How do you enforce the principle of least privilege in your information security policy?

One of the firsts steps to enforce the POLP, information security should start by understanding business process and systems privileges. system owner must create Access control matrix defining every administrator's, and operator's privileges. Another access control matrix must be created by data/business owner to define system users access privileges based on business needs only. Matrices must be reviewed periodically to ensure that resigned or transferred employees are reflected on the system also to ensure that the privileged on matrices are the same as system privileges.

Instead of thinking about permissions, think of their job function and combine permissions into functions like contributor, editor, approver and so on. Makes life a lot easier for non-trained individuals to equate back to business terminology

From my perspective it is important that you have a clear 5-step plan to archive the Principle of Least Privilege (POLP). 1.) Identify and define Roles and Responsibilities - in regards of the business processes of your organisation. 2.) Implement a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): Always assign permissions to roles - never to direct accounts. 3.) Execute a Least Privilege Analysis: determine the minimum permissions required to perform the tasks. 4.) Permission Management: Configure accounts, both human and system accounts, with the minimal set of permissions needed to carry out their functions 5.) Implement a regular review of access and permissions (for example once every 6-month)

If in-house developed application, I find it helpful for PoLP to be integral part of the design phase. Which translate to roles and detailed by security matrix.

There can be different interfaces to access a workload e.g. cloud console and Bastion host both can be used to access RDP on an VM running Windows OS granted you have appropriate configuration/ misconfiguration. The Access control matrix should account for the terminology (e.g., specific built-in OR custom roles, etc.) used by specific access layer to avoid over/ under privilege granted due to human errors. This will help when organization decides to roll out IDAM tool like Saviynt, etc.

Implementing effective access control mechanisms is crucial for enforcing PoLP and securing your cloud environment. We've opted for a mix of Mandatory Access Control (MAC) for high-security applications and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) for general use-cases. MAC offers rigidity but ensures critical data is only accessed by vetted personnel. RBAC, being more flexible, is easier to manage and more scalable. To add another layer of granularity, we integrate Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) into our systems. This allows us to add conditions like geolocation or time-based restrictions on top of roles. For example, an employee might only be allowed to access sensitive data during working hours from within the corporate network.

this question is wrong; if you are writing control mechanisms, you aren't writing policy, you are writing an SOP / implementation standard.

Consider having privileged access management as a subset of your access control. This helps better control access to critical resources. Limiting the number of users who have access to administrative functions increases system security while additional layers of protection mitigate data breaches by threat actors.

Access control mechanisms have become smart enough to determine "who can access what, how and when". There has recently been an increase in uptake in integration of Access control mechanisms with the DLP type platforms. So access control tries to cater to two important aspects "who" is trying to access "what". The "how" and "when" are determined based on that.

I'm still a fan of RBAC. (1) Identify the requirements of the business bearing the customer or clients, partners, etc in mind (2) Identify the required roles and ensure that dormant roles are disabled. (3) Define permissions on roles using POLP (4) Assign the defined roles to users (5) Periodically monitor/review the assigned roles to reflect employee movements and other changes. For instance, user access control audits/review may be carried out every 6 months depending on the needs of the organization. (6) Each business owner (maybe HOD) should be aware or update the IT about any changes. Such process should exist.

The principle of separation of duties involves dividing critical tasks among different individuals to prevent unchecked control. This strategy minimizes fraud and errors by ensuring no one person has complete authority. Security experts identify where this principle applies, set up access controls and workflows, and conduct regular audits to ensure its effectiveness. By enhancing transparency and accountability, separation of duties strengthens an organization's security.

Yes, to be successful with PoLP, we need these things to be followed religiously. - Segregation of Duties - Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) - MFA - Regular Access Review - Monitoring and Auditing

Implementing the principle of Separation of Duties (SoD) is essential in maintaining robust cloud security. In our organization, SoD is rigorously enforced to break down monolithic permissions, reducing the risk of internal threats, mistakes, or fraud. This strategy assigns each critical task to multiple parties, ensuring no single point of failure or abuse. For instance, a developer may have the ability to write code but not deploy it to a production environment. Instead, a separate operations team handles deployments, and their work is subject to peer review. This not only reduces risk but also allows for checks and balances at each step.

Segregation of duties is important but is often overlooked when people change roles. RBAC can help with this but not everyone uses RBAC. Processes must be put in place requiring a user access review when person changes roles. This should prevent situations where someone moves from accounts payable to accounts receivable and holds access to both (I've seen it happen).

Every user doesn't need to part of each group and every user doesn't need all level of access which he/she might not able to work on. Here's where the principle of separation of duties comes in place. Even every tool follow the same principle and create default roles in such a way that user can perform certain actions based on the assigned role. This mechanism can segregate the level of privileges have on the tool and specific users can perform specific tasks

Fine-grained access control systems, of course, are preferred from a security perspective, but challenging to implement and manage - with more specific permissions, explicit access to specific objects can be granted as needed, but are more difficult to maintain and more prone to sprawl and forgotten access rights. More and more solutioning will review each granted permission against use of that permission to objects requiring it within a defined time period. If a user hasn't required "admin" in a month, maybe that user shouldn't be an admin. This seems an elegant solution, assuming there are processes for provisioning "break glass" accounts.

In my 30 years of experience as a CISO, monitoring and auditing have been indispensable components in enforcing PoLP. Leveraging SIEM systems allows us to collect granular log data and correlate events for real-time alerting. This is complemented by User Behavior Analytics (UBA) to discern between legitimate actions and anomalous behavior that might indicate an internal or external threat. It's crucial to establish key performance indicators (KPIs) and key risk indicators (KRIs) that are regularly reported to senior management, thereby ensuring alignment with business objectives. These indicators provide the actionable metrics needed to fine-tune access controls and re-evaluate the sufficiency of current security measures.

Monitoring and auditing has 2 important aspects. First of all, monitoring has to be continuous with ideally a real-time (or near real-time) alerting mechanism in place. Secondly, a process/system in place to audit, triage and action any alert that needs attention. This is where tools like SIEM and SOAR come into consideration.

But Creating and managing access levels, permission sets and user accounts is not the end Goal. Its important to keep certain auditing, logging of events in place for any kind of analysis, troubleshooting purpose or else in case of any rollbacks. These events will let us know the changes made on the tool which helps us incase of any kind of incident

Using Active Directory Tiering is mandatory (in my opinion), but if you don't monitor Active Directory (AD) group changes (adding or removing users from groups), you are only halfway there. For example, if administrative users can add themselves to a tier that they should not have access to in the first place, monitoring AD group changes adds an additional layer of security.

The security landscape is constantly changing, so security awareness training should be an ongoing process. Awareness is the cornerstone of a secure user, but we must also keep in mind that users may be aware of the risks but simply do not care.

Education and training are often the first lines of defense. You can have robust technical controls, but if your workforce isn't educated about the importance of PoLP, those controls can easily be undermined. We incorporate PoLP into our onboarding process and reinforce it through mandatory annual cybersecurity training. This includes real-world examples and simulations that mimic potential scenarios employees may encounter. The most effective programs leverage a variety of training methods including e-learning modules, interactive webinars, and hands-on exercises. We also deploy periodic phishing tests to measure awareness and response.

Access tools by users is different in individual level and enterprise level. We should clearly define the roles and responsibilities and the policy should define the reasons for implementation of least security possible. Users should be educated and trained in such a way to follow best practices and inform respective personnel in case of any challenge or roadblock. This will make Infosec team's process smooth

Sorry to say, but education is overrated, it is something that continually has to be done or the end-user will forget and you will never hit 0% click rate. I personally find it better to use your resources to prepare for the event when the user clicks on malicious mails. The next point is that many people job within a organisation is to click on link and responds to mail received from outside the organization, so it security job to prepare for when a user clicks and reduce the effect of the attacker.

I use Just in Time (JiT) and Just enough access controls to enforce lease privilege. Defense in depth requires the proper tools used in the proper way. An example of this could be Microsoft Entra (IAM), Microsoft Defender for Cloud (Multi / Cloud Sec Posture Management), Microsoft 365 Defender (XDR), Microsoft Sentinel (SIEM / SOAR). You could use any combination of third party tools also. This covers the modern tech stack for defense in depth overall.

We all know from our experiences, that every single line of defense has its own limitations and challenges. Which is why having multiple lines of defense in the way of tools/platforms and technologies is essential to having a well-rounded approach to the security apparatus of the organization and ensure reduced managed threat landscape. The other leverage for security teams using DiD is having multiple mitigating controls in place in case of a targeted attack or wide-spread threat campaign.

I don’t understand the use of “redundancy” here. If it’s in the sense of data replication it’s probably related to the availability (non functional requirement) of the system. If it’s in a security sense, such as backups, I don’t see the relation to the PoLP

Defense in depth should be a core part of any good security strategy and program. Even with the best of controls in terms of either segregation of duties, gaps may occur inadvertently, and therefore, it pays to ensure that additional controls are implemented to mitigate any risks posed by such gaps. As an example, if segregation of duties isn't possible, or say is inefficient, then dual control mechanisms may be employed as a measure. Other measures such as risk based transaction monitoring would add a layer of additional control over and above any mechanisms used to segregate duties such as RBAC/ABAC.

Defense-in-Depth sollte man als grunds?tzliches Prinzip immer im Hinterkopf behalten. Im Bereich der Berechtigungsvergabe und -nutzung sind dort bspw. folgende Ma?nahmen denkbar: * Einsatz von Multi-Factor-Authentication (2FA, MFA) * Einsatz des Two-People-Principle für besonders kritische Aktionen * Zugriffsbschr?nkung auf bestimmte Netzbereiche oder Einsatz eines VPN * automatischer Entzug von Berechtigungen au?erhalb der Arbeitszeit / an Wochenenden / bei Abwesenheit * Etablierung eines dokumentierten Offboarding-Prozesses, der erst nach Entzug s?mtlicher Berechtigungen beendet wird

A frequently overlooked aspect of the principle of least privilege pertains to the time frame during which access is authorized for a specific job or task. This duration should precisely align with the necessary time for completing the job, without any unnecessary extension. The automation of access revocation is pivotal for the efficient enforcement of this security principle.

To ensure the principles of least privilege in their security policy, organizations are advised to use role-based access controls, stringent authentication, and regular permission reviews. Access should be based on actual responsibilities, with continuous monitoring and permission audits for a strong security posture. Training can establish a culture of security awareness, making least privilege a cornerstone in their protection framework.

Another important thing to consider is the "need to know" principle. Users should only be allowed access to data on a need to know basis ensured by the PoLP.

Having controls such as segregation of duties, RBAC, etc. is a good place to start. However, without regular controls reviews situations may arise where the control becomes ineffective. For example , user access and role reviews, you are likely to have individuals with accesses beyond what they need to perform their job.

I think the best advice I can give is to use common sense and listen to your users. If they find your security posture too cumbersome they will find ways around it! You need to adjust your posture and tooling to your user base. Education can help, but no amount of education will help if your users continuously feel unproductive due to your controls.