166’s crew, however, made no such attempt to de-ice or reassess the aircraft’s condition. During takeoff, the Antonov reached a maximum airspeed of 220 km/h and initiated a right bank to follow its departure route. Within 25 seconds, the airspeed dropped to 179 km/h. The flight crew responded with nose-down elevator input, temporarily increasing speed to 185 km/h. However, continuing the right turn, they applied nose-up input again, causing the speed to drop to 155 km/h. The bank angle steepened to 67 degrees, far beyond safe limits for the aircraft’s configuration. The aircraft’s aerodynamic performance had severely deteriorated. Ice contamination on the wings disrupted airflow, reducing lift and increasing drag. This, combined with the aircraft being overloaded by approximately 2000 kilograms, created a scenario where the crew could no longer maintain controlled flight. Just 47 seconds after liftoff, the plane entered an uncontrollable descent, striking the ground right-wing first. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and caught fire, leaving no survivors. The investigation determined the primary cause was the captain’s decision to take off without de-icing, despite clear weather-related guidance to do so. The resulting ice buildup critically degraded the aircraft’s aerodynamic stability. The excess weight further compounded the loss of control by increasing the stall speed, reducing the aircraft’s performance margins, and making recovery from abnormal flight attitudes more difficult. Subscribe to our Aviation Safety Newsletter NOW and get the hot stuff free and without delay: https://lnkd.in/eGZqhPHR! Visit https://AEROTHRIVE.com for professional training courses, audits and solutions in aviation safety, compliance, quality and operations!

?? AEROTHRIVE Update ??????? We’re proud to share that we've signed two major new agreements for extensive safety assessment work and in-house trainings — with a US major and one of the top leading airlines in the Middle East. On the SARPcheck side, all three March audits have been successfully completed, with those and more operators joining the SARPcheck registry soon. We’ve also concluded a complex audit for a European national carrier, and our team is currently on site in West Africa, wrapping up another tailored project. Looking ahead into the coming week: in-house auditor training for a pan-European airline group, strategic work for SARP Ltd. and our next public on-site training in Frankfurt — in cooperation with our esteemed Condor Flugdienst GmbH and hosted at their new training center. Plenty of momentum — and more to come! And here a few Caribbean impressions from one of the three SARPcheck audits conducted throughout the past weeks in America, Europe and Asia. #aviation #safety #quality #growth #AEROTHRIVE #SARPcheck